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1 Introduction
The modeling assumptions in the analysis of an economic problem highly depend on the
knowledge different agents have about the particular economic setting. In particular, the
assumptions made about common knowledge may strongly influence the outcome of an
economic analysis. However, the assumption that specific aspects of an economic setting
are common knowledge, may not always be plausible. This issue has been brought up in
the Wilson Doctrine stated by Robert Wilson in 1987:
“Game Theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequence of trading rules
that presumably are really common knowledge; it is deficient to the extent it assumes other features
to be common knowledge, such as one player’s probability assessment about another’s preferences
or information. I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive reductions
in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful analysis of practical problems.
Only by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality.”
This doctrine served as an inspiration for many economic papers, in particular, it was
pathbreaking for the literature on “Robustness”. Typically, in this literature at least one
agent faces uncertainty about the specification of one (or more) model component, i.e. the
agent faces a set of possible specifications instead of knowing that a particular specification
is correct. The research question is to find a strategy for this agent which ensures a certain
outcome independent of which specification from the set of possible specifications is the
correct one.
This thesis contains three papers which analyze such a research question in the context of
auctions. In the first paper the agent facing uncertainty has to delegate the execution of an
auction (or procurement auction) to an auctioneer whose particular choice of the auction
mechanism is not known to the agent. While the auctioneer may have a favorite bidder, the
goal of the agent is to ensure the absence of (positive or negative) discrimination. Common
examples for such agents are public institutions who have to procure a good. Thus, I
introduce the rule “imitation perfection” which ensures that every auction fulfilling this
rule is discrimination-free. As a consequence, the agent delegating the execution of the
auction can be sure that an auctioneer who is restricted to choose from imitation-perfect
auctions cannot discriminate.
In the second paper bidders participating in a first-price auction face uncertainty about
each other’s valuation distributions. This departs from the commonly used assumption in
economic literature on first-price auctions, that the valuation distributions are common
knowledge. However, I assume that the support and the mean of the valuation distributions
are common knowledge. In order to derive a strategy under this uncertainty, bidders form
a subjective belief which is a worst-case belief. That is, under all possible beliefs about
the other bidders’ valuation distributions, a bidder chooses the subjective belief which
minimizes her maximum possible utility.
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In the third paper I consider an abstract game of incomplete information and an agent
facing uncertainty about the other players’ strategies. This agent seeks to ensure a certain
utility independent of the other players’ strategies. In other words, this player applies the
maximin expected utility criterion. However, even under the given uncertainty the fact
that rational players interact strategically already contains information about the other
players’ possible strategies. Thus, I propose a decision criterion which works in two steps.
First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and restrict the set of the other players’
possible strategies to the set of rationalizable strategies. Second, I apply the maximin
expected utility criterion. As a result, one can derive recommendations for a player facing
strategic uncertainty. I apply this decision criterion to first-price auctions where the issue
of strategic uncertainty has received very little attention in economic literature so far.
In the following I provide for each paper a short summary of the motivation and the
main results.
The first paper ”Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in
procurement” is joint work Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko and Achim Wambach where
I am the first author.1 It investigates the question which rules prevent discrimination in
(procurement) auctions.
In its rules for public procurement, for example, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
demands that governments comply with “non-discrimination, equality of treatment,
transparency”. Furthermore, the WTO seeks “to avoid introducing or continuing
discriminatory measures that distort open procurement”’. These regulations imply that
the rules and procedures of a procurement process should treat suppliers equally.
However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that regulation requiring equal treatment of suppliers
on its own poses virtually no restriction on the ability to discriminate. In particular, such
symmetric auctions allow for perfect discrimination. That is, there exists a symmetric
auction and an equilibrium of this auction, in which the project is always awarded to a
particular bidder at the most favorable price. Hence, an auctioneer can favor a particular
bidder in the most extreme way without violating existing legal hurdles. This in turn
indicates that existing legal hurdles are not sufficient to prevent discrimination and that
regulators should not focus on rules that imply equal treatment but need to go further to
guarantee non-discriminatory outcomes. We seek to answer the question: How should a
non-discriminatory outcome be defined and what rules are sufficient in order to achieve
non-discriminatory outcomes?
We propose a simple rule named imitation perfection. Imitation perfection requires that
for any realization of bids and the resulting allocation and payments, every bidder had the
opportunity to imitate the allocation and payment of any other bidder. It ensures that in
every equilibrium, bidders with the same valuation distribution and the same valuation
1I presented this paper at the Ruhr Graduate School Doctoral Conference 2015 in Essen, at the Conference
of the Economic Design Society 2015 in Istanbul and at the Jornadas de Economía Industrial 2015 in
Alicante.
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earn the same expected utility. This result is robust to perturbations of homogeneity. This
means, if at any point of the domain the distribution functions of two bidders differ at
most by some constant, then the expected utilities of these two bidders with the same
valuation in the same imitation-perfect auction differ at most by a linear expression of this
constant regardless of the other bidders’ distributions.
If all bidders are homogeneous (i.e. have the same valuation distributions), revenue
and social surplus optimal auctions which are consistent with imitation perfection exist.
For heterogeneous bidders however, imitation perfection is incompatible with revenue and
social surplus optimization.
The second paper ”Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions” is joint work with
Vitali Gretschko.2 In this paper we analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in
which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution of their competitors’ valuations
is restricted to the support and the mean.
Consider a company participating in an auction or procurement auction. The knowledge
of the competitors’ valuation distributions is crucial for the derivation of an optimal
bidding strategy. Bidders go at great lengths in order to learn their competitors’ valuations.
For example, companies participating in procurement auctions reverse-engineer their
competitors’ products in order to learn about their production costs. However, such
learning has its limits and bidders may learn only some summary statistics of the underlying
distribution.
We consider a bidder in a first-price auction whose only information about the valuations
of her competitors is the support and the mean of their distribution. From our own
experience in consulting bidders in high-stakes auctions, it is a typical approach taken by
bidders to generate several scenarios with respect to the valuations of their competitors
and than to tailor their strategy to the worst-case. Thus, we assume that for a given bid
strategy of her competitors the bidder will tailor her bid to be optimal given that she
expects to face the worst distribution of her competitors’ valuations among all distributions
with the same support and mean. Worst distribution, in this context, means the bidder
will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected utility, given
her bid is an optimal reaction to the bids of her competitors induced by this distribution.
In other words, the worst-case belief of a bidder minimizes her maximum possible expected
utility.
We assume that every bidder in the auction follows a similar logic when preparing her
bid. In this case, a profile of bids is a worst-case belief equilibrium if each bidder chooses
her optimal bid given her valuation, the bidding strategy of her competitors, and the
2I presented this paper in 2016 at the Seminar for Applied Microeconomics at the University of Cologne,
at the Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2016 in Lisbon, at the Meeting of the Society for Social
Choice and Welfare 2016 in Lund, at the Conference of the Economic Design Society 2017 in York, at
the Congress of the EEA 2017 in Lisbon and at the Econometric Society European Winter Meeting
2017 in Barcelona.
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worst-case belief as defined above. In particular, this implies that the worst-case belief of a
bidder will crucially depend on her type (valuation) in a non-monotonic way.
Despite the absence of monotonicity in the beliefs, an ex-post efficient equilibrium exists.
The intuition is that the worst-case belief of a bidder with a given valuation, just puts
enough probability weight on lower valuations to induce that for this bidder it is optimal
to outbid each bidder with a lower valuation. The remaining probability weight is put on
the valuation of the bidder in question in order to minimize her winning probability. It
follows directly that such beliefs induce bidding that leads to an efficient allocation.
In the third paper “Strategies under distributional and strategic uncertainty” I propose
a decision criterion for players facing uncertainty about the other players’ strategies in a
game of incomplete information.3
In a game of incomplete information a player faces strategic uncertainty if the smallest
set of strategies such that the player knows that the other players’ true strategy is an
element of this set, is not a singleton. Strategic uncertainty can occur due to many reasons,
even if Nash equilibria exist. There may exist strategy profiles which formally fulfill the
conditions of a (Bayes-) Nash equilibrium. However, a player may be uncertain whether
her opponents employ such strategies and consequently face strategic uncertainty. As
stated by Pearce (1984), “some Nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all
reasonable strategy profiles are Nash equilibria”. Thus, a Nash equilibrium may not be
a suitable decision criterion, in particular, if multiple equilibria exist without one being
focal or salient or if players cannot communicate (Bernheim (1984)). Similarly, Renou
and Schlag (2010) argue that “common knowledge of conjectures, mutual knowledge of
rationality and utilities, and existence of a common prior” are required in order to justify
Nash equilibria as a solution concept.
Given strategic uncertainty in games of incomplete information, I propose a new decision
criterion which works in two steps: First, I assume common knowledge of rationality
and eliminate all actions which are not rationalizable. Afterwards, I apply the maximin
expected utility criterion. Using this decision criterion, I can derive recommendations for a
player facing strategic uncertainty. Furthermore, I analyze outcomes under the assumption
that every player in the game uses this criterion. In an extension I discuss how the proposed
decision criterion can be applied under the presence of both, distributional and strategic
uncertainty.
I apply the proposed decision criterion to first-price auctions where valuations are
independently and identically distributed according to a commonly known distribution
function. For every type there exists a unique highest belief-free rationalizable bid. A
bidder applying the decision criterion expects the other bidders to bid the highest belief-free
3I presented this paper in 2016 at the reading group seminar at Yale University, in 2017 at the DFG
research workshop at the University of Cologne, in 2018 at the BGSE Micro Workshop at the University
of Bonn and at the International Conference on Game Theory 2018 in Stony Brook.
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rationalizable bid given their valuation. As a consequence, the bidder never expects to win
against a bidder with an equal or higher valuation and therefore bids the highest belief-free
rationalizable bid of a lower type. If all bidders apply the criterion, it turns out that due
to the symmetry of beliefs about distributions and strategies, the higher the type of the
bidder, the higher is the type whose highest rationalizable bid maximizes her expected
utility. Therefore, every outcome under maximin strategies is efficient.
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2 Imitation perfection
Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment
of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that such regulation imposes
virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule
– imitation perfection – that restricts discrimination significantly. It ensures that
in every equilibrium bidders with the same valuation distribution and the same
valuation earn the same expected utility. If all bidders are homogeneous, revenue
and social surplus optimal auctions which are consistent with imitation perfection
exist. For heterogeneous bidders however, it is incompatible with revenue and
social surplus optimization. Thus, a trade-off between non-discrimination and
optimality exists.
JEL classification: D44, D73, D82, L13
Keywords: Discrimination, symmetric auctions, procurement regulation
2.1 Introduction
Regulators go to great lengths to prevent discrimination in procurement. In its rules for
public procurement, for example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) demands that
governments comply with “non-discrimination, equality of treatment, transparency and
mutual recognition”. Furthermore, the WTO seeks “to avoid introducing or continuing
discriminatory measures that distort open procurement.”4 The European Commission
requires public buyers to reach their decision “in full accordance with the principles of
equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.”5 These regulations imply that
the rules and procedures of a procurement process should treat suppliers equally. That
is, the rules of a procurement process must not depend on the identity of the suppliers.
However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that regulation requiring equal treatment of suppliers
on its own imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. In particular,
such symmetric auctions allow for perfect discrimination. That is, there exists a symmetric
auction and an equilibrium of this auction, in which the project is always awarded to a
particular bidder at the most favorable price. Hence, an auctioneer can favor a particular
bidder in the most extreme way without violating existing legal hurdles. This in turn,
indicates that existing legal hurdles are not sufficient to prevent discrimination and that
regulators should not remain satisfied with rules that imply equal treatment but need to
go further to guarantee discrimination-free outcomes.
This article is complementary to Deb and Pai (2017) and provides an answer to the
4See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Article 1), General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) (Article 2), and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) (Article 4) and World Trade Organization (2012).
5See Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public
service contracts.
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question: what rules are sufficient in order to achieve discrimination-free outcomes? We
propose a simple rule named imitation perfection. Imitation perfection requires that for
any realization of bids and the resulting allocation and payments, every bidder had the
opportunity to imitate the allocation and payment of any other bidder. We show that
imposing imitation perfection rules out perfect discrimination. This is due to the fact that
imitation perfection implies that every bidder could have won the auction at (almost) the
same price as the winning bidder by slightly outbidding the winning bidder. More generally,
in an imitation-perfect auction each bidder had the opportunity to come arbitrarily close
to the ex-post allocation and payment of every other bidder.
We denote an equilibrium as non-discriminatory if among a group of (possibly
heterogeneous) bidders a pair of homogeneous bidders (i.e. bidders with the same valuation
distribution) with the same valuation expects the same utility. Furthermore, we denote a
mechanism as discrimination-free if all of its equilibria are non-discriminatory. We show
that each imitation-perfect auction is discrimination-free.
For a pair of ex-ante heterogeneous bidders there is no clear definition of a
non-discriminatory equilibrium. We repurpose a measure of how two ex-ante heterogeneous
bidders’ distributions differ. We show that in an imitation-perfect auction the difference in
the expected utility of two ex-ante heterogeneous bidders with the same valuation is limited
by the measure of their heterogeneity. Thus, we show that the auction designer’s ability to
discriminate between (heterogeneous) bidders in an imitation-perfect auction is limited by
the heterogeneity between these bidders regardless of the other bidders’ distributions. In
particular, this implies that the result, that a pair of ex-ante homogeneous bidders expects
the same utility given their valuation, is robust with respect to small perturbations of
homogeneity, even if the heterogeneity among the other bidders is arbitrarily high.
Since we want a non-corrupt auctioneer to have enough freedom to choose the appropriate
auction mechanism, it is also useful to know whether an auctioneer can discriminate in
favor of a bidder by choosing among different imitation-perfect auctions. We introduce a
measure of the heterogeneity of all bidders and show that the expected utilities of a bidder
with a given valuation in two different imitation-perfect auctions is limited by the measure
of the heterogeneity of all bidders.
Usually, the beneficiary of a procurement organization (the people of a country, the CPO
of a company, or its shareholders) is responsible for thousands of different procurement
projects with thousands of different bidders. According to the European Commission, there
are over 250,000 public authorities involved in procurement in the EU. Delegating the
specific procurement project to a (potentially large) group of agents is therefore unavoidable.
Most of these agents will have the buyer’s best interest in mind and will use the optimal
procedures. There may, however, be some agents who are corrupt and/or favor certain
bidders.6 For the buyer, it is impossible to monitor each of the procurement transactions
and to check whether the implemented procedures were optimal. Thus, there is a need
6See Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2016) for some recent empirical evidence.
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to set general procurement rules. The set of procurement regulations should have the
following properties. Firstly, it should be easy to check whether these regulations have
been followed. In particular, this should not require knowledge of unobservables such
as subjective beliefs, or the use of complicated calculations such as equilibrium analyses.
Secondly, the regulation should restrict corrupt agents in a meaningful way. Finally,
honest agents should maintain enough freedom to enable them to implement the optimal
procedures. Imitation perfection has all of these desirable properties. Firstly, a quick look
at the rules of the particular auction is sufficient to verify whether the procurement process
satisfies imitation perfection. This is due to the fact that imitation perfection is a property
of the payment rule. Hence, the verification does not require information on any details of
the procurement project and can also be done ex-ante or ex-post without the calculation
of equilibria. Secondly, imitation perfection prevents corrupt agents from implementing
perfectly discriminatory outcomes and guarantees discrimination-free outcomes. Finally,
imitation perfection gives honest agents the opportunity to implement the efficient auction
as well as the revenue-optimal one if bidders are homogeneous. In this respect, ensuring
that the procurement mechanism is imitation-perfect comes at no costs if all bidders are
ex-ante homogeneous.
If bidders are ex-ante heterogeneous, imitation perfection is neither compatible with
social surplus maximization nor with revenue maximization. Efficiency requires that
bidders with the same valuation place the same bids. We will show that in imitation-perfect
auctions the payment of a winning bidder depends only on her own bid. This, however,
implies that if bidders with the same valuation have different beliefs about the bids they are
competing against, it cannot be optimal for these bidders to place the same bid. Applying a
similar reasoning to virtual valuations indicates that imitation perfection is not compatible
with revenue maximization in the case of ex-ante heterogeneous bidders. Thus, there is a
trade-off between non-discrimination and optimality.
Common auction formats which are compatible with imitation perfection are first-price
auctions and all-pay auctions with a reservation bid. A common auction format which is
ruled out by imitation perfection is the second-price auction. It cannot be imitation-perfect
since it has a perfect discrimination equilibrium where one bidder bids an arbitrarily high
bid b and all other bidders bid zero. It is also easy to see that none of the bidders bidding
zero can imitate the bidder bidding b since by bidding slightly above b, the imitating bidder
would have to pay b and not zero.
Relation to the literature
Only few papers deal with the question how general procurement rules must be designed
in order to achieve the goals of procurement organizations. Deb and Pai (2017) analyze
the common desideratum of “non-discrimination”. However, they show that even equal
and anonymous treatment of all bidders does not prevent discrimination. Gretschko and
Wambach (2016) analyze how far public scrutiny can help to prevent corruption and
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discrimination. They consider a setting in which the agent is privately informed about
the preferences of the buyer regarding the specifications of the horizontally differentiated
sellers. The agent colludes with one exogenously chosen seller. They show that in the
optimal mechanism the agent should have no discretion with respect to the probability
of the favorite seller winning, which in turn induces the agent to truthfully report the
preference of the buyer whenever his favorite seller fails to win. Moreover, they demonstrate
that intransparent negotiations have this feature of the optimal mechanism whenever the
favorite bidder fails to win the project and thus may outperform transparent auctions.
Even though we do not explicitly model an agent of the buyer, our model could easily be
extended by the introduction of an agent who, in exchange for a bribe, would bend the
rules of the mechanism in the most favorable way that is consistent with the procurement
regulations. Contrary to Gretschko and Wambach (2016), we do not focus on the ability of
the agent to manipulate the quality assessment of the buyer but rather on the ability of
an agent to design procurement mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, our article is
therefore the first to investigate the design of procurement regulations in the presence of
corruption and manipulation of the rules of the mechanism.7
In the majority of work on corruption in auctions, the ability of the agent to manipulate
is defined with respect to the particular mechanism. Either the agent is able to favor one
of the sellers within the rules of a particular mechanism (typically, bid-rigging in first-price
auctions) or the agent is able to manipulate the quality assessment of the sellers for a
particular mechanism. Examples of the first strand of literature include Arozamena and
Weinschelbaum (2009), Burguet and Perry (2007), Burguet and Perry (2009), Cai et al.
(2013), Compte et al. (2005), Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2010), and Menezes and Monteiro
(2006). Examples of the second strand include Burguet and Che (2004), Koessler and
Lambert-Mogiliansky (2013), and Laffont and Tirole (1991).
Finally, our article is related to the literature on mechanism design with fairness concerns.
As pointed out by Bolton et al. (2005) and Saito (2013) (among others), market participants
care about whether the rules governing a particular market are procedurally fair. Thus,
imitation perfection can be seen not only as a device to prevent favoritism and corruption,
but also as a possible way of ensuring that all equilibria of a particular mechanism yield
fair (discrimination-free) outcomes. Previous approaches to mechanism design with fairness
concerns in auctions and other settings include Bierbrauer et al. (2017), Bierbrauer and
Netzer (2016), Budish (2011), Englmaier and Wambach (2010) and Rasch et al. (2012).
7Previous work on mechanism design with corruption focused on the ability of the agent to manipulate the
quality assessment and the principal’s optimal reaction to this. In particular, the mechanism designed
by the principal is tailored to the situation at hand and does not imply general procurement regulations.
See Celentani and Ganuza (2002) and Burguet (2017) for details.
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2.2 Model
Environment Let {1, . . . , n} denote a set of risk-neutral bidders that compete for one
indivisible item. Bidder i’s valuation vi for the item is her private information and is drawn
independently from the interval [0, v] according to a continuous (i.e. atomless) differentiable
distribution function Fi with corresponding continuous density fi.8 The functions Fi are
common knowledge among the bidders. Denote by v−i ∈ [0, v]n−1 the vector containing all
the valuations of bidder i’s competitors. 9
Symmetric auctions We consider an auction mechanism in which all participants submit
bids bi ∈ R+ and the auction mechanism assigns the item based on these bids.10 An
auction mechanism is a double (x, p) of an allocation function x and a payment function p.





xn : b→ (x1, . . . , xn) with xi ∈ [0, 1],
∑
xi ≤ 1
determines for each participant the probability of receiving the item. For every number of
bidders n and for every vector of bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈
(
R+
)n the payment function
pn : b→ (p1, . . . , pn) with pi ∈ R+
determines each participant’s payment.11 We require that the payment function fulfills the
following minimal consistency condition.
For all bidders i and for all bid vectors (b1, . . . , bi, . . . bn) it holds that
pni (b1, . . . , bi, . . . bn) = pn+1i (b1, . . . , bi, . . . bn, 0) .12
In order to be able to properly account for ties throughout the paper, we introduce the
term winner with a tie. For a given vector of bids (bi, b−i) bidder i is a winner with a tie if
it holds that bi = max
j 6=i
bj and there exists a bidder k 6= i such that bk = max
j 6=k
bj .
8We allow for the fact that the support of Fi is a strict subset of [0, v].
9For a vector (v1, . . . , vn) we denote by v−i the vector (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn).
10The process of a procurement auction is mostly similar to the process of a sales auction, the only difference
being that the lowest bid is awarded the contract. The bidders do not have valuations for the good but
costs for fulfilling the contract. Due to the existence of the correspondence between selling auctions and
procurement auctions, the formal framework will be set up for selling auctions and we will use the term
auctions from now on. This has the advantage that most readers are more familiar with this notation.
11Since the Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and
public service contracts requires the auctioneers “to post in advance all decision criteria”, we define the
allocation and payment functions for all possible number of bidders. That is, the auctioneer has to
commit to an auction mechanism before observing the number of bidders. In the following all results
and definitions hold for all number of bidders.
12If the number of bidders is not relevant, we will omit the subscript indicating the number of bidders.
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A pure strategy of bidder i is a mapping
βi : [0, v]→ R+.
A (mixed) strategy of bidder i is a map from the set of valuations to the set of bid
distributions on R+:
βi : [0, v]→ ∆R+.
That is, for all valuations vi and all bids b, βi (vi) (b) denotes the probability that bidder
i places a bid lower or equal than b. Let supp (βi (vi)) denote the support of the bid
distribution βi (vi) and gβivi the corresponding density.
13
A tuple β = (β1, . . . , βn) of pure strategies constitutes an equilibrium of a mechanism




i (vi, b) =
∫
[0,v]n−1
[vi · xi (b, β−i (v−i))− pi (b, β−i (v−i))] f−i (v−i) dv−i.
A tuple β = (β1, . . . , βn) of (mixed) strategies constitutes an equilibrium of a mechanism if
for all i, for all vi ∈ [0, v] and for all bi ∈ supp (βi (vi)) the bid bi maximizes over all bids b
bidder i’s expected utility
U
β−i









vj (bj) f−i (v−i) dv−i
where supp (β−i (v−i)) =Xj 6=isupp (βj (vj)) . The expected equilibrium utility of bidder
i with valuation vi, which is given by Uβi (vi, bi) for bi ∈ supp (βi (vi)), is denoted by
Uβ (vi).14 In the remainder of this paper we allow for mixed strategies if we use the term
strategy or equilibrium. In particular, all results hold for mixed strategies unless specified
otherwise. However, we need the following assumption in order to be able to derive results:
Assumption 1. We assume that every equilibrium of an auction mechanism consists of
strategies which are continuous except a set of valuations which has measure zero.
Current public procurement regulation aimed at preventing discrimination requires equal
treatment of bidders. The restrictiveness of this requirement is analyzed by Deb and Pai
(2017), who provide the following definition.
13A pure strategy can be interpreted as distribution of bids which puts probability weight 1 on one bid.
We abuse notation since in the case of a pure strategy, βi (vi) denotes an element in R+ while in the
case of a (mixed) strategy βi (vi) denotes an element in ∆R+. However, in the following it will be clear
whether βi is a pure or a mixed strategy.
14In the following we will use the notation Uβ (vi) or Uβ (vi, bi) in order to denote bidder i’s equilibrium
utility. We will use the notation Uβ−i (vi, b) in order to indicate that bidder i deviates from equilibrium
to bid b.
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Definition 1 (Symmetric auction). A symmetric auction with reservation bid r is an
auction mechanism which fulfills the following two conditions:
(i) The highest bidder wins, that is the allocation is given by
xi (bi, b−i) =

1
#{j∈{1,...,n}:bj=bi} if bi ≥ maxj 6=i {bj , r}
0 otherwise,
where r is a reservation bid.15
(ii) The payment does not depend on the identity of the bidder and every bidder is treated
equally. Formally, let pin be a permutation of the elements 1, . . . , n. In a symmetric
auction, it holds true for all b = (b1, . . . , bn) that
pi
(
bpin(1), . . . , bpin(i−1), bpin(i), bpin(i+1), . . . , bpin(n)
)
= ppin(i) (bi, b−i) .
In a symmetric auction, the highest bidder wins and the payment function is anonymous.
Hence, a bidder’s payment depends only on the bids and not on her identity. Moreover, a
permutation of all bids would lead to the same permutation of payments and allocations.
In addition to the requirements of a symmetric auction, we assume that an auction
mechanism fulfills some monotonicity conditions. First, we require that the payment of a
bidder is non-decreasing in her own bid. Second, we require that conditional on winning
or losing the payment of a bidder is non-decreasing in the other bidders’ bids. Third, we
require that the payment of a winning bidder is strictly increasing in at least one component
of the bid vector.
Assumption 2. We assume that the payment function of every auction mechanism is
monotone. We call a payment function p monotone if for every bidder i and for each vector
of bids (bi, b−i) the following holds:
(i) The payment of bidder i is non-decreasing in her bid, i.e. for all b′i with bi ≤ b′i it
holds that





(ii) Given that a bidder is losing or winning, her payment is non-decreasing in the other
bidders’ bids. That is, if bi 6= max
j 6=i
bj, then for every bid b′j with bj ≤ b′j it holds that
pi
(








and if bi = max
j 6=i
bj, then for every bid b′j with bj ≤ b′j ≤ bi it holds that
pi
(









15Throughout the paper we assume that a reservation bid r is given unless specified otherwise.
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(iii) If i is a winning bidder, her payment is strictly increasing in at least one component
of the bid vector (bi, b−i). That is, if bi ≥ max
j 6=i
{bj , r}, then there exist a bid bj for
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that for all b′j with b′j > bj and bi ≥ b′j if j 6= i, it holds that





We impose these conditions in order to ensure equilibrium existence. If the payment of
a bidder was strictly decreasing in her own bid, she would place arbitrarily high bids. A
similar reasoning applies to the second and third condition. Consider an auction with two
bidders who both have a valuation of v.16 The payment rule is defined by
pi (bi, bj) =
max {bi −A · bj , 0} if bi > bj0 if bi < bj
for A > 0. An equilibrium does not exist because bidders want to place arbitrarily high
bids.17 Finally, consider an auction in which a bidder pays a constant independent of her
bid, which contradicts the third condition. Again this bidder has an incentive to place
arbitrarily high bids and an equilibrium does not exist. Although requiring a monotone
payment function is a technical assumption, it is not restrictive in the sense that it does
not rule out any of the auction formats that are popular in practice, like the first-price
auction or the second-price auction.18
Moreover, we assume that every bidder has the possibility to achieve at least an expected
utility of zero by bidding below the reservation bid or bidding zero.
Assumption 3. We assume that for every bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and every bid vector
(bi, b−i) with bi < r or bi = 0 it holds that
pi (bi, b−i) = 0.
2.2.1 Discrimination-free auctions
The main insight of Deb and Pai (2017) is that even though the rules of a symmetric
auction treat all bidders equally, mechanisms with discriminating outcomes can still be
implemented. In particular, they demonstrate that almost every reasonable mechanism
has an implementation as a symmetric auction. Thus, requiring a symmetric auction, i.e.
equal treatment, is not an effective anti-discrimination measure. To get an idea of the
discrimination that is possible in symmetric auctions, consider the following example.
16In the following we will use the terms auction and auction mechanism interchangeably.
17Assume there would exist an equilibrium where bidder 1 bids b1 and bidder 2 bids b2. W.l.o.g. it holds
that b2 > b1. It must hold that v − b2 +Ab1 ≥ 0. It follows that v − b1 +Ab2 > 0. Thus, bidder 1 has
an incentive to deviate to a bid above b2.
18Note that Deb and Pai (2017) and Example 1 show that symmetric auctions with a monotone payment
function do not prevent perfect discrimination as defined in Definition 2.
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Example 1. An agency is in charge of running an auction among n bidders with valuations
in [0, 1]. One of the bidders, say bidder 1, has close ties to the agency. Thus, the agency
does not aim at maximizing revenue but instead seeks to maximize the utility of bidder
1. In this case, the agency can implement the following symmetric auction. If only one
bidder bids a strictly positive amount, all payments are zero. If more than one bidder bids
a strictly positive amount, all bidders who bid a strictly positive amount pay their own
bid plus (a penalty of) one. This auction has a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in undominated
strategies in which bidder 1, irrespective of her valuation, bids some strictly positive amount
b1 > 0. All other bidders bid zero, irrespective of their valuations. In this case, bidder 1
receives the object with probability one and pays nothing.
We call an equilibrium a perfect discrimination equilibrium if one bidder wins the auction
with probability one independent of her valuation and pays nothing.
Definition 2 (Perfect discrimination equilibrium). An equilibrium (β1, . . . , βn) of an
auction mechanism (x, p) is called a perfect discrimination equilibrium if there exists a
bidder i such that for any vector of valuations (v1, . . . vn) and every vector of bids (b1, . . . , bn)
such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, bj ∈ supp (βj (vj)), it holds that:
xi (b1, . . . , bn) = 1
pi (b1, . . . , bn) = 0.
Given that symmetric auctions do not prevent perfect discrimination, the aim of this
article is to provide a simple extension to the existing rules that restricts discrimination in
a meaningful way. A minimum requirement for the extension is that it rules out perfect
discrimination equilibria.19 In addition, we demand that in a non-discriminatory equilibrium
ex-ante homogeneous bidders with the same valuation expect the same utility. We denote
a symmetric auction as discrimination-free if all of its equilibria are non-discriminatory.
Definition 3 (Discrimination-free auction). An equilibrium (β1, . . . , βn) of a symmetric
auction is called non-discriminatory if for all bidders i, j with Fi = Fj it holds for all
v ∈ [0, v] that
Uβi (v) = U
β
j (v) .
A symmetric auction is called discrimination-free if all equilibria of this auction are
non-discriminatory.
19Note that Deb and Pai (2017) propose adjustments of symmetric auctions that may restrict the class
of implementable mechanisms. In particular, they consider auction mechanisms with inactive losers,
continuous payment rules, monotonic payment rules and ex-post individual rationality. However, it is
easy to see that none of these adjustments prevents the existence of perfect discrimination equilibria.
This is due to the fact that any of these adjustments allows for the implementation of the second-price
auction. The second-price auction has perfectly-discriminating equilibria in which one of the bidders
bids bi ≥ v and all other bidders bid zero.
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2.3 Imitation perfection
In what follows we introduce a simple extension of the existing symmetric rules which
require equal treatment. We call this extension imitation perfection and show that all
imitation-perfect auctions are discrimination-free.
Imitation perfection requires that for any realization of bids each bidder could have
achieved the same allocation and payment as any other bidder by bidding slightly higher
than a bidder with a higher bid and bidding slightly lower than a bidder with a lower bid.
Definition 4 (Imitation perfection). A symmetric auction (x, p) is imitation-perfect if for
all bidders i, all bids bi, and all  > 0
(i) For all vectors of bids
(
bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
such that bidder i is not a winner with a tie
and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with bi > bj there exists a bid b > bi such that∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pj (bi, b, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < .
That is, all bidders can imitate the allocation and payment of a higher bidder who is
not a winner with a tie by bidding slightly higher.
(ii) For all vectors of bids
(
bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with bi < bj there
exists a bid b < bi such that∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pj (bi, b, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < .20
That is, all bidders can imitate the allocation and payment of a lower bidder by
bidding slightly lower.
In an imitation-perfect auction every bidder could have imitated the (ex-post) allocation
and payment of each bidder who is not a winner with a tie. By bidding slightly above a
winner with a tie a bidder would become the unique winner and therefore cannot imitate
the allocation and payment of a bidder with tie. We discuss the payments of winners with
a tie further below.
A strength of our proposed rule is that the verification of whether an auction is
imitation-perfect can be done without knowledge about the environment, such as the
beliefs of the bidders or the selection of a particular equilibrium. A simple verification of
the payment rule is sufficient.
In order to gain some intuition for the definition of imitation perfection, we consider the
following examples.
Example 2. Consider the mechanism proposed in Example 1. Recall that bidder 1 is the
favorite bidder and if more than one bidder places a strictly positive bid, all bidders who
20It is sufficient to consider only the payment function, because in a symmetric auction the allocation rule
is fixed.
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placed a strictly positive bid pay their bid plus a penalty of one. This mechanism is not
imitation-perfect. For b1 > 0 it holds that
p1 (b1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0.
Bidder 1 wins the auction and pays nothing. For every bj > b1 it holds that
pj (b1, 0, . . . , 0, bj , 0, . . . 0)− p1 (b1, 0, . . . , 0) > 1,
which implies that bidder 1 cannot be imitated.
Example 3. Consider a second-price auction with two bidders. If bidder 1 is bidding
b1 = 1 and bidder 2 is bidding b2 = 0, bidder 1 will receive the object and pay a price of
zero. Bidder 2 cannot imitate this outcome. By bidding above 1, bidder 2 would win the
object but her payment would be 1.
Example 4. Consider a first-price auction with two bidders. If bidder 1 is bidding b1 = 1
and bidder 2 is bidding b2 = 2, bidder 2 will receive the object and pay a price of 2 while
bidder 1 pays zero. By placing a bid marginally higher than 2 bidder 1 can imitate bidder
2’s allocation and payment. Bidder 2 can imitate bidder 1’s allocation and payment by
placing a bid marginally lower than 1.
In the following, we will present the properties of an imitation-perfect auction and of its
outcomes. We start with a property of imitation perfection which we need for subsequent
proofs:
Proposition 1. In an imitation-perfect auction the payment of a bidder depends only on
her own bid conditional on winning or losing. That is, for all bidders i the following holds
true:
(i) For all bid vectors
(
bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
such that bi > max
j 6=i















(ii) For all bid vectors
(
bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
such that bi < max
j
bj it holds for all bids b′j with
bi < max{b′j , b−(i,j)} that
pi
(









The proof is relegated to Appendix 2.7.2.
As indicated above, we have to discuss the payments of winners with a tie. Proposition
1 implies that if there is a unique highest bidder i with bid bi, then her payment depends
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only on her bid. That is, there exists a function pwin such that bidder i’s payment is equal
to pwin (bi). If bidder i is a losing bidder, then there exists a function plose such that her
payment is equal to plose (bi). Since the allocation rule breaks ties randomly, an analogous
property should hold for the payment rule. We can use the functions pwin and plose in
order to define such a payment rule. This is formalized in the following assumption.
Assumption 4. We assume that for every bidder i and for every vector of bids
(bi, b−i)
such that bi = max
j 6=i
bj and k = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | bj = bi}, i.e. i is a bidder with a tie
bidding bi, the payment of bidder i is given by









where for every bi > 0, pwin (bi) is defined by
pwin (bi) = pi (bi, 0, . . . , 0)
and for every bi, plose (bi) is defined by
plose (bi) = pi (bi, bj , 0 . . . , 0)
for any bj with bj > bi.
It follows from Proposition 1 that the definition of the payment for a bidder who is
winner with a tie and the definitions of pwin and plose are well-defined.
We have shown that the payment of a bidder who is not a winner with a tie does not
depend on lower bids. In addition, we state the following properties of imitation perfection
that will be useful in the sections to follow. They also serve as necessary and sufficient
conditions for imitation perfection. First, we need the following definition.
Definition 5 (Bid-determines-payment auction). A symmetric auction is a bid-determines-
payment auction if the payment of every bidder depends only on whether or not she wins
and on her bid. Formally, an auction satisfies the bid-determines-payment rule if there
exist functions pwin, plose : R+ → R+ such that for bidder i her payment can be written as
pi (bi, b−i) = xi (bi, b−i) pwin (bi) + [1− xi (bi, b−i)] plose (bi) .
Note that the functions pwin and plose are identical for every number of bidders.
Proposition 2. An auction is imitation-perfect if and only if the following holds true:
(i) (Bid-determines-payment) The auction is a bid-determines-payment auction.
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(ii) (Continuity) If bidder i is not a winner with a tie, her payment is right-continuous in
her bid. That is, for every bidder i, for every bid vector (bi, b−i) such that it follows
from bi = max
j 6=i
bj that bi > max
j 6=i
bj, and for every  > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that
for all b′i with bi < b′i < bi + δ it holds that
|pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)− pi
(
b1, . . . , b
′
i, . . . , bn
) | < .
Moreover, if a bidder does not place the highest bid, then her payment is left-continuous
in her bid. That is, for every bidder i, for every bid vector such that bi < max
j 6=i
bj,
and for every  > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for all b′i with bi − δ < b′i < bi it
holds that
|pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)− pi
(
b1, . . . , b
′
i, . . . , bn
) | < .
The proof is relegated to Appendix 2.7.3.
We continue with the results specifying the desirable properties imitation-perfect auctions
have. We illustrated in Examples 2 and 3 how imitation perfection can prevent perfect
discrimination equilibria. The following proposition states that imitation perfection prevents
in general the existence of perfect discrimination equilibria in symmetric auctions.
Proposition 3. If there are at least two bidders i and j who have a strictly positive
valuation with a strictly positive probability, then an imitation-perfect auction does not
have a perfect discrimination equilibrium.
We illustrate a sketch of the proof for the case of pure strategies. Assume that there exists
a perfect discrimination equilibrium in which bidder i wins the auction with probability 1
and pays zero. We show in Lemma 6 in Appendix 2.7.4 that every equilibrium bidding
strategy is non-decreasing. Thus, the highest bid placed by bidder i is given by βi (v).
Assume that bidder j has a strictly positive valuation vj . Due to imitation perfection, for
every  > 0 there exists a bid b > βi (v) such that
|pi
(











for every vector of valuations v−i. Since in equilibrium bidder i always pays zero, this
implies that by bidding b, bidder j would win the auction with probability 1 and pay
an amount which is strictly lower than her valuation. Therefore, she has an incentive to
deviate. Hence, a perfect discrimination equilibrium cannot exist in an imitation-perfect
auction, because every bidder j 6= i would have an incentive to deviate whenever she has a
strictly positive valuation for the good. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 2.7.5.
We have established that imitation perfection fulfills the minimum requirement of
preventing perfect discrimination. The following theorem states that imitation-perfect
auctions are discrimination- free.
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Theorem 1. A symmetric and imitation-perfect auction is discrimination-free.
Intuitively, Theorem 1 builds on the fundamental idea of imitation perfection that
bidders can imitate the allocation and payment of the other bidders that have outbid them.
Formally, we prove that homogeneous bidders follow identical strategies. This ensures that
ex-ante homogeneous bidders with the same valuation have the same expected utility. In
order to do so, we adapt a technique of Chawla and Hartline (2013). They show that
for a given auction, if some interval [z, z] satisfies utility crossing, that is, if for some
bidders i and j it holds that Uβi (z) ≥ Uβj (z) and Uβj (z) ≥ Uβi (z) and βj (v) ≥ βi (v) for
all v ∈ [z, z], then the strategies of bidder i and bidder j must be identical on this interval.
If there is an interval of valuations of positive measure such that the equilibrium prescribes
that one bidder strictly outbids the other, we apply imitation perfection at the endpoints
of this interval in order to demonstrate that this interval satisfies utility crossing. Due
to imitation perfection, at the upper endpoint z a deviating bid for bidder i exists, such
that bidder i can achieve the same expected utility as bidder j by bidding slightly higher
than bidder j. Bidder i’s utility in equilibrium cannot, therefore, be lower than bidder j’s
utility as bidder i would otherwise have an incentive to deviate. Similarly, bidder j can
achieve the same expected utility as bidder i at the lower endpoint z. The formal proof is
relegated to Appendix 2.7.6.
2.4 Imitation perfection with homogeneous bidders
In this section we present further results for the case that bidders are ex-ante homogeneous.
Bidders are ex-ante homogeneous if all bidders draw their valuations from the same
distribution, i.e. it holds for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . n} that Fi = Fj . We provide conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in imitation-perfect auctions. Furthermore, we
show that imitation perfection is compatible with revenue and social surplus maximization.
Proposition 4. Assume that the bid spaces of all bidders are compact intervals, i.e. every
bidder is allowed to submit bids in some interval [0, b]. Then the following holds true in an
imitation-perfect auction:
(i) There exists an equilibrium.
(ii) If bidders are ex-ante homogeneous, then there exists a unique non-decreasing
equilibrium in pure strategies.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 2.7.7.
If bidders are ex-ante homogeneous, the revenue-optimal auction can be implemented as
a first-price auction, which is an imitation-perfect auction, with an appropriate reservation
bid (see Krishna 2009). Similarly, the efficient auction can be implemented as a first-price
auction without a reservation bid. Thus, it follows from Proposition 2 that there exist
19
imitation-perfect auctions which are revenue and social surplus optimal, as stated in the
following Corollary.
Corollary 1. If bidders are ex-ante homogeneous, the following holds true:
(i) There exists a symmetric and discrimination-free auction that is revenue-optimal
among all incentive compatible mechanisms.
(ii) There exists a symmetric and discrimination-free auction that is social surplus
maximizing among all incentive compatible mechanisms.
Thus, the implementation of a discrimination-free auction is not in conflict with the
aims of revenue or social surplus maximization if all bidders are ex-ante homogeneous.
2.5 Imitation perfection with heterogeneous bidders
In this section we analyze the extent to which imitation perfection limits discrimination
between bidders that are ex-ante heterogeneous and examine whether imitation perfection
is compatible with revenue and social surplus maximization.
If bidders are ex-ante heterogeneous it is not reasonable to require that bidders with the
same valuation earn the same expected utility in equilibrium. The heterogeneity implies
that different bidders face different degrees of competition even if they have the same
valuation.
Nevertheless, we will show that even in settings with ex-ante heterogeneous bidders
imitation perfection effectively limits the possible extent of discrimination. In order to
provide a precise and tractable measure of heterogeneity, we follow Fibich et al. (2004).










|Fi (v)−H (v) |
Hi (v) = (Fi (v)−H (v)) /δ,
for any set of distribution functions F1, . . . , Fn defined on some interval [0, v] and for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the distribution function Fi can be decomposed in the following way
Fi (v) = H (v) + δHi (v) (1)
where H (0) = 0, H (v) = 1, Hi (0) = Hi (v) = 0, |Hi| ≤ 1 on [0, v] and δ ≥ 0. Among all
H, {Hi}i and δ which allow such a decomposition, δ as defined above is minimal. The
parameter δ formalizes the degree of heterogeneity between all bidders.
In particular, by defining






|Fk (v)−H (v) |
Hk (v) = (Fk (v)−H (v)) /δi,j for k ∈ {i, j}
for every pair of bidders i and j it holds that
Fi (v) = H (v) + δi,jHi (v) , Fj (v) = H (v) + δi,jHj (v) (2)
where H (0) = 0, H (v) = 1, Hk (0) = Hk (v) = 0, and |Hk| ≤ 1 on [0, v] for k ∈ {i, j}.
Analogously, among all H, Hi, Hj and δi,j which allow such a decomposition, δi,j as defined
above is minimal. The parameter δi,j formalizes the degree of heterogeneity between two
specific bidders i and j.
The following proposition provides an upper bound on the difference in expected utilities
of two bidders with the same valuation in an imitation-perfect auction. We will need the
condition pwin (b) ≥ plose (b) for all b ≥ 0. In order to gain some intuition for why this
condition is necessary, consider an imitation-perfect auction with two bidders i and j. If
both bidders adopt the same strictly increasing strategy β, then for every valuation v it
holds that
Uβi (v)− Uβj (v) = Fj (v)
(
v − pwin (β (v))
)





v − pwin (β (v))
)
− (1− Fi (v)) plose (β (v))
)
≤ (Fi (v) + δi,j)
(
v − pwin (β (v))
)





v − pwin (β (v))
)




v − pwin (β (v)) + plose (β (v))
)
.
Thus, in order to find an upper bound of the difference in the bidders’ expected utility





which can be achieved by imposing the condition pwin (b) ≥ plose (b) for all b ≥ 0.
Proposition 5. In an imitation-perfect auction for every equilibrium β = (β1, . . . , βn),
for every pair of bidders i, j and for every valuation v it holds that
|Uβi (v)− Uβj (v) | ≤ δi,j + δi,j (v − v)
if it holds for all b ∈ R+ that pwin (b) ≥ plose (b) where δi,j is defined as in (2). That is,
the difference in the expected utilities of two bidders with the same valuation in the same
imitation-perfect auction is given by at most δi,j + δi,j (v − v) independent of the degree of
heterogeneity of the other n− 2 bidders.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 2.7.8.
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Theorem 1 states that in an imitation-perfect auction two ex-ante homogeneous bidders
with the same valuation expect the same utility even if the heterogeneity among the other
bidders is arbitrarily strong. Proposition 5 implies that this finding is robust towards small
pertubations of homogeneity, which is illustrated in the following example.
Example 5. Consider a first-price auction with two bidders. The valuation of bidder 1
is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1000], the valuation of bidder 2 is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1001]. Following Krishna (2009), one can derive the unique
equilibrium and calculate the expected utilities as a function of a bidder’s valuation. The
difference in the expected utilities of the two bidders is maximized at v∗ ≈ 700. The upper
bound provided in Proposition 5 is given by
δv + δ (v − v) = 10011001 +
1001− 700
1001 ≈ 1.302.
This is equal to one half percent of the utility expected by bidder i and j at v∗.
While Proposition 5 shows that there is little room for discrimination in imitation-perfect
auctions if bidders are ex-ante almost homogeneous, it is obvious that extreme heterogeneity
results in outcomes that are arbitrarily close to perfect discrimination. This is illustrated
in the following example.
Example 6. Consider a first-price auction with two bidders. Bidder 1’s valuation is drawn
from the interval [0, 1], whereas bidder 2’s valuation is drawn from the interval [0, v] with
v >> 1. Following Krishna (2009), one can derive the unique equilibrium and show that
for every v ∈ (0, 1] it holds that U2 (v) > U1(v). Figure 1 illustrates the expected utilities
of bidder 1 (blue line) and bidder 2 (orange line) for v ∈ [0, 1] and v = 100.
Figure 1: U1 (v), U2 (v)





Even if bidder 1 has a valuation of 1, bidder 2 will have a higher valuation with a
probability of 0.99. In contrast to that, bidder 2 can be sure to have the higher valuation if her
valuation is 1. This example highlights, that if bidders are extremely ex-ante heterogeneous,
their expected utilities given the same valuation can also differ extremely.
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So far, we have analyzed the auctioneer’s possibility to discriminate between two
heterogeneous bidders in the same imitation-perfect auction. Now we turn our attention
to the auctioneer’s possibility to increase a favorite bidder’s expected utility by choosing
among different imitation-perfect auctions. If bidders are ex-ante heterogeneous, the
revenue equivalence theorem does not hold. Hence, the expected utility of a bidder with
a given valuation can differ between different imitation-perfect auctions. Proposition
6 demonstrates that the possible extent of discrimination is limited by the degree of
heterogeneity. If the heterogeneity between bidders is small, so is the extent to which the
auctioneer can discriminate between them by choosing different auction formats.
Since we make use of the Revenue Equivalence Principle and a Lemma in Fibich et al.
(2004) in the proof of the following Proposition, the following holds true for all pure strictly
increasing and differentiable equilibria in imitation-perfect auctions with reservation bid
zero.
Proposition 6. Let A and B be imitation-perfect auctions with reservation bid zero and β
be an equilibrium of A and β′ be an equilibrium of B. If the equilibria β and β′ are in pure
strictly increasing and differentiable strategies, then for every bidder i and every valuation
v it holds that ∣∣∣Ui (v)β − Ui (v)β′ ∣∣∣ ≤ 2 (δv + δ (v − v)) +O (δ2) .
That is, for every bidder i with a given valuation v the difference in the expected utilities
in any equilibrium of A and B is given by at most





The proof is relegated to Appendix 2.7.9.
If the ex-ante heterogeneity among bidders is sufficiently pronounced, an auctioneer
who knows the distributions of the bidders is able to substantially influence her favorite
bidder’s expected utility by choosing among imitation-perfect auctions. We illustrate the
auctioneer’s possibility to influence her favorite bidder’s expected utility with the following
example.
Example 7. Consider an auctioneer who has to conduct an imitation-perfect auction
with two bidders. The valuation of bidder 1 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 5]
and the valuation of bidder 2 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 10]. Assume that
the auctioneer can either conduct a frist-price auction or an all-pay auction. Following
Krishna (2009) and Amann and Leininger (1996), we can compute the unique equilibrium
bidding functions for both bidders in both auctions. If the auctioneer wants to favor bidder
1, he will conduct a first-price auction. Independent from her valuation, bidder 1 expects a
weakly higher utility in a first-price auction than in an all-pay auction. Figure 2 illustrates
the difference in the expected utility of bidder 1 in the first-price and the all-pay auction
for all possible valuations.
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Figure 2: UFPA1 (v)− UAPA1 (v)







Notes. The difference in the expected utilities UFPA1 (v)− UAPA1 (v) obtains its
maximum valuation of 0.126 at v = 2.9. In this case, bidder 1’s utility in a
first-price auction is 39 percent larger than in an all-pay auction.
Vice versa, the auctioneer can favor bidder 2 by conducting an all-pay auction. Figure 3
illustrates that, independent of her valuation, bidder 2 expects a (weakly) larger utility in
an all-pay auction.
Figure 3: UAPA2 (v)− UFPA2 (v)






Notes. The difference in the expected utilities UAPA2 (v)− UFPA2 (v) obtains its
maximum valuation of 0.252 at v = 3.4. In this case, bidder 2’s utility in an
all-pay auction is 24 percent larger than in a first-price auction.
Finally, we will show that imitation perfection is not compatible with efficiency and
revenue maximization if bidders are ex-ante heterogeneous.
Proposition 7. Assume there exists at least one pair of bidders i, j such that
∫ v
0 Fi (z) dz 6=∫ v
0 Fj (z) dz, then there does not exist an efficient equilibrium in any imitation-perfect
auction.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 2.7.10.
In symmetric auctions efficiency requires that bidders with the same valuation place the
same bid. As a consequence, ex-ante heterogeneous bidders face different bid distributions.
The winner’s payment in an imitation-perfect auction cannot depend on others bidders’
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bids. This implies that following the same bidding strategy cannot be optimal for ex-ante
heterogeneous bidders. Applying a similar reasoning to virtual valuations indicates that
imitation perfection is not compatible with revenue maximization in the case of ex-ante
heterogeneous bidders.
Proposition 8. For every bidder i let Vi (vi) = 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) , that is Vi (vi) denotes the virtual





V −1i (Vj (z))
)
dz 6= ∫ v0 Fj (V −1j (Vi (z))) dz. In this case, all equilibria of
an imitation-perfect auction are not revenue-maximizing. That is, the object is not always
allocated to the bidder with the highest virtual valuation.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 2.7.10.
2.6 Conclusion
This article demonstrates that the existing rules imposed to prevent discrimination in
procurement, which require equal treatment of bidders, are not sufficient to prevent even
perfect discrimination. We introduce a simple extension to the existing rules called imitation
perfection. Imitation perfection requires that for any realization of bids and the resulting
allocation and payments, every bidder had the opportunity to imitate the allocation and
payment of every other bidder. Imitation perfection can be easily verified without specific
knowledge of details of the environment and guarantees discrimination-free outcomes. If
all bidders are ex-ante homogeneous, both an imitation-perfect revenue optimal auction
and an imitation-perfect social surplus optimal auction exist. If bidders are heterogeneous,
imitation perfection still ensures that the difference in the expected utilities of two bidders
with the same valuation is limited by the heterogeneity of their valuation distributions.
Moreover, the difference in the expected utilities of a bidder with a given valuation in two
different imitation-perfect auctions is limited by the heterogeneity of all bidders.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Definition of expected allocation and payment
If (β1, . . . , βn) is an equilibrium of an auction mechanism (x, p), then the expected (interim)












pi (bi, β−i (v−i)) f−i (v−i) d (v−i) . (4)
Similarly as in the notation for expected utility, we will use the notation Xβi (vi) or
Xβi (βi (vi)) in order to denote the equilibrium allocation of bidder i with valuation vi. We
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will use the notation Xβ−ii (b) in order to indicate that bidder i deviated from equilibrium
to bid b. The analogous notation holds for the expected payment.
2.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. As a preparation for this proof we will need four lemmas. The statements in these
lemmas can be (informally) summarized as follows:
• Lemma 1: The payment of a bidder does not depend on lower bids.
• Lemma 2: The payment of a bidder does not depend on higher bids.
• Lemma 3: The payment of a bidder who is not a winner with a tie is right-continuous
in her bid.
• Lemma 4: The payment of a bidder who is not the highest bidder is left-continuous
in her bid.
We will formally state and prove the four lemmas and then continue with the proof of
Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. In an imitation-perfect auction for every bidder i and for every pair of vectors(








where bi > bj, bi > b′j and bidder i is not a winner with a tie, it holds that
pi
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be bid vectors where bidder i is not a winner
with a tie and it holds bi > bj , bi > b′j . Imitation perfection implies that for every  > 0
there exist bids b and b′ with b > bi, b
′
> bi such that∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pj (bi, b, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < 2 (5)
and ∣∣∣pi (bi, b′j , b−(i,j))− pj (bi, b′, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < 2 .
W.l.o.g. it holds that b ≤ b′. Since the payment function of a bidder is non-decreasing in






























Due to the triangle inequality, it follows from (5) and (6) that∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pi (bi, b′j , b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < .
Since  can be chosen arbitrarily, it holds that
pi
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Lemma 2. In an imitation-perfect auction for every bidder i and for every pair of vectors(








where bi < bj and bi < b′j, it holds that
pi
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i.e. the payment of a bidder does not depend on the bids of competitors who placed higher
bids.
Proof. The proof works analogously to the proof of Lemma 1. Let
(







be bid vectors such that bi < bj and bi < b′j . Imitation perfection implies
that for every  > 0 there exist bids b and b′ with b < bi, b′ < bi such that∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pj (bi, b, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < 2
and ∣∣∣pi (bi, b′j , b−(i,j))− pj (bi, b′, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < 2 . (7)
W.l.o.g. it holds that b ≤ b′. Since the payment function of a bidder is non-decreasing in
the other bidders’ bids, it holds that
pi
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Due to the triangle inequality, it follows from (7) and (8) that∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pi (bi, b′j , b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < .
Since  can be chosen arbitrarily, it holds that
pi
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Lemma 3. In an imitation-perfect auction for every bidder i, for all bid vectors (bi, b−i)
such that it follows from bi = max
j 6=i
bj that bi > max
j 6=i
bj, and for every  > 0 there exists a
δ > 0 such that for all b′i with bi < b′i < bi + δ it holds that∣∣pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)− pi (b1, . . . , b′i, . . . , bn)∣∣ < ,
i.e. the payment of a bidder who is not a winner with a tie is right-continuous in her bid.
Proof. Let i be a bidder with bid bi and  > 0. Let (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn) be a bid vector
where bidder i is not a winner with a tie. It follows from imitation perfection that there
exists a bid b > bi such that∣∣∣pn+1i (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn, 0)− pn+1n+1 (b1, . . . bi, . . . , bn, b)∣∣∣ < .21
Since the auction is symmetric, it holds that
pn+1n+1
(




b1, . . . , b, . . . , bn, bi
)
and therefore ∣∣∣pn+1i (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn, 0)− pn+1i (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bn, bi)∣∣∣ < .
Since b > bi ≥ 0, it follows from Lemma 1 that
pn+1i
(




b1, . . . , b, . . . , bn, 0
)
.
Therefore, ∣∣∣pn+1i (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn, 0)− pn+1i (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bn, 0)∣∣∣ < 
⇔
∣∣∣pni (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)− pni (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bn)∣∣∣ < .
Define δ by δ := b− bi. Since the payment function of bidder i is non-decreasing in her
21We need the construction with the (n+ 1)th bidder only to ensure that the lowest bidder in a bid vector
can be also imitated by a higher bid.
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own bid, it holds for every b with bi < b < bi + δ that
|pni (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)− pni (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bn)| < 
for all bid vectors (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn) where bidder i is not a winner with a tie. Hence, we
have shown that the payment of bidder i is right-continuous if she is not a winner with a
tie.
Lemma 4. In an imitation-perfect auction for every bidder i, for all bid vectors (bi, b−i)
such that bi < max
j 6=i
bj, and for every  > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for all b with
bi − δ < b < bi it holds that
|pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)− pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bn)| < ,
i.e. the payment of a bidder who is not the highest bidder is left-continuous in her bid.
Proof. The proof works analogously to the proof of Lemma 3. Let i be a bidder with bid
bi and  > 0. Let (bi, b−i) be a bid vector such that bi < max
j 6=i
bj . Let bj be a bid such that
bj > bi. It follows from imitation perfection that there exists a bid b with b < bi such that
|pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . bj . . . , bn)− pj (b1, . . . bi, . . . , b, . . . , bn)| < .
Since the auction is symmetric, it holds that
pj (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , b, . . . , bn) = pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)
and therefore
|pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)− pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)| < .
Since b < bi < bj , it follows from Lemma 2 that
pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bi, . . . , bn) = pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)
from which follows that
|pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)− pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)| < .
Let δ be defined by δ := bi − b. Since the payment function of bidder i is non-decreasing in
her own bid, it holds for every b′i with bi − δ < b′i < bi that∣∣pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)− pi (b1, . . . , b′i, . . . , bi, . . . , bn)∣∣ < 
for every vector (b1, . . . , bi, . . . bj . . . , bn) with bj > bi. Hence, we have shown that the
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payment of bidder i is left-continuous if she is not the highest bidder.
After proving the four lemmas, we continue with the proof of Proposition 1. The first
part of Proposition 1 follows from Lemma 1. However, the second part does not directly
follow from Lemma 2. We have not shown yet that the payment of a losing bidder with bid
bi does not change if another bidder changes her bid from bj to b′j (or from b′j to bj) with
b′j > bi > bj given that bidder i remains a losing bidder. First, we will show the following
claim. Let (bi, b−i) be a bid vector such that i is a losing bidder, i.e. it holds bi < max
j 6=i
bj .







bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
.
First, we consider the case that bj < bi. Since bidder i’s payment is right-continuous in
her own bid if she is not a winner with a tie, for every  > 0 there exists a bid b′i > bi such
that ∣∣∣pi (b′i, bi, b−(i,j))− pi (bi, bi, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < 2
and ∣∣∣pi (b′i, bj , b−(i,j))− pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < 2 .
It holds that ∣∣∣pi (bi, bi, b−(i,j))− pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣pi (bi, bi, b−(i,j))− pi (b′i, bi, b−(i,j))∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pi (b′i, bi, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ .






Now we consider the case that bj > bi. Since bidder i’s payment is left-continuous in her
own bid if she is not the highest bidder, for every  > 0 there exists a bid b′i < bi such that∣∣∣pi (b′i, bi, b−(i,j))− pi (bi, bi, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < 2
and ∣∣∣pi (b′i, bj , b−(i,j))− pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < 2 .
It holds that ∣∣∣pi (bi, bi, b−(i,j))− pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣pi (bi, bi, b−(i,j))− pi (b′i, bi, b−(i,j)) |+ |pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pi (b′i, bi, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ .
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bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
for every vector of bids (bi, b−i) where i is a losing bidder.
After proving the claim, we can conclude that for two vectors of bids
(







where bidder i is a losing bidder that
pi
(













This shows the second part of Proposition 1.
2.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We begin by proving that imitation perfection implies the first part of Proposition
2. We begin by stating the following two statements:





such that bi > max
j 6=i
bj
and bi > max
j 6=i
b′j it holds that












such that bi < max
j 6=i
bj
and bi < max
j 6=i
b′j it holds that







The first statement follows from the repeated application of the statement in Lemma 1
and the second statement follows from the repeated application of (9).
Given these two statements, we can define the function pwin by:
pwin (bi) = p2i (bi, 0)
and define plose by
plose (bi) = p2i (bi, bj)
for bj > bi. In order to see that this definition is consistent for all numbers of bidders and
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all bid vectors, consider the vector (bi, b−i) ∈
(
R+
)n such that bi > max
j 6=i
bj . Then due to
statement 1, it holds that
pni (bi, b−i) = p2i (bi, 0, . . . , 0) = p2i (bi, 0) .
Now consider the vector (bi, b−i) ∈
(
R+
)n such that bi < max
j 6=i
bj . Then due to statement 2,
it holds for every bj > bi that
pni (bi, b−i) = pni (bi, bj , 0, . . . , 0) = p2i (bi, bj) .












#{j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | bj = bi} = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | b′j = bi}}
it holds that








k = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | bj = bi} = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | b′j = bi}.
According to Assumption 4, it holds that















The fact that imitation perfection implies that second part of Proposition 2, follows directly
from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
It remains for us to show that the two conditions in Proposition 2 imply that an auction
is imitation-perfect. That is, we have to show that
(i) For every vector of bids
(
bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
such that bidder i is not a winner with a tie
and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with bi > bj there exists a bid b > bi such that∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pj (bi, b, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < .
(ii) For every vector of bids
(
bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with bi < bj there
exists a bid b < bi such that∣∣∣pi (bi, bj , b−(i,j))− pj (bi, b, b−(i,j))∣∣∣ < .
Let
(
bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
be a bid vector such that bidder i is not a winner with a tie and bi > bj
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Since bidder i’s payment is right-continuous in bi if she is not a winner with a tie, there
exists a b > bi such that∣∣∣pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)− pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)∣∣∣ < .
Since the payment of bidder i does not depend on lower bids and b > bi > bj , it holds that
pi
(




b1, . . . , b, . . . , bi, . . . , bn
)
.
Due to the symmetry of the auction, it holds that
pi
(




b1, . . . , bi, . . . , b, . . . , bn
)
from which follows that∣∣∣pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)− pj (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , b, . . . , bn)∣∣∣ < .
This completes the proof of the statement in (i). For the proof of part (ii) let
(
bi, bj , b−(i,j)
)
be a bid vector such that bi < bj . Since bidder i’s payment is left-continuous in bi if she is
not the highest bidder, there exists a b < bi such that
|pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)− pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)| < .
Since the payment of bidder i does not depend on higher bids and bj > bi > b, it holds
that
pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bj , . . . , bn) = pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bi, . . . , bn) .
Due to the symmetry of the auction, it holds that
pi (b1, . . . , b, . . . , bi, . . . , bn) = pj (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , b, . . . , bn)
from which follows that
|pi (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bj , . . . , bn)− pj (b1, . . . , bi, . . . , b, . . . , bn)| < .
This completes the proof of part (ii).
2.7.4 Lemmas
After proving Propositions 1 and 2, which provided statements regarding the payment
rules in imitation-perfect auctions, we use these results in order to prove the following
Lemmas. They provide statements about possible equilibria in imitation-perfect auctions
and will be used throughout most of the proofs.
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Lemma 5. In an imitation-perfect auction and for every equilibrium β = (β1, . . . , βn) the
expected payment as defined in (4) is strictly increasing above the reservation bid. That is,
for all bids bi, b′i with r ≤ bi < b′i it holds that







Proof. Due to Assumption 2, it holds that the payment of a winning bidder is strictly
increasing in at least one component of the bid vector. Since we have shown in Proposition
1 that the payment of a winning bidder in an imitation-perfect auction does not depend on
other bids, we conclude that the payment of a winning bidder is strictly increasing in her
own bid.
Assume that the lemma is not true and there exists an equilibrium β, a bidder i and
bids bi, b′i with r ≤ bi < b′i such that





This implies that bidder i with bid b′i wins the auction with probability zero given the
equilibrium strategies of the other bidders β−i. It follows that there exists an interval [0, v]
such that for all bidders j 6= i, for all z ∈ [0, v] and for all b ∈ supp (βj (z)) it holds that
b > b′i (except a measure zero set of valuations in [0,v]). Therefore, there exists a valuation
v, a bid b > b′i and a bidder j 6= i such that v < pwin (b′i) and b ∈ supp (βj (v)). Since
this cannot be optimal, this leads to a contradiction to the assumption





Lemma 6. In an imitation-perfect auction every equilibrium is non-decreasing above the
reservation bid. That is, for every equilibrium β (β1, . . . , βn), for every bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
for every pair of valuations v′, v ∈ [0, v] such that v′ > v and for every pair of bids b′, b
with b ≥ r, b′ ≥ r such that b′ ∈ supp (βi (v′)) and b ∈ supp (βi (v)) it holds that b′ ≥ b.
Proof. The proof works analogously to the proof of Lemma 3.9 in Chawla and Hartline
(2013). Assume the Lemma is not true and there exists an equilibrium β of an imitation-
perfect auction which is decreasing. Then there exists a bidder i, valuations v′, v ∈ [0, v]






= Uβi (v, b) +
(











v′ − v)Xβi (b′)
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) ≤ Uβi (v′, b′) .
and





Therefore, it must hold that
(
v′ − v)Xβi (b′) ≥ (v′ − v)Xβi (b) .
It follows from b′ < b that Xβi (b′) ≤ Xβi (b). Hence, it holds that Xβi (b′) = Xβi (b) and
Uβi (v′, b′) = U
β















= P βi (b)
which is a contradiction to Lemma 5.
In order to state the next lemma, we need the following definition
Definition 6. For an equilibrium β = (β1, . . . , βn) and a bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we denote
the endpoints of an interval of valuations over which βi (v) = b by vi (b) and vi (b). Formally,
we define
vi (b) = inf{v ∈ [0, v] | βi (v) = b}
and
vi (b) = sup{v ∈ [0, v] | βi (v) = b}.
Lemma 7. In an imitation-perfect auction for every pure strategy equilibrium β =
(β1, . . . , βn), for every bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for every pair of valuations v, v′ such
that










Proof. Assume there exists a pure strategy equilibrium β = (β1, . . . , βn), a bidder i and
valuations v, v′ with r ≤ b = βi (v) < b′ = βi (v′) such that






Then there exist vˆ and vˆ′ such that




= b′ and vˆ′ < vˆ.
This is a contradiction to Lemma 6. Thus, we conclude that it must hold





In several proofs we will show the particular statement for pure strategy equilibria and
use the following Lemma in order to derive the statement for general strategies.
Lemma 8. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be an equilibrium of an imitation-perfect auction. Then
there exists a pure strategy equilibrium β′ = (β′1, . . . , β′n) such that it holds for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n} and for all v ∈ [0, v] that
Xβi (v) = X
β′
i (v)
except a set of valuations which has measure zero.
Proof. Since we have shown that an imitation-perfect auction is a bid-determines-payment
auction, we can follow the same steps as the proof of Lemma 3.10 in Chawla and Hartline
(2013).
2.7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let bidder i be the bidder who wins the auction with probability 1 and pays zero.
As indicated in the sketch of the proof, we will show that in a perfect discrimination
equilibrium a bidder with a strictly positive valuation can deviate to a bid which is strictly
higher than any bid placed in equilibrium and come arbitrarily close to bidder i’s payment
which is zero.
Let bidder j be a bidder who has a strictly positive valuation vj and let  be such
that 0 <  < vj . For every vector of valuations (vi, v−i) and for every vector of bids
(bi (vi) , b−i (v−i)), where bk (vk) ∈ supp (βk (vk)) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, bidder i is the unique
winner. Thus, due to imitation perfection, for every bi (vi) ∈ supp (βi (vi)) there exists a
bid bj (bi (vi)) such that
|pj
(










| < 2 (10)
for every vector of valuations v−i and for every b−i ∈ supp (β−i (v−i)). Let
bˆj = sup
{




It is not a priori clear that the statement in (10) holds for the supremum. In the following
we will show that the statement in (10) also holds for the supremum.
Since for every vector of valuations v−j and for every b−j ∈ supp (β−j (v−j)) in the vector(




bidder j is the unique winner, it follows from Proposition 2 that her payment function is
right-continuous in her bid and there exists a δ > 0 such that for all bj with bj (bi (vi)) <
bj < bj (bi (vi)) + δ it holds that∣∣∣pj (bi (vi) , bj (bi (vi)) , b−(i,j) (v−(i,j)))− pj (bi (vi) , bj , b−(i,j) (v−(i,j)))∣∣∣ < 2 . (11)
Fix a δ for which (11) holds. There exists a valuation v∗i ∈ [0, v] and a bid bi (v∗i ) ∈
supp (βi (v∗i )) such that
bj (bi (v∗i )) < bˆj < bj (bi (v∗i )) + δ.
Otherwise, it would hold for all vi ∈ [0, v] and for all bi (vi) ∈ supp (βi (vi)) that bˆj ≥
bj (bi (vi)) + δ. This is a contradiction to the fact that bˆj is the smallest upper bound of
the set {
bj (bi (vi)) | bi (vi) ∈ supp (βi (vi)) , vi ∈ [0, v]
}
.
Let v∗i ∈ [0, v] and bi (v∗i ) ∈ supp (βi (v∗i )) be such that
bj (bi (v∗i )) < bˆj < bj (bi (v∗i )) + δ.
Then for every vector of valuations v−i and for every b−i ∈ supp (β−i (v−i)) it follows from
(10) and (11) that∣∣∣pj (bi (v∗i ) , bˆj , b−(i,j) (v−(i,j)))− pi (bi (v∗i ) , bj (vj) , b−(i,j) (v−(i,j)))∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣pj (bi (v∗i ) , bˆj , b−(i,j) (v−(i,j)))− pj (bi (v∗i ) , bj (bi (v∗i )) , b−(i,j) (v−(i,j)))∣∣∣
+






For every vector of valuations v−i and for every b−i ∈ supp (β−i (v−i)) it follows from
pi
(














Since bˆj is higher than any other bid placed by any bidder in equilibrium, bidder j would
win the auction when bidding bˆj . According to Proposition 2 (or Lemma 1), the payment
of a bidder does not depend on lower bids from which follows for every vector of valuations
v−j and for every b−j ∈ supp (β−i (v−i)) that
pj
(










<  < vj .
That is, by bidding bˆj , bidder j would pay an amount which is strictly smaller than her
valuation. Hence, a perfect discrimination equilibrium cannot exist in an imitation-perfect
symmetric auction, because each bidder j 6= i would have an incentive to deviate whenever
she has a strictly positive valuation for the good.
2.7.6 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Although this theorem directly follows from Proposition 5, we provide a separate
proof for Theorem 1 since this proof is less technical and may help to understand the
intuition behind the results in Theorem 1 and Proposition 5. We prove that the auction is
discrimination-free by demonstrating that in every equilibrium two bidders with the same
distribution function follow identical strategies above the reservation bid except a set of
valuations which has measure zero. In order to do so, we adapt a proof by Chawla and
Hartline (2013).
First, we show the theorem for the case of equilibria in pure strategies and afterwards
use Lemma 8 in order to derive the result for mixed strategy equilibria. We begin the
proof by showing the following two lemmas, Lemma 9 and Lemma 10.
Lemma 9. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a pure strategy equilibrium of an imitation-perfect
auction.
(i) Let i and j be two bidders with the same distribution function and v a valuation such
that
r ≤ βi (v) < βj (v) .
Then it holds that
Xβj (v) > X
β
i (v)
where Xβj (v) and X
β
i (v) are defined as in (3) in Appendix 2.7.1.
(ii) Let i and j be two bidders with the same distribution function and v a valuation such
that
βi (v) = βj (v) = b and vj (b) ≤ vi (b) , vj (b) ≤ vi (b)
where vj (b) , vi (b) , vj (b) , vi (b) are defined as in Definition 6 in Appendix 2.7.4.
Then it holds that
Xβj (v) ≥ Xβi (v) .
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Proof. Part (i): Let v ∈ [0, v] be a valuation such that bj > bi ≥ r where bj = βj (v) and
bi = βi (v). The allocation probability of bidder i is equal or lower than her allocation
probability if she wins every tie with probability one. In this case her winning probability
is determined by the case that she bids equal or higher than any other bidder. Formally,
we define a new allocation rule x˜ which is identical to the allocation rule x except for all
bid vectors where bidder i is a winning bidder with a tie. For such a bid vector it holds
that x˜i (bi, b−i) = 1. It holds that
X
β−i
















where F is defined by F := Fi = Fj . Due to Lemma 7, it holds that vk (bi) ≤ vk (bj) for
all bidders k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, it holds that





F (vk (bi)) ≤ F (vi (bj))
∏
k 6=i,j











k + 1Pr (k bidders bid bi and none higher) = X
β−j
j (bj) .
According to Lemma 5, the expected payment of a bidder is strictly increasing in her
own bid above the reservation bid. Thus, it cannot hold that Xβ−ii (bi) = X
β−j
j (bj) in
equilibrium. Otherwise, bidder j could deviate to a bid b′j with bi < b′j < bj . With the




≥ Xβ−ii (bi) = Xβ−jj (bj). Due






j (bj). Hence, deviating to b′j would increase
bidder j’s expected utility. Therefore, bj > bi implies
X
β−i
i (bi) < X
β−j
j (bj) .
Proof of part (ii): If b < r, then the allocation probability for both bidders is zero and
39
therefore the same. If b ≥ r, it holds that




Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
+
[




Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)].
Since vj (b) ≤ vi (b) and vj (b) ≤ vi (b), this is smaller or equal than
F (vi (b))Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
+ [F (vi (b))− F (vi (b))]Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)].
The term Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)] denotes the probability that bidder i wins
against all other bidders besides bidder j if she bids b and given that she wins against
bidder j. This is equal to the probability that bidder j wins against all other bidders
besides bidder i if she bids b given that she wins against bidder i, which is denoted by
the term Ev−j [xj (b, β−j (v−j)) | b > βi (vi)]. An analogous reasoning applies to the term
Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)]. Therefore, the expression above is equal to
= F (vi (b))Ev−j [xj (b, β−j (v−j)) | b > βi (vi)]
+ [F (vi (b))− F (vi (b))]Ev−j [xj (b, β−j (v−j)) | b = βi (vi)] = Xβj (b) .
Lemma 10. If there exists a pure strategy equilibrium β = (β1, . . . , βn) of an imitation-perfect
auction, a bidder k and an interval [vk, vk] with Fk (vk)− Fk (vk) > 0 such that βk (v) =
bk ≥ r for all v ∈ [vk, vk], then there does not exist another bidder j and a valuation vj
such that βj (vj) = bk and
Pr (bk > βi (vi) for all i 6= k, j)
(
vj − pwin (bk)
)
> 0.
That is, if bidder k’s bidding strategy is constant over some interval, then due to the
continuity of the payment function, every other bidder would never bid the same amount
but has an incentive to slightly overbid bidder k.
Proof. Assume there exists a bidder j and a valuation vj such that βj (vj) = bk and
Pr (bk > βi (vi) for all i 6= k, j)
(
vj − pwin (bk)
)
> 0. First, we consider the case that bidder
k is the only bidder such that there exists an interval of valuations with measure larger




be the maximal interval over which











βk (v) = b.
For a shorter notation let P be defined by
P = Pr (bk > βi (vi) for all i 6= k, j) .






− Fk (vˆk)][vj − pwin (bk)]P −  > 0.





)− pj (bk, b−j) < 2
for all vectors (bk, b−j) where bidder j is not a winning bidder with a tie.
If bidder j deviates to b′, then her winning probability increases from


















b′ > βi (vi) for all i 6= k, j
)
.






























































− Fk (vˆk)]P + .





















− Fk (vˆk)][vj − pwin (βj (vj))]P −  > 0.
We conclude that there does not exist a bidder j and a valuation vj such that βj (vj) = bk
because otherwise bidder j would have an incentive to deviate.
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The case where more than one bidder bids bk over an interval of valuations with measure
greater than zero, can be excluded analogously.
We continue with the proof of Theorem 1. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be an equilibrium in
pure strategies. In order to show that bidders with the same distribution function follow
identical strategies, we consider two arbitrary bidders i and j who draw their valuations
from the same distribution. Assume that the strategies of bidder i and bidder j differ
above the reservation bid over some set of valuations with strictly positive measure. Since
strategies are continuous except a set of valuations which has measure zero, there exists
an interval of valuations with strictly positive measure over which the strategies differ.
Consider the lowest valuation at which the strategies differ above the reservation bid over
an interval of valuations with strictly positive measure. Formally, let
z = inf
{
v′ | ∃ z′′ > v′ s.t. βj (v) 6= βi (v) and βi (v) ≥ r, βj (v) ≥ r for all v ∈ [v′, z′′]
}
.
Since strategies are continuous besides a set of valuations which has measure zero, there
exists a valuation v′′ such that w.l.o.g. it holds for all z ∈ (z, v′′) that βj (z) > βi (z).
In order to show that this leads to a contradiction, we use the following definition.
Definition 7 (Utility crossing). For a given equilibrium β an interval (z, z) satisfies utility
crossing if Xβj (v) ≥ Xβi (v) for all v ∈ (z, z) and Uβj (z) ≥ Uβi (z) and Uβi (z) ≥ Uβj (z).
We will show that strategies have to be equal on an interval which satisfies utility
crossing.
Lemma 11. Let β be an equilibrium of an imitation-perfect auction and (z, z) be an
interval satisfying utility crossing. Then it holds that βi (v) = βj (v) for all v ∈ (z, z) except
a set of measure zero.
Proof. Suppose that βj 6= βi over some subset of (z, z) with strictly positive measure.
Since strategies are discontinuous on a measure zero set of valuations, there exists a set
with strictly positive measure such that either βj > βi or βi > βj for all valuations of
this set. Since Xβj (v) ≥ Xβi (v) for all v ∈ (z, z), it follows from Lemma 9 that βj > βi
over some subset of (z, z) with strictly positive measure. Due to Lemma 9, it holds that
Xβj (v) > X
β
i (v) for all v with βj (v) > βi (v). According to Myerson (1981), in every
auction mechanism the expected utility of a bidder can be written as a function of the
winning probability. Formally, it holds for every k and every vk that





Xβk (z) dz. (12)
Since the payment function of a winning bidder is strictly increasing in her bid 22, a
22Recall the argument provided in the proof of Lemma 5: Due to Assumption 2, the payment of a bidder
has to be strictly increasing in at least one component of the bid vector. We have shown in Proposition
1 (and Lemma 1) that the payment of a winning bidder depends only on her own bid. Therefore, the
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bidder with valuation zero does not win with positive probability. Because payments are
non-negative, the expected payment of a bidder with valuation zero is zero. Therefore, the
expected utility of a bidder with valuation zero is zero.
Thus, applying equation (12) to z and z and rearranging it accordingly gives









Since Xβj > X
β
i over a subset of (z, z) with strictly positive measure, it holds that
Uβj (z)− Uβj (z) > Uβi (z)− Uβi (z) ,
which contradicts utility crossing. It therefore holds that βi (v) = βj (v) for all v in (z, z)
except a set of measure zero.
We will show that (z, v′′) lies in an interval satisfying utility crossing. Hence, the strategy
of bidder i and j cannot differ on the interval (z, v′′). We will show that the interval which
satisfies utility crossing is given by (z, z) where z is defined by
z = inf {v > z|βi (v) ≥ βj (v)} .
If the infimum does not exist, we redefine z = v. It follows from Lemma 9 that Xβj (v) >
Xβi (v) for all v ∈ (z, z). Thus, it is left to show that
Ui (z) ≥ Uj (z) and Uj (z) ≥ Ui (z) .
Let b < βj (z) be such that there exists a valuation z ∈ [0, z] with βi (z) = b. Since z < z
and z is the infimum of valuations at which the strategies of bidder i and bidder j differ, it
holds that
βi (z) = βj (z) = b
and
vi (b) = vj (b) .
It also holds that vj (b) ≤ vi (b) . Assume this is not true. Then it holds that vj (b) > vi (b) .
Since the equilibrium is non-decreasing, this implies that there exists an interval (vi (b) , vˆ)
such that βi (v) > βj (v) for all v ∈ (vi (b) , vˆ). This is a contradiction to the assumption
that z is the infimum of valuations at which the strategies of bidder i and j differ and that
bidder j bids higher than bidder i on some interval (z, v′′).
payment of a winning bidder has to be strictly increasing in her own bid.
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Thus, it holds that vj (b) ≤ vi (b) and it follows from Lemma 9 that Xβi (b) = Xβj (b) .23
If βj (z) > βi (z), it follows from part (ii) of Lemma 9 that Xβi (b) < X
β
j (b) .
If βj (z) = βi (z), it holds that vi (βi (z)) = vj (βi (z)) because strategies are equal
below z. Moreover, it holds that vi (βi (z)) ≥ vj (βi (z)) because otherwise bidder i’s
strategy would be decreasing. Thus, it follows from Lemma 9 that Xβi (z) ≤ Xβj (z) for all
z ∈ [vi (βi (z)) , z].





Xβj (z) dz ≥
∫ z
0
Xβi (z) dz = U
β
i (z) .
It is left to show that
Ui (z) ≥ Uj (z) .
In order to do so, we show that for every  > 0 there exists a bid for bidder i with which
she could achieve an expected utility of at least Uβj (z)−  if she has valuation z. Therefore,
the expected utility of bidder i’s equilibrium bid has to induce at least an expected utility
of Uβj (z) and it holds that
Uβi (z) ≥ Uβj (z) .
It follows from Proposition 2 that the expected payment in equilibrium of bidder j at z
is given by
P βj (βj (z)) = X
β




plose (βj (z)) .
Let  be greater than zero. Due to the right-continuity of the functions pwin and plose,
there exists a bid b > βj (z) such that
pwin (b)− pwin (βj (z)) < 
and
plose (b)− plose (βj (z)) < .
We can assume that Pr (βj (z) > βk (vk) for all k 6= i, j) (z − βj (z)) > 0 because
otherwise it immediately follows that Uβi (z) ≥ Uβj (z) = 0. Thus, by Lemma 10, the
event that bidder j is a winner with a tie bidding βj (z) has probability zero. In particular,
the interval [vi (βj (z)) , vi (βj (z))] has measure zero.
23Recall that es stated in (3) in Appendix 2.7.1, by Xβi (b) we denote the allocation probability of a bidder
i who submits bid b given the equilibrium β.
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In equilibrium the expected utility of bidder j bidding βj (z) is given by
Uβj (z, βj (z))
= F (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
(




1− F (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
)
plose (βj (z)) .
Since the event that bidder j is a winner with a tie has measure zero, this equation does
not account for the possibility of ties. The expected utility of bidder i deviating to bid b at
z is given by
U
β−i




Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
(
z − pwin (b)
)




]Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)]
(








Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (z)]
)
(











Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
(








Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (z)]
)
plose (b) . (13)
Since b > βj (z), it follows from Lemma 7 that vj (b) ≥ vj (b) ≥ vj (βj (z)) ≥ z. Since
the interval [vi (βj (z)) , vi (βj (z))] has measure zero, it holds that βi (v) > βi (z) for all
v > z except a set of valuations which has measure zero. It follows that vi (βj (z)) ≤ z.
Hence, it holds that
vi (βj (z)) ≤ vi (βj (z)) ≤ z ≤ vj (βj (z)) ≤ vj (b) . (14)
It follows from (14) that the term in (13) is greater or equal than
F (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
(




1− F (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
)
plose (b)








1− F (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
) (
plose (βj (z)) + 
)
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1− F (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
) (
plose (βj (z)) + 
)
= F (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
(




1− F (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
)
plose (βj (z))− .
It follows that
Uβj (z, βj (z))− Uβ−ii (z, b) < .
Hence, we have shown that for every  > 0 there exists a deviating bid b such that bidder
i can achieve an expected utility of at least Uβj (z)−  from which follows that
Uβi (z) ≥ Uβj (z) .
We conclude that the interval (z, z) fulfills utility crossing. Therefore, it hods that
βi (v) = βj (v) for all v ∈ (z, z) except a measure zero set of valuations. Thus, the
assumption, that there exists a measurable interval over which the bidding strategies of
two bidders differ above the reservation bid, leads to a contradiction.
It is left to consider the case of mixed equilibria. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a (possibly
mixed equilibrium). According to Lemma 8, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium
β′ = (β′1, . . . , β′n) such that it holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all v ∈ {1, . . . , n} that
Xβi (v) = X
β′
i (v)
except for a set of valuations with measure zero. Since we have shown that in a pure
strategy equilibrium all bidders adopt identical strategies above the reservation bid, for
every pair of bidders i and j and for every v ∈ [0, v] it holds that
Xβ
′
i (v) = X
β′
j (v) .
Thus, for every v ∈ [0, v] it holds that











Thus, it hods that Uβi (v) = U
β
j (v) which completes the proof.
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2.7.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of part (i). Since we apply a result from Reny (1999), we begin the proof by
explaining his framework.
A game consists of a set of players {1, . . . , n}, a set of pure strategies Xi which is a
subset of a topological vector space for every player i and a utility function
ui : X → R
for every player i where X =Xni=1Xi. The function u denotes the vector of all utility
functions (u1, . . . , un). Note that in a setting with incomplete information like our auction
setting, the pure strategy set for a bidder i corresponds to the set of pure bidding strategies
for this bidder and the utility function ui corresponds to bidder i’s ex-ante utility given
the valuation distributions of all bidders. That is, in our setting in the notation used in
Reny (1999) the function ui maps a profile of bidding strategies to an ex-ante utility for
bidder i. Given the notation used in this paper, it holds that
Xi = {βi : Θi → Ai}
and
ui (x1, . . . , xn) =
∫
[0,v]
Uxi (vi) dFi (vi) .
where ui is the utility function as defined in Reny (1999) and Ui is defined as in this paper
in the model section.
A game is a compact Hausdorff game if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that Xi is a
compact Hausdorff space and ui is bounded. If f : A → B is a function and A,B are
topological spaces, then a tuple (a, b) with a ∈ A and b ∈ B is in the closure of the graph
of f if there exists a sequence {am}∞m=1 converging to a such that b = limm→∞ f (a
m) .





p for all x′−i in some open neighborhood of x−i. A game is better-reply secure if whenever
(x∗, u∗) is in the closure of the graph of u and x∗ is not an equilibrium, there exists a player
i who can secure a utility strictly above u∗i at x∗.
The existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (in possibly mixed strategies) follows from
Corollary 5.2 in Reny (1999). It states that if the mixed extension of a compact Hausdorff
Game is better-reply secure, then an equilibrium exists. We apply this result to our setting
by adopting the proof for Example 5.2 in Reny (1999) which applies Corollary 5.2 to
first-price auctions. As stated in Example 5.2, the space of pure bidding strategies for a
bidder is a compact Hausdorff space with respect to the topology of pointwise convergence.24
Thus, it is left to show that an imitation-perfect auction (where also mixed strategies are
24Recall that for a set X and a space of functions from X to R the topology of pointwise convergence is
generated by the subbase Ux,a,b for x ∈ X, a, b ∈ R, a < b with U, x, b = {f : X → R | α < f (x) < b}.
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allowed) is better-reply secure.
Assume that x∗ ∈ X is not an equilibrium and let (x∗, u∗) be in the closure of the graph
of u. By definition, there exists a sequence of strategies {xm}∞m=1 converging to x∗ such
that u∗ = lim
m→∞u (x
m).
First, we consider the case that ties occur with probability zero at x∗. Then u is




denote bidder i’s supremum utility at x∗−i, i.e. for all



















> ui (x∗) .
Therefore, for every  > 0 there exists a strategy for bidder i, xi , such that∣∣ui (xi , x∗−i)− usi (x∗−i)∣∣ < .







> ui (x∗) .








for all x′−i in this neighborhood. Thus, if ties occur with probability zero, the game is
better-reply secure. Now we consider the case that ties occur with positive probability at
x∗. Let i and j be two bidders who tie with positive probability, that is, there exists an
interval [vt, vt] on which they submit the same bid bt. For every strategy profile xm either
bidder i or bidder j loses with positive (ex-ante) probability over the interval [vt, vt]. This
implies that there exists a bidder l for l ∈ {i, j} and a subsequence {xmk} such that bidder
l loses with positive (ex-ante) probability on the interval [vt, vt] for every xmk . Then this
subsequence converges to x∗. W.l.o.g. we assume that l = i.
It must hold that pwin (bt) ≤ vt < vt. Therefore, bidder i would strictly increase her
ex-ante utility if her ex-ante winning probability increases on a subset of [vt, vt] with
positive measure. For every k > 0 it holds that at xmk bidder i can strictly increase her





denote bidder i’s supremum utility at xmk−i . Since the functions pwin and





> ui (xmk) .
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That is, bidder i’s strategy cannot be optimal since by slightly increasing her bid, she could






> ui (x∗) .
Hence, for every  > 0 there exists a strategy xi such that∣∣ui (xi , x∗−i)− usi (x∗−i)∣∣ < .













bidder i does not tie with another bidder, ui is continuous at x∗−i.








for all x′−i in this neighborhood.
We conclude that an imitation-perfect auction with compact intervals as bid spaces is
better-reply secure and therefore an equilibrium exists.
Proof of part (ii). It follows from Theorem 4.5 in Chawla and Hartline (2013) that in a bid
determines-payment auction with homogeneous bidders there exists only one symmetric
equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium where all bidders adopt identical strategies. Due to
Proposition 2, all imitation-perfect auctions are bid-determines-payment auctions. As
shown in the proof of Theorem 1, in an imitation-perfect auction all equilibria are symmetric.
Therefore, an imitation-perfect auction with homogeneous bidders has a unique equilibrium.
It follows from Lemma 8 that if a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, then a pure strategy
equilibrium also exists. Since the equilibrium is unique, it has to be a pure strategy
equilibrium. It follows from Lemma 6 that the equilibrium is non-decreasing.
2.7.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we will first show the statement in Proposition 5 for
pure strategy equilibria and then apply Lemma 8 in order to show the statement for mixed
strategy equilibria. We will prove Proposition 5 for pure strategy equilibria by showing the
following claim: For every equilibrium β = (β1, . . . , βn), every valuation v and every pair
of bidders i and j it holds that∣∣∣∣∫ v0 Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δi,jv + δi,j (v − v) . (15)
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Given this claim, Proposition 5 directly follows from Myerson (1981) since
∣∣∣Uβj (v)− Uβi (v)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫ v0 Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz
∣∣∣∣ .
The proof of the claim works similarly to the proof of Theorem 1. We start by proving
the following Lemma which provides an analogous result to Lemma 9 for heterogeneous
bidders.
Lemma 12. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a pure strategy equilibrium equilibrium of an imitation-
perfect auction.
(i) Let i and j be two bidders and v a valuation such that
βi (v) < βj (v) .
Then it holds that
Xβj (v) + δi,j ≥ Xβi (v)
where δi,j is defined as in (2).
(ii) Let i and j be two bidders and v a valuation such that
βi (v) = βj (v) = b and vj (b) ≤ vi (b) , vj (b) ≤ vi (b) .
Then it holds that
Xβj (v) + δi,j ≥ Xβi (v)
where δi,j is defined as in (2).
Proof. Part (i): Let v be a valuation and bi, bj be defined by βi (v) = bi and βj (vj) = bj .
If bi < r, it holds that Xβi (bi) = 0 and the statement follows directly. Otherwise, similarly
to the proof of Lemma 9 we have:



















= Fj (vj (bi))
∏
k 6=i,j




Since for every v ∈ [0, v] it holds that Fj (v) ≤ Fi (v) + δ, this is smaller or equal than
(Fi (vi (bj)) + δi,j)
∏
k 6=i,j
F (vk (bj)) =
∏
k 6=i















k + 1Pr (k bidders bid bi and none higher)
= Xβj (bj) + δi,j .
Proof of part (ii): If b < r, the allocation probability for both bidders is zero and therefore
the same. If b ≥ r, it holds that




Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
+
[









Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]− Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)]
)
+ Fj (vj (b))Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)]
≤ (Fi (vi (b)) + δi,j)
(
Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
)
(−Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)])
+ (Fi (vi (b)) + δi,j)Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)]
≤ Fi (vi (b))
(
Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]− Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)]
)
Fi (vi (b))Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)] + δi,j
= Fi (vi (b))Ev−j [xj (b, β−j (v−j)) | b > βi (vi)]
+ [Fi (vi (b))− Fi (vi (b))]Ev−j [xj (b, β−j (v−j)) | b = βi (vi)] + δi,j = Xβj (b) + δi,j
where the first inequality follows from the assumption that vj (b) ≤ vi (b) and vj (b) ≤
vi (b).
Note that Lemma 10 holds independent of the bidders’ homogeneity. We will show the
claim in (15) given by ∣∣∣∣∫ v0 Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δi,jv + δi,j (v − v)
by contradiction. Assume that there exist bidders i and j and a valuation v such that∣∣∣∣∫ v0 Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz
∣∣∣∣ > δi,jv + δi,j (v − v) .
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W.l.o.g. we can assume that it holds∫ v
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz > δi,jv + δi,j (v − v) .
We will need the following Lemma:
Lemma 13. Let β be an equilibrium of an imitation-perfect auction and z a valuation.
Then the following holds true:
(i) If βi (z) ≥ βj (z), then it holds that
Uβi (z) + δi,jv ≥ Uβj (z) .
(ii) If there exists a valuation vˆ > z such that for all z ∈ (z, vˆ) it holds that βi (z) ≥ βj (z),
then it holds that
Uβi (z) + δi,jv ≥ Uβj (z) .
(iii) If z = v, then it holds that




Proof. For all three parts we can make the following statements. If βj (z) < r, it holds
that Uβj (z) = 0 and the statement follows directly. If βj (z) ≥ r, let  be greater than zero.
Due to Proposition 2, it holds that the expected payment of bidder j at z is given by
P βj (βj (z)) = X
β




plose (βj (z)) .
We continue with the proof for part (i) and (ii). Analogously as in the proof of Theorem
1, we will prove that
Uβi (z) + δi,jv ≥ Uβj (z)
by showing that for every  > 0 there exists a deviating bid b for bidder i at valuation z
with which she could achieve at least a utility of Uβij (z)− δi,jv − .
In equilibrium the expected utility of bidder j bidding βj (z) is given by
Uβj (z, βj (z))
= Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
(




1− Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
)
plose (βj (z)) .
We can assume that Pr (βj (z) > βk (vk) for all k 6= i, j) > 0 because otherwise it directly
follows that Uβi (z) ≥ Uβj (z) = 0. Thus, according to Lemma 10, the event that bidder
j is a winner with a tie bidding βj (z), has probability zero. In particular, the interval
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[vi (βj (z)) , vi (βj (z))] has measure zero. Thus, the above equation does not account for
the possibility of ties. Due to the right-continuity of the functions pwin and plose, there
exists a bid b > βj (z) such that
pwin (b)− pwin (βj (z)) < 
and
plose (b)− plose (βj (z)) < .
The expected utility of bidder i deviating to bid b at z is given by
U
β−i




Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
(
z − pwin (b)
)




]Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b = βj (vj)]
(








Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (z)]
)
(











Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
(








Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (z)]
)
plose (b) . (16)
Since b > βj (z), it follows from Lemma 7 that vj (b) ≥ vj (b) ≥ vj (βj (z)) ≥ z. Since
the interval [vi (βj (z)) , vi (βj (z))] has measure zero, it holds that βi (v) > βi (z) for all
v > z except a set of valuations which has measure zero. It follows that vi (βj (z)) ≤ z.
Hence, it holds that
vi (βj (z)) ≤ vi (βj (z)) ≤ z ≤ vj (βj (z)) ≤ vj (b) . (17)
It follows from (17) that the expression in (16) is greater or equal than
Fj (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
(




1− Fj (vi (βj) (z))Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
)
plose (b) .








1− Fj (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
) (
plose (βj (z)) + 
)
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≥ (Fi (vi (βj) (z))− δi,j)Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
(









≥ Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
(









z − pwin (βj (z)) + plose (βj (z))
)
− 
≥ Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (βj (z) , β−i (v−i)) | βj (z) > βj (vj)]
(








= Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
(









Uβj (z, βj (z))− Uβ−ii (z, b) < δi,jz + .
Hence, we have shown that for every  > 0 there exists a deviating bid b such that bidder
i can achieve an expected utility of at least Uβj (z)− δi,jz −  from which follows that
Uβi (z) + δi,j (z) ≥ Uβj (z) .
Now we provide a proof for part (iii). It is sufficient to show that Uβi (z) ≥ Uβj (z) , since
then Uβj (z) ≥ Uβi (z) follows by symmetry. As in part (i) and (ii), the expected utility of
bidder j bidding βj (z) is given by
Uβj (z, βj (z))
= Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
(




1− Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
)
plose (βj (z)) .
Since z = v, by bidding b bidder i will bid higher than bidder j with probability one. Thus,
the expected utility of bidder i bidding b at z is given by
U
β−i
i (z, b) = Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
(
z − pwin (b)
)
− (1− Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]) plose (b)
54
≥ Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
(




1− Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
)
plose (b)








1− Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
) (
plose (βj (z)) + 
)
= Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
(




1− Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−i [xi (b, β−i (v−i)) | b > βj (vj)]
)
ploseβj (z)− 
≥ Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
(




1− Fi (vi (βj (z)))Ev−j [xj (βj (z) , β−j (v−j)) | βj (z) > βi (vi)]
)
ploseβj (z)− .
Hence, we have shown that for every  > 0 there exists a deviating bid b such that bidder i
can achieve an expected utility of at least Uβj (z)−  from which follows that
Uβi (z) ≥ Uβj (z) .
We continue with the proof of Proposition 5 by considering the following three cases.
Case 1: First, we will consider the case that there exists an interval (v′, v) such that
βj (z) > βi (z) for all z ∈ (v′, v). In this case let
z = inf{z > v | βi (z) ≥ βj (v)}.
If the infimum does not exist, we redefine z = v.
In both cases it follows from Lemma 13 that
∫ z
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz = Uβj (z)− Uβi (z) ≤ δi,jz.
It holds that∫ v
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz =
∫ z
0
Xβj (z)−Xβj (z) dz −
∫ z
v




Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz +
∫ z
v




Xβi (z)−Xβj (z) dz
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≤ δi,jz + δi,j (z − v) .
Due to βj (z) > βi (z), for all z ∈ (v, z), the last inequality follows from Lemma 12.
We conclude that the assumption that∫ v
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz > δi,jv + δi,j (v − v)
leads to a contradiction.
Case 2: Second, we consider the case that there exists an interval (v′, v) such that










Therefore, it holds that ∫ v′
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz ≤ δi,jv′.
It follows from the fact that βi (z) > βj (z) for all z ∈ (v′, v) and from Lemma 12 that∫ v
v′
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz ≤ δi,j
(
v − v′) .
Therefore, we can conclude that
∫ v
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz =
∫ v′
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz +
∫ v
v′
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz
≤ δi,jv′ + δi,j
(
v − v′) ≤ δi,jv + δi,j (v − v)
which leads to a contradiction.
Case 3: Finally, we consider the case that there exists an interval (v′, v) such that
βi (z) = βj (z) for all z ∈ (v′, v). Since the bidding functions of bidders i and j are
continuous except a measure zero set of valuations, case 1, 2 and 3 constitute all possible
cases. It follows from Lemma 13 that
Uβi (v) + δi,jv ≥ Uβj (v) . (19)
Thus, it holds that ∫ v
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz ≤ δi,jv ≤ δi,jv + δi,j (v − v)
which leads to a contradiction.
We conclude that for every possible case the assumption that∫ v
0
Xβj (z)−Xβi (z) dz > δi,jv + δi,j (v − v)
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leads to a contradiction which completes the proof of the claim in (15) and hence the proof
of Proposition 5 for pure strategy equilibria.
It is left to consider the case of mixed equilibria. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a (possibly
mixed equilibrium). According to Lemma 8, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium
β′ = (β′1, . . . , β′n) such that it holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all v ∈ {1, . . . , n} that
Xβi (v) = X
β′
i (v)
except a set of valuations which has measure zero. Since we have shown Proposition 5 for






∣∣∣∣ ≤ δi,jv + δi,j (v − v) .
Thus, for every v ∈ [0, v] it holds that
|Uβi (v)− Uβj (v) | =












∣∣∣∣ ≤ δi,jv + δi,j (v − v) .
This completes the proof.
2.7.9 Proof of and Proposition 6
Proof. Let A be a mechanism and i a bidder with valuation v. Let βδ denote an equilibrium




denote the expected utility of
bidder i with valuation v in the equilibrium βδ. If δ equals to zero, then we can deduce
from the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (e.g. as stated in Krishna (2009)) that for every
mechanism A and every strictly increasing equilibrium β of A the expected utility of bidder
i with valuation v is given by
Uβi (v) = vX
β









neither depends on the mechanism nor on the equilibrium (if



























As in the proof of Theorem 1 in Fibich et al. (2004), we use the Taylor series in order to

















































does not. It follows from Proposition 5 that for every j 6= i it holds that∣∣∣Uβj (v)− Uβi (v)∣∣∣ ≤ δi,j + δi,j (v − v) ≤ δ + δ (v − v)
from which follows for every bidder i that∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Uβi (v)− nUβi (v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ nδ + nδ (v − v) .
Hence it holds that ∣∣∣U (v) +O (δ2)− nUβi (v)∣∣∣ ≤ nδ + nδ (v − v) .












− n (δv + δ (v − v))
)








+ n (δv + δ (v − v))
)
.
Let B be a mechanism with equilibrium β′. Since the same statement holds for equilibrium
β′, it follows that ∣∣∣Ui (v)β − Ui (v)β′ ∣∣∣ ≤ 2 (δv + δ (v − v)) +O (δ2) .
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2.7.10 Proof of Propositions 7 and 8
Proof. First, we will show Proposition 7 for pure strategy equilibria and afterwards apply
Lemma 8 in order to derive the result for mixed strategy equilibria. We will show
Proposition 7 for pure strategy equilibria by contradiction. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be an
efficient equilibrium of an imitation-perfect auction. Let bidders i and j be such that∫
[0,v]n−1








Xj (z) dz =
∫ v
0
F−j (z) dz >
∫ v
0
F−i (z) dz =
∫ v
0
Xi (z) dz = Uβi (v) . (20)
According to Lemma 13, it holds that Uβj (v) = U
β
i (v) which leads to a contradiction.
This completes the proof for pure strategy equilibria. It is left to consider the case of mixed
strategy equilibria. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a (possibly mixed equilibrium). According to
Lemma 8, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium β′ = (β′1, . . . , β′n) such that it holds for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all v ∈ {1, . . . , n} that
Xβi (v) = X
β′
i (v)
except a set of valuations which has measure zero. Since the equilibrium β′ is efficient, for
every pair of bidders i and j and for every pair of valuations vi and vj such that vj > vi
it holds that Xβ
′
i (vi) < X
β′
j (vj). Therefore, it holds that X
β
i (vi) < X
β
j (vj) except a
measure zero set of valuations. Conclusively, given equilibrium β, the bidder with the
highest valuation wins with probability one and the same reasoning as above applies.
The proof of Proposition 8 works in the same way with the only difference being that
valuations are replaced with the corresponding virtual valuations. Assume there exists a
pure strategy equilibrium β = (β1, . . . , βn) of an imitation-perfect auction such that the
bidder with the highest virtual valuation wins with probability 1. Let bidders i and j be











V −1j (Vi (z))
)
dz.



























Xi (z) dz = Uβi (v) .
As before, one can show that this leads to a contradiction since the expected utilities of
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bidders i and j at v are equal. The same reasoning as above applies to mixed strategy
equilibria.
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3 Endogenous worst-case beliefs in
first-price auctions
Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders
about their competitors’ willingness to pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a
first-price auction in which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution
of their competitors’ valuations is restricted to the support and the mean. To
model this situation, we assume that under such uncertainty a bidder will expect
to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected utility, given
her bid is an optimal reaction to the bids of her competitors induced by this
distribution. This introduces a novel way to endogenize beliefs in games of
incomplete information. We find that for a bidder with a given valuation her
worst-case belief just puts sufficient probability weight on lower valuations of her
competitors to induce a high bid. At the same time the worst-case belief puts as
much as possible probability weight on the same valuation in order to minimize
the bidder’s winning probability. This implies that even though the worst-case
beliefs are type dependent in a non-monotonic way, an efficient equilibrium of
the first-price auction exists.
JEL classification: D44, D81, D82
Keywords: Auctions, mechanism design, beliefs, uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
Consider a company preparing a bid for a first-price procurement auction. Their optimal
bidding strategy will crucially depend on their belief about the costs of their competitors.
Typically, this company would spend a considerable amount of resources to reverse-engineer
the products of their competitors and learn about their cost structure. However, such
learning has its limits. For example, reverse-engineering may inform the company about
the used components and the general complexities in producing this part. But it cannot
inform about the production processes and the used equipment of its competitors. Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that learning about the distribution of the competitors’ costs is
not perfect and just specifies some summary statistic of the underlying distribution like
the support and the mean. How to weigh the probabilities of certain costs within this
support is subjective and hard to objectify. Thus, in order to submit a bid in the auction,
the company has to form a subjective belief.
In this paper we consider the problem of a bidder in a first-price auction whose only
information about the valuations of her competitors is the support and the mean of their
distribution. Given such a large uncertainty, it seems natural for this bidder to prepare for
the worst case.25 Thus, we assume that for a given bidding strategy of her competitors the
25From our own experience in consulting bidders in high-stakes (procurement) auctions, it is a typical
approach taken by bidders to generate several scenarios with respect to the valuations (costs) of their
competitors and than to tailor their strategy to the worst-case.
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bidder will tailor her bid to be optimal given that she expects to face the worst distribution
of of her competitors’ valuations among all distributions with the same support and mean.
Worst distribution, in this context, means the bidder will expect to face the distribution
of valuations that minimizes her expected utility, given her bid is an optimal reaction to
the bids of her competitors induced by this distribution. In other words, the worst-case
belief of a bidder minimizes her maximum possible expected utility. We assume that every
bidder in the auction follows a similar logic when preparing her bid. In this case, a profile
of bids is an equilibrium if each bidder chooses her optimal bid given her valuation (type),
the bidding strategy of her competitors, and the worst-case belief as defined above. In
particular, this implies that the worst-case belief of a bidder will crucially depend on her
type (valuation) in a non-monotonic way.
Our contribution is threefold. Our first contribution is to introduce a novel way to model
endogenous beliefs in a first-price auction. Endogenous, in this case, means that a bidder’s
beliefs about the valuations of the competitors are not assumed as a primitive of the
environment but arise naturally as worst-case beliefs from the game induced by the rules of
the first-price auction.26 This can be viewed as a relaxation of the paradigm of symmetric
independent private value (IPV) auctions that each bidder’s valuation for the object is
drawn from a distribution that is common knowledge among all bidders. Moreover, our
solution concept constitutes a novel way to analyze games with asymmetric information
and can be straightforwardly extended to any kind of such game.
Our second contribution is to show that even though the endogenous beliefs that arise
from our solution concept are type dependent in a non-monotonic way, an ex-post efficient
equilibrium exists. That is, even though the worst-case beliefs of bidders with a higher
valuation do not imply that they believe to face a stronger competition in the auction than
bidders with a lower valuation, in equilibrium the object is allocated with probability one
to the bidder with the highest valuation.
Our third contribution is to introduce a novel proof method that we use in order to derive
the worst-case strategies and beliefs in the efficient equilibrium. The method encompasses
an elegant way to compare the solutions of an infinite set of minimization problems. To fix
ideas and to gain some intuition for our results, consider the case that the valuation of a
bidder can take one of three valuations 0, θ and 1. Suppose furthermore that it is common
knowledge among the bidders that the mean of the distribution of valuations is µ with
µ < θ. In this case, the efficient equilibrium takes the following form: all bidders with
valuation 0 bid 0, all bidders with valuation θ mix between 0 and some bθ, and all bidders
with a valuation of 1 mix between bθ and some b1. The beliefs of a bidder with valuation 0
are arbitrary as she will always bid 0 and expect a utility of 0. A bidder with valuation
θ believes that she is facing only bidders with valuations 0 and θ with probabilities such
that the mean of her belief is µ. A bidder with valuation 1 believes that she is facing
bidders with valuations 0, θ, and 1 with probabilities such that she is indifferent between






and bidding 0 and such that the mean of her belief is µ. Given their
beliefs, all bidders best reply to the bidding strategies of their competitors. Given the
bidding strategies, the beliefs make each bidder worst off given her type. It may appear
counterintuitive that, given her bid, the worst-case scenario for a bidder with valuation θ
is that she is the strongest bidder. However, given the bidding strategies in the efficient
equilibrium, the utility of a bidder with a valuation of θ depends only on the probability
that she is facing bidders with a valuation of 0. Given that the mean of the belief is fixed,
this probability is minimized if the probability of facing bidders with a valuation of 1 is
zero. In other words, for a bidder with a valuation of θ it is the worst-case to that the
probability that she will face only bidders with a valuation of 0, against whom she will win
for sure, is minimized.
For bidders with a valuation of 1, the worst-case is determined by minimizing her winning
probability while keeping the incentives intact to bid above bθ. Thus, the belief of a bidder
with a valuation of 1 puts just enough probability weight on 0 and θ such that she will bid
above the highest bid of a bidder with a valuation of θ and then as much probability as
possible on 1.
The intuitions from the case with three types carry over to the general model. In
particular, the worst-case belief of a bidder with a given valuation just puts enough
probability weight on lower valuations to induce that for this bidder it is optimal to
outbid each bidder with a lower valuation. The remaining probability weight is put on the
valuation of the bidder in question in order to minimize her winning probability. It follows
directly that such beliefs induce bidding that leads to an efficient allocation.
In order to show that the proposed strategies indeed constitute an equilibrium with
worst-case beliefs, it remains to show that there is no other belief that would induce a
bid that would make a bidder worse off than in the proposed equilibrium. For this we
introduce a novel proof method. The underlying idea of the proof is to show that we can
switch from comparing different beliefs and their induced utilities to comparing different
bids and their induced utilities. This is due to the fact that a given best reply b can
be induced by a multitude of beliefs (given the bidder’s valuation and the other bidders’
strategies). It follows that every bid b can be identified by a minimization problem: among
all distribution functions with mean µ which induce bid b as a best reply it suffices to
consider the belief which leads to the minimum utility. Using this concept, we can map
every bid to a belief and a corresponding utility. Therefore, checking whether the utility
induced by b is lower than the utility induced by some other b′ establishes a transitive total
order on the set of bids.
We use three different tools with which we can compare different bids with respect to
the introduced transitive order. The first tool is to show that for certain types there exists
only one distribution which induces a particular bid. This allows to directly compute the
minimum expected utility which can be induced by this bid for these types. The second
tool constitutes a connection between binding constraints in the minimization problem
63
corresponding to a bid b and bids which are lower than b with respect to our order. Third,
we show that for a given type there exist bids which can never be a best reply independent
of the subjective belief. Hence, these bids cannot be possible deviations from the proposed
worst-case equilibrium for the given type. Using these three tools, we construct a chain
where all bids are arranged with respect to our order and the efficient equilibrium bids are
the lowest. Due to the transitivity of our relation, this excludes exclude all other bids as
possible deviations from the proposed equilibrium strategy.
Besides specifying an efficient worst-case belief equilibrium, we provide a comparison of
expected revenues of a second-price auction and a first-price auction under endogenous
worst-case beliefs for the case where bidders can have three discrete valuations 0, θ and 1. We
show that for certain parameter constellations of θ and µ the first-price or the second-price
auction perform better in terms of expected revenue independent of the true valuation
distribution. There also exist parameters θ and µ such that the revenue-maximizing choice
of the auction format depends on the true valuation distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We conclude the introduction with
an overview over the related literature. The second section contains the formal model
including the formal description of our solution concept, the worst-case belief equilibrium.
In the third section we show the existence of an efficient worst-case belief-equilibrium
and derive the corresponding beliefs and strategies for the special case of two bidders
and three types. We consider this special case in order to focus on the intuition of the
results and to illustrate the techniques of our proof. In the fourth section we conduct the
revenue comparison between the first-price and the second-price auction under endogenous
worst-case beliefs for the case of two bidders and three valuations. The fifth section contains
the formal model and an outline of the proof for the general case with an arbitrary number
of bidders and discrete valuations. We conclude in section six and section seven provides
an overview over the most used notation and definitions. The appendix contains the proofs
not provided in previous sections. We provide all proofs in the Appendix for the case of
two bidders and three valuations and the general case separately. The proofs for the special
case are provided in order to give an intuition for the general case. However, the model for
the general case in the fifth section as well as the proofs for the general case can be also
understood without reading the special case first.
Relation to the literature
Our paper complements two strands of literature: the literature on robust auction design
and the literature on first-price auctions with non-standard priors. Both strands of literature
relax the typically strict assumptions that are placed on the beliefs of the designer and the
participants of an auction.
Contrary to the literature on robust auction design that focuses on the problem of the
designer who does not have precise beliefs about the bidders, we focus on the problem of the
bidder who does not have precise beliefs about her competitors. Departing from the ideas
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posed in this literature, we propose that not only the designer may be uninformed about
the environment but also the bidders, if they do not interact frequently, may have some
uncertainty. We then use modeling techniques developed in this literature and develop a
novel solution concept to analyze this problem. For example, Bergemann and Schlag (2008)
consider optimal monopoly pricing under uncertainty about demand distribution with a
seller who either maximizes worst-case expected utilities or minimizes the maximal regret.
They find that the optimal pricing policy hedges against uncertainty by randomizing over
a range of prices. Buyers with low valuations cannot generate substantial regret and are
priced out of the market. Bergemann and Schlag (2011) consider a robust version of the
classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. The seller faces
model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood
of a given model distribution. They find that the equilibrium price under either criterion
is lower then in the absence of uncertainty. The concern for robustness leads the seller to
concede a larger information rent to all buyers with valuations below the optimal price
without uncertainty. Carrasco et al. (2018) analyze the optimal selling mechanism if
the seller maximizes worst-case expected profits and is only informed about one moment
of the distribution of the buyer’s valuations. They show that the optimal mechanism
entails distortions at the intensive margin, e.g., except for the highest valuation buyer,
sales will take place with probability strictly smaller than one. The seller can implement
such allocation by committing to post prices drawn from a non-degenerate distribution,
so that randomizing over prices is an optimal robust selling mechanism. Brooks (2016)
considers the mechanism design problem of a seller who is uninformed about demand,
while potential buyers are well-informed. The seller’s goal is to maximize the minimum
ratio between expected revenue and the expected efficient utility. He characterizes simple
mechanisms that maximize the minimum extraction ratio. In these mechanisms, the
seller runs a second-price auction and simultaneously surveys the beliefs of buyers about
other’s valuations. Carroll (2015) considers a moral hazard problem where the principal
is uncertain what the agent can and cannot do: She knows some actions available to the
agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal demands robustness,
evaluating possible contracts by their worst-case performance, over unknown actions the
agent might potentially take. He finds that the optimal contract from the point of view of
the principal is linear.
The literature on first-price auctions with non-standard priors relaxes the assumptions
placed on the priors of the bidders by the standard IPV model. For example, Fang and
Morris (2006) consider parametric examples of symmetric two-bidder private valuation
auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals
about her opponent’s private valuation. They show that in such environments the revenue
equivalence between the first and second-price auction (SPA) breaks down and there is no
definite revenue ranking; while the SPA always allocates efficiently, the first price auction
(FPA) may be inefficient; equilibria may fail to exist for the FPA. Kim and Che (2004)
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study auctions in which bidders may know the types of some rival bidders but not others.
They show that the first-price auction results in an inefficient allocation and that this
inefficient allocation translates into a poor revenue performance. Bergemann et al. (2017)
characterize the set of all possible outcomes that may arise in a first-price auction under any
given information structure among the bidders. They find that revenue is maximized when
buyers know who has the highest valuation, but the highest valuation buyer has partial
information about others’ valuations. Revenue is minimized when buyers are uncertain
about whether they will win or lose and incentive constraints are binding for all upward
bid deviations. Contrary to this literature, we do not assume an exogenously given prior
but rather introduce a novel way to model endogenous beliefs that will depend on the
specific game structure. We find, in contrast to most findings in this literature, that the
first-price auction allocates efficiently.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Setup
There are n risk-neutral bidders competing in a first-price sealed-bid auction for one
indivisible object. Before the auction starts, each bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} privately observes
her valuation (type) θi ∈ Θ =
{
0 = θ1, θ2, . . . , θm−1, 1 = θm
}
. The valuation distributions
are unknown to the bidders. However, it is common knowledge among the bidders that
the mean of this distribution is µ. Hence, every bidder knows that the probability mass
function of the other bidders’ valuations is an element from
Fn−1µ =








= µ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ,
where for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, fi(θj) denotes the probability
with which valuation θj occurs according to the probability mass function fi. In other
words, this is the set of all probability mass functions of independently drawn valuations
from the set Θ for n− 1 bidders with mean µ. For a shorter notation we will use the term
probability function instead of probability mass function.
In the auction the bidders submit bids, the bidder with the highest bid wins the object
and pays her bid. In addition, we assume an efficient tie-breaking rule27. Thus, the utility
of bidder i with valuation θi and bid bi given that the other bids are b−i is denoted by 28
27We assume an efficient tie-breaking rule since it simplifies notation. With a random tie-breaking rule one
would need to assume a discrete bid grid (which may be arbitrarily fine) in order to ensure equilibrium
existence. However, the equilibrium strategies under both tie breaking rules would differ by at most one
bid step in the bid grid.
28For a vector (v1, . . . , vn) we denote by v−i the vector (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn).
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ui (θi, bi, b−i) =

θi − bi if bi > max
j 6=i
bj
θi − bi if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi > max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
0 if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi < max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
1
k (θi − bi) if bi = maxj 6=i bj and θi = maxj 6=i {θj | bj = bi}
0 if bi < max
j 6=i
bj
where θj denotes the valuation of bidder j with bid bj for j ∈ {1, ..., n} and k =
#{max{θj |bj = bi}}.
A (mixed) strategy βi of a bidder i maps the valuation (type) of a bidder to a distribution
of bids:
βi : Θ→ ∆R+
θi 7→ βi (θi)
where ∆R+ is the set of all probability distributions on R+. For bidder i with valuation θi
it is a cumulative distribution function of bids, denoted by Gβiθi with corresponding density
gβiθi and support supp (βi(θi)). A pure strategy of bidder i with valuation θi is a mapping
βi : Θ→ R+
θi 7→ βi (θi) ,
i.e. this is a mapping from the set of valuations to the set of bids.29 The expected utility
of a bidder i with valuation θi, belief f−i ∈ Fn−1µ and bid bi given that her competitors
employ bidding strategies β−i can be written as













We are interested in the bidding behavior of a bidder who apart from the support and
mean has no information about the distribution of the valuations of her competitors. Thus,
in order to derive a bid, the bidder has to form a subjective belief. We assume that this
bidder will prepare for the worst case. Prepare means that the bidder will choose her
optimal bid given she expects to face the worst-case distribution of valuations. That is,
the bidder will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected
29A pure strategy can be interpreted as distribution of bids which puts probability weight 1 on one bid.
We abuse notation since in the case of a pure strategy, βi (θi) denotes an element in R+ while in the
case of a (mixed) strategy βi (θi) denotes an element in ∆R+. However, in the following it will be clear
whether βi is a pure or a mixed strategy. In addition, we will also use the notation Gβiθi instead of βi(θi)
in case of mixed strategies.
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utility, given her bid is an optimal reaction to the bids of her competitors induced by
this distribution and their bidding strategy. We will introduce the concept in several
steps. First, we define the best reply of bidder i to a given belief f−i and a given bidding
strategy of the competitors β−i. Second, we introduce the worst-case belief for a given
bidding strategy of the competitors β−i. That is, we derive the belief that minimizes the
expected utility of bidder i given her best reply to this belief and the bidding strategy of
her competitors. Third, we will define the worst-case belief equilibrium in which each type
of each bidder bids the optimal bid given her worst-case belief and the bidding strategy of
her competitors.
Best reply to a belief and the competitors’ strategies For bidder i with valuation θi
and for each belief f−i about the other bidders’ valuations and bidding strategies β−i, the
set of best replies of bidder i is given by
Bri (θi, f−i, β−i) = argmax
bi
Ui (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) .
Bidder i’s best reply induces an expected utility of
U (θi, f−i, bri (θi, f−i, β−i) , β−i)
for bri (θi, f−i, β−i) ∈ Bri (θi, f−i, β−i) .
Worst-case belief given a best reply and the competitors’ strategies As argued before,
we will assume that a bidder prepares for the worst case, i.e. she will assume that the
distribution of her competitors’ valuations induces the worst utility given her best reply
and the bidding strategy of her competitors. Since after forming a belief, a bidder will
choose an optimal bid given this belief, a distribution induces the worst outcome for a
bidder if it minimizes the expected utility of a bidder given her optimal bid. That is,
the worst-case belief minimizes the maximum expected utility of the bidder. Formally, a
worst-case belief fθi−i of bidder i with valuation θi is given by
fθi−i = argmin
f−i∈Fn−1µ





Ui (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) .
Given the other bidders’ strategies β−i, a bidder i with type θi calculates her best reply
to each belief in Fn−1µ and the corresponding utility. The worst-case belief of bidder i is
the one inducing the lowest utility. In other words, the worst-case belief minimizes the
maximum possible expected utility of a bidder given her valuation and the other bidders’
strategies. Note that a worst-case belief is not necessarily unique but every worst-case
belief yields the same utility.
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Worst-case belief equilibrium In equilibrium, after forming a worst-case belief as described
above, each bidder will choose an optimal bid given her valuation, her worst-case belief
and the other bidders’ strategies. That is, in equilibrium it has to hold for every valuation
of every bidder that
(i) Given her valuation, her belief, and the other bidders’ strategies the bid of a bidder
maximizes her expected utility.
(ii) For every bidder there does not exists another belief such that a best reply to this
belief induces a lower expected utility.
This leads to the following definition.
Definition 8 (Worst-case belief equilibrium). A profile of bidding strategies (β1, . . . , βn)
together with a profile of beliefs
(
[fθ1−1, . . . , f
θm−1
−1 , f
θm−1 ], . . . , [fθ
1










form a worst-case belief equilibrium if for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, all θi ∈ Θ, all f−i ∈ Fn−1µ and













≤ Ui (θi, f−i, br (θi, f−i, β−i) , β−i) . (22)
In the following we will refer to the first condition as the best-reply condition and to the
second condition as the worst-case belief condition.
3.3 Worst-case belief equilibria: two bidders, three valuations
This section focuses on our main result which states that an efficient worst-case belief
equilibrium exists. We characterize the beliefs and strategies in the worst-case belief
equilibrium and illustrate the techniques of our proof. We start our analysis with the case
of two bidders, A and B and and three possible valuations 0, θ and 1. This allows us to
focus on the main features of the concept without complex notation. The general case with
n bidders and m types is analyzed in section 3.5.
3.3.1 Efficient worst-case belief equilibrium
Theorem 2. In a first-price auction there exists an efficient worst-case belief equilibrium.
In order to prove the existence of an efficient worst-case equilibrium, we specify a
profile of increasing strategies and beliefs and show that they constitute a worst-case belief
equilibrium. The underlying idea of the proof is to show that we can switch from comparing
different beliefs and their induced utilities to comparing different bids and their induced
utilities. This is due to the fact that a given best reply b can be induced by a multitude
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of beliefs (given the bidder’s valuation and the other bidders’ strategies). It follows that
every bid b can be identified by a minimization problem: among all distribution functions
with mean µ which induce bid b as a best reply it suffices to consider the belief which
leads to the minimum utility. Using this concept, we can map every bid to a belief and a
corresponding utility. Therefore, checking whether the utility induced by b is lower than
the utility induced by some other b′ establishes a transitive total order on the set of bids.
We use three different tools with which we can compare different bids with respect to
the introduced transitive order. The first tool is to show that for certain types there exists
only one distribution which induces a particular bid. This allows to directly compute the
minimum expected utility which can be induced by this bid for these types. The second
tool constitutes a connection between binding constraints in the minimization problem
corresponding to a bid b and bids which are lower than b with respect to our order. Third,
we show that for a given type there exist bids which can never be a best reply independent
of the belief. Hence, these bids cannot be possible deviations from the proposed worst-case
equilibrium for the given type. Using these three tools, we construct a chain where all bids
are arranged with respect to our order and the efficient equilibrium bids are the lowest.
Due to the transitivity of our relation, this excludes all other bids as possible deviations
from the proposed worst-case strategy.
We start with the formal description of the strategies and beliefs we claim to constitute
a worst-case belief equilibrium. We will consider two possible cases: θ ≤ µ and θ > µ.
3.3.2 Characterization of the efficient worst-case belief equilibrium for θ ≤ µ
We start with the simpler case θ ≤ µ and claim that the following strategies and beliefs
constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium. The proof of this claim is provided in section
3.3.3. Since both bidders will have symmetric beliefs and strategies, we omit the identity
of the bidder in the notation of beliefs and strategies.
We denote the strategy which we claim to be played in a worst-case belief equilibrium
by β∗. We define
β∗ (0) = 0, β∗ (θ) = θ, β∗ (1) = G∗1. (23)
That is, a bidder with valuation zero bids zero, a bidder with valuation θ bids θ and
a bidder with valuation 1 plays a mixed strategy on the interval [θ, b1] according to a
continuous bid distribution G∗1. We will calculate G∗1 and the exact valuation of b1 further
below. One can immediately see that these strategies constitute an efficient equilibrium,
that is, the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction with probability 1.
We will denote the belief which we claim to constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium
together with the strategies specified above, by f θˆ,∗ =
(






for θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}.30
That is, f θˆ,∗0 denotes the probability with which bidder A with valuation θˆ believes that
30In the following we will refer to β∗ and f θˆ∗ as the worst-case strategy and the worst-case beliefs.
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bidder B has valuation zero (and analogously for other valuations and bidder B).
The subjective worst-case beliefs are defined as follows. Type zero can have any belief
from the set Fn−1µ . A bidder with valuation θ has the subjective worst-case belief that the
probability weight in the other bidder’s probability function is solely distributed between
valuations θ and 1. Since probabilities have to add up to one and the mean has to be







fθ,∗0 0 + f
θ,∗
θ θ + f
θ,∗
1 1 = µ.
In the following we will refer to these two constraints as the first and second probability
constraint. If it holds that fθ,∗0 = 0, it follows from these constraints that








1− θ . (24)
We define the subjective worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1 to be the solution of




s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ
(f0 + fθ) (1− θ) ≥ f0.31
The second and third constraints are the above described probability constraints. The
last constraint ensures that bidding θ is weakly better for a bidder with valuation 1 than
bidding any lower bid given the other bidder’s strategy.32 That is, there is just enough
probability weight on lower types in order to induce a bid of at least θ for type 1. It is
sufficient to consider only a possible deviation to bid 0 because all bids in the interval (0, θ)
are placed with zero probability and therefore are never best replies. Note that the feasible
set of this minimization problem is not empty since the worst-case belief of type θ is an
element of the feasible set.
In the case with three types such that θ ≤ µ the solution of minimization problem M1<θ
31We use the expression “the solution” instead of “a solution” since we will show that this minimization
problem has a unique solution. Also in the remainder of the paper we will use the term “the solution”
in order to indicate that we will show that the particular minimization problem has a unique solution.
32In the following we will use the notation with subscript "<" like in M1<θ in order to indicate that a
minimization problem does not contain all possible constraints but only the constraints which ensure
that bidding a given bid is weakly better than bidding any lower bid.
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s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ.
The solution of this minimization problem puts zero probability weight on type θ. Such a
solution does not fulfill the constraint
(f0 + fθ) (1− θ) ≥ f0.
Since this is the only constraint besides the probability constraints, this constraint has to
be binding in minimization problem M1<θ. Therefore, the solution of minimization problem












1− θ2 . (25)
Given the subjective worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1, one can compute the
upper endpoint of her bidding interval, denoted by b1, and the bid distribution, denoted





(1− θ) = 1− b1.







2 + θ − µθ
1− θ2 =
θ + µ
1 + θ .
The bid distribution is defined such that bidders A and B with valuation 1 make each














(1− θ) . (26)
3.3.3 Proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition for θ ≤ µ
After specifying the worst-case beliefs and strategy, we have to show that these indeed
constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium. That is, we have to show that the best-reply
and the worst-case belief condition are fulfilled.
33Since according to the worst-case strategy the support of the bid distribution for every type is an interval
(which may consists only of one point), we use the term "bidding interval" for the support of the bid
distribution prescribed by the worst-case strategy for a given type.
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Proposition 9. Given the worst-case strategy as defined in (23) and the worst-case beliefs
as defined in (24) and (25), it holds for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1} that
(i) The best-reply condition given by
bθˆ ∈ Br
(
θˆ, f θˆ,∗, β∗
)






is fulfilled, i.e. every bidder plays a best reply given her valuation, her worst-case
belief and the other bidder’s worst-case strategy.









θˆ, f θˆ,∗, bθˆ, β
∗) ≤ U (θˆ, f, br (θˆ, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fµ.34
That is, there does not exist another belief such that a best reply to this belief induces
a lower expected utility than the worst-case belief.
Proof. Part (i): Due to the symmetry of beliefs and strategies, it is sufficient to show the
best-reply condition for bidder A. The result is obvious for a bidder with valuation zero.
Given the subjective worst-case belief of bidder A with valuation θ as defined in (24) and
bidder B’s strategy, bidder A with valuation θ considers θ to be the lowest bid placed by
bidder B. Therefore, she expects a utility of zero and bidding θ is a best reply. It follows
from the definition of the worst-case belief of bidder A with valuation 1 as defined in (25)
that she does not earn a higher expected utility by bidding any bid lower than θ. Bids in
the interval (0, θ) are never played according to β∗ and therefore cannot be a best reply.
The constraint
(f0 + fθ) (1− θ) ≥ f0
in minimization problem M1<θ ensures that bidding zero does not induce a higher expected
utility than bidding θ. Since bidder B does not place bids above b1, it cannot be a best
reply for bidder A to bid above b1. The bid distribution G1 is constructed in a way which
makes bidder A with valuation 1 indifferent between any bid in [θ, b1] which completes the
proof of part (i).
The remainder of this section is dedicated to proving the worst-case belief condition.
That is, for every type we have to consider all probability functions over the valuations 0,
θ and 1 with mean µ and have to show that none of these probability functions induces a
lower expected utility than the worst-case beliefs of the given type. Before we can complete
the proof of part (ii), we need to introduce several proof techniques.
As a first step, we will introduce the concept of minimizing probability functions which
enables us to switch from comparing the induced utility of probability functions to comparing
34Since utility functions are symmetric among bidders, we will omit the identitiy of the bidder in the
notation of utility functions.
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the induced utility of bids. Afterwards, we will introduce different tools with which we
can compare the utility induced by different bids and therefore exclude bids as possible
deviations from the proposed worst-case strategy.
Minimizing probability functions Consider the list of possible subjective beliefs from
which bidder A chooses. Given the type of bidder A and bidder B’s strategy, every
probability function induces a best reply for bidder A. The best reply induces an expected
utility:
probability function fB → best reply br (θA, fB, βB)→ expected utility U (θA, fB, br, βB)
faB b


















Here θA ∈ {0, θ, 1} denotes a valuation of bidder A and faB, f bB, . . . denotes a list of
probability functions of bidder B’s valuations among which bidder A chooses her subjective
worst-case belief. Note that different probability functions can induce the same best reply.
Therefore, the list can be rearranged by grouping those probability functions together
which induce the same best reply:
probability function fB → best reply br (θA, fB, βB)→ expected utility U (θA, fB, br, βB)
faB b






















































Among the probability functions which induce the same bid, it is sufficient to consider the
probability functions which induce the minimum expected utility. That is, it is sufficient to
select the probability functions inducing the minimum expected utility from each group and
compare the induced utilities. Hence, we can switch from comparing probability functions
to comparing bids. This is formalized in the following definition and observation which we
provide for bidder A to simplify notation.
Definition 9. For bidder A with valuation θA ∈ {0, θ, 1}, a bid bA and the competitor’s
strategy βB, the set of probability functions Fmin (θA, bA, βB) given by
Fmin (θA, bA, βB) = argmin
fB∈Fµ
{U (θA, fB, bA, βB) | bA ∈ Br (θA, fB, βB)}
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is called the set of minimizing probability functions of bid bA for a bidder with valuation
θA given the other bidder’s strategy βB. Among all probability functions which induce bid
bA as a best reply, a minimizing probability function is a probability function which induces
the minimum utility.









profile of beliefs bidder A has about bidder B’s valuation. For a valuation θA ∈ {0, θ, 1} of





B , bA, βB
)
≤ U (θA, fB, br (θA, fB, βB) , βB)
for all fB ∈ Fµ, is equivalent to the following two conditions:
(i) The belief fθAB is an element in Fmin (θA, bA, βB), i.e. a minimizing probability
function of bid bA for a bidder with valuation θA given B’s strategy βB.
(ii) Let b′A be a bid and fB be an element in Fmin (θA, b′A, βB), i.e. a minimizing





B , bA, βB
)
≤ U (θA, fB, b′A, βB) .
Clearly, a belief cannot be a worst-case belief of a given type if this belief induces a bid
as a best reply for this type but there exists another belief which induces the same bid
but with a lower expected utility. Therefore, a worst-case belief has to be a minimizing
probability function for all bids in the support of bidder A’s bidding strategy, as stated
in the first condition of the observation. Moreover, for every type and every bid in the
support of the given type there cannot exist another bid which induces a lower expected
utility together with a minimizing probability function for this type and this bid, as stated
in the second condition. In other words, if we group together all probability functions
which induce the same bid and consider the minimizing probability function in every group,
we can compare the expected utility induced by bids instead the expected utility induced
by beliefs.
That is, it is sufficient to compare bids if we compare them with respect to the expected
utility they induce together with their minimizing probability function. In order to apply
this technique, we need the following definitions.
Definition 10. For a bidder with valuation 1 minimization problem M1b of a bid b ∈ [θ, b1]
is the minimization problem corresponding to its minimizing probability functions, i.e. all
solutions of minimization problem M1b are minimizing probability functions of b for a bidder
with valuation 1 given the other bidder’s worst-case strategy β∗. Formally, minimization
problem M1b is given by
min
(f0,fθ,f1)
(f0 + fθ + f1G1 (b)) (1− b)
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s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ
(f0 + fθ + f1G1 (b)) (1− b) ≥ (f0 + fθGθ (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [0, bθ]
(f0 + fθ + f1G1 (b)) (1− b) ≥ (f0 + fθ + f1G1 (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [bθ, b1].
In other words, among all probability functions which induce bid b for type 1 as a best
reply, the solutions of minimization problemM1b induce the minimum expected utility. Note
that since bids above b1 are never a best reply, it is not necessary to include constraints
which ensure that bidding b induces at least the same expected utility as bids above b1.
Definition 11. Apart from the constraints
fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ,
every constraint in minimization problem M1b compares the utility of bidding b to the utility
of bidding some other bid b′, which is formalized by
U (1, f, b, β∗) ≥ U (1, f, b′, β∗) .
We call such a constraint an incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′.
Definition 12. For a type θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1} and bids b, b′ we use the notation b ≤θˆ b′ if for the
θˆ-type bid b′ does not induce a strictly lower expected utility than bid b together with their






































































⇒ b =θˆ b′.
We also use the notation b <θˆ b′ if b′ does not have a minimizing probability function given
θˆ because it is never a best reply for a bidder with valuation θˆ, but b does have a minimizing
probability function. We use the notation b =θˆ b′ if neither b, nor b′ have a minimizing
probability function.
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Given the notation provided in this definition and Observation 1, we can state a condition
which is equivalent to the worst-case belief condition but is more tractable:
Observation 2. The worst-case belief condition for a bidder with valuation θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1},






and the other bidder’s strategy β∗ given by
U
(
θˆ, f θˆ,∗, bθˆ, β
∗) ≤ U (θˆ, f, br (θˆ, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fµ
is equivalent to





(ii) bθˆ ≤θˆ b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, b1].
In order to apply this observation, we will make use of the fact that the relation ≤θˆ
constitutes a transitive order which allows us to build chains of the form
bθˆ ≤θˆ b1 · · · ≤θˆ bk
and exclude all bids b1, . . . , bk as bids which could induce a lower expected utility.
After reframing the worst-case belief condition, we prove two lemmas which correspond
to two different tools with which we can compare the utility induced by different bids and
therefore exclude bids as possible deviations from the proposed worst-case strategy.35 The
first tool is to show that for every bid in the interval (θ, b1) there exists only one probability
function which induces this bid as a best reply for the 1-type. As a consequence, one
can directly compute the minimum utility which can be induced for a bid in the interval
[θ, b1] and show that the minimum utility is equal for all bids in the interval [θ, b1]. This is
formalized in the following Lemma and Corollary.




for f1,b ∈ Fµ.








, the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation
1.
The intuition behind this is that the worst-case belief of a 1-type together with the
strategy of the other 1-type makes her indifferent between any bid in the interval [θ, b1].
Any change of the worst-case belief makes either a deviation to θ or to b1 more profitable.




cannot be induced by a belief different from the worst-case belief
of the 1-type. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 3.8.1.
Corollary 2. For every b ∈ [θ, b1] it holds that θ =1 b.
That is, every bid in the interval [θ, b1] induces the same expected utility together with
a minimizing probability function.
35We will need a third tool in the case θ > µ.
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Proof. As defined in (25), the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1, denoted
by f1,∗, is the solution of minimization problem M1<θ. Since we have shown that the
best-reply condition is fulfilled for type 1, it holds that f1,∗ is an element of the feasible
set of minimization problem M1θ . Since the constraints of minimization problem M1<θ are
a subset of the constraints of minimization problem M1θ , it follows that f1,∗ is a solution
of M1θ . It follows from Lemma 14 and the definition of the worst-case belief of the 1-type
that every bid in [θ, b1) together with its unique minimizing probability function induces






Independent of the probability function the expected utility of bidding b1 is equal to 1− b1






(1− θ). Therefore, it holds for all b ∈ [θ, b1] that
θ =1 b.
The second tool constitutes a connection between binding incentive constraints in
minimization problem M1b and bids which are lower than b with respect to the introduced
transitive order ≤1.
Lemma 15. Let b be a bid and f1,b a solution of minimization problem M1b . If there exists
a binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid bˆ, i.e.
U
(




1, f1,b, bˆ, β∗
)
,
then it holds that bˆ ≤1 b.























1, f1,bˆ, bˆ, β∗
)
the values of the objective functions of




s ∈ [θ, b1] the incentive constraint corresponding to bid s given by
U
(
1, f, bˆ, β∗
)
≥ U (1, f, s, β∗)
is fulfilled for f = f1,b because it holds that
U
(








1, f1,b, s, β∗
)
.
The equality follows from the fact that the incentive constraint corresponding to bˆ is
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binding in minimization problem M1b . The inequality
U
(




1, f1,b, s, β∗
)
holds because f1,b is a solution of minimization problem M1b . Since every constraint in
M1
bˆ
is fulfilled by f1,b, it holds that f1,b is an element of L1
bˆ
. This also shows that the
feasible set of minimization problem M1
bˆ
is not empty. Therefore, in M1
bˆ
the solution
of minimization problem M1
bˆ
has to induce a lower or equal utility than the solution of
minimization problem M1b and it follows that
U
(








1, f1,b, b, β∗
)
.
We conclude that bid b together with a minimizing probability function does not induce
a lower expected utility than bid bˆ together with a minimizing probability function and it
therefore holds that bˆ ≤1 b.
After introducing two tools with which we can compare bids with respect to the introduced
transitive order, we can prove the second part of Proposition 9.
Proof. Since by bidding zero a bidder with valuation zero expects a utility of zero and this
is the lowest possible utility, the worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for type zero. The
expected utility of a bidder with valuation θ induced by her worst-case belief and the other
bidder’s strategy is zero and therefore, the worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for type θ.
It is left to show the worst-case belief condition for type 1. As stated in Observation 2, the
worst-case belief condition for type 1 is equivalent to
(i) f1,∗ ∈ Fmin (1, b, β∗)
(ii) b ≤1 b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, b1]
for all b ∈ [θ, b1]. Analogously as in the proof of Corollary 2, one can show that the
worst-case belief of type 1 is a solution of minimization problem M1b for all b ∈ [bθ, b1]. It
follows from Lemma 14 that condition (i) is fulfilled for all bids in [0, bθ). By definition of
the worst-case belief of type 1, this belief induces b1 as best reply for a bidder with valuation
1. Since any probability function which induces b1 as a best reply for the 1-type yields
an expected utility of 1− b1, any probability function with this property is a minimizing
probability function. Therefore, condition (i) is also fulfilled for bid b1. Given the result in
Corollary 2, condition (ii) reduces to
θ ≤1 b for all b ∈ [0, θ). (27)
The only candidate for a bid in the interval [0, θ) which could induce a lower expected
utility than bid θ is 0 since all other bids cannot be a best reply independently of the belief.
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s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = 1 = µ
f0 ≥ (f0 + fθ + f1G1 (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [θ, b1].
Note that it is not necessary to include incentive constraints with corresponding bid in
the interval (0, θ) since such a bid is never a best reply. If only the constraints
s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = 1 = µ
would be considered, it would hold for the solution of M10 that f1 = 0. But then the
constraint
f0 ≥ (f0 + fθ) (1− θ)
would be violated. Therefore, one of the incentive constraints in M10 has to be binding.
Let bˆ be the bid such that the corresponding incentive constraint is binding. It follows
from Lemma 15 that bˆ ≤1 0. Since bids in the interval (0, θ) are never a best reply, it must
hold that bˆ ∈ [θ, b1]. Using the transitivity of the relation ≤1, we conclude that
0 ≤1 bˆ =1 θ.
Thus, we have shown (27) which completes the proof.
After proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition, we conclude that the
strategies and beliefs specified in 3.3.2 indeed constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium.
This completes the example with two bidders and three types such that θ ≤ µ and now
we turn to the case where θ > µ. As before, we first specify the worst-case strategy and
beliefs.
3.3.4 Characterization of the efficient worst-case belief equilibrium for θ > µ
Again, we denote the worst-case strategy by β∗ and define
β∗ (0) = 0, β∗ (θ) = Gθ, β∗ (1) = G1. (28)
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That is, type zero bids zero, type θ plays a mixed strategy on the interval [0, bθ] and
type 1 plays a mixed strategy on the interval [bθ, b1]. As before, one can immediately see
that this constitutes an efficient equilibrium. We denote the worst-case belief of a bidder
with valuation θˆ by
(






for θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}. Type zero can have any belief. The





s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ.
Recall that in the case θ ≤ µ, by definition, the worst-case belief of a bidder with a given
type contained all incentive constraints with corresponding bids which are lower than the
lower endpoint of the type’s bidding interval. This also holds for the case θ > µ. Since
type θ plays a mixed strategy on an interval beginning with zero, there are no incentive
constraints in this minimization problem. Any solution of minimization problem M θ0 has
to fulfill the two probability constraints:
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ.





+ f1 = 1
⇔ f0 = θ − µ
θ
+ f1 (1− θ)
θ
.
Thus, the minimum value for f0 is given by θ−µθ and the solution of minimization problem







, fθ,∗1 = 0. (29)











⇔ bθ = fθ,∗θ θ = µ.
The bid distribution of bidders A and B with valuation θ makes them indifferent between
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(θ − s) . (31)
The subjective worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation 1 is the solution of the






s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1





≥ (f0 + fθGθ (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [0, bθ].
As before, the minimization problem contains all incentive constraints with corresponding
bids which are lower than the lower endpoint of type 1’s bidding interval. This implies
that there is just enough probability weight on types zero and θ in order to incentivize the
1-type to play a mixed strategy on an interval beginning with bθ. The upper endpoint of


















The bid distribution of bidders A and B with valuation 1 makes them indifferent between
















(1− s) . (32)
Note that in contrast to previous minimization problems we cannot derive the solution
of minimization problem M1
<bθ
directly since we have to consider an uncountable number
of incentive constraints . For now, we proceed with the given definition of the worst-case
belief of a bidder with valuation 1 and provide the explicit solution of the minimization
problem later on. However, it is easy to see that the feasible set of minimization problem
M1
<bθ
is not empty since the worst-case belief of type θ is an element of this set.
3.3.5 Proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition for θ > µ
After specifying the worst-case strategy and beliefs, we have to show that these indeed
constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium. That is, we have to show the optimality and the
worst-case belief condition.
Proposition 10. Given the worst-case strategy as defined in (28) and the worst-case
beliefs as defined in (29) and (32), it holds for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1} that
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(i) The best-reply condition given by
bθˆ ∈ Br
(
θˆ, f θˆ,∗, β∗
)






is fulfilled, i.e. every bidder plays a best reply given her valuation, her worst-case
belief and the other bidder’s worst-case strategy.









θˆ, f θˆ,∗, bθˆ, β
∗) ≤ U (θˆ, f, br (θˆ, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fµ.
That is, there does not exist another belief such that a best reply to this belief induces
a lower expected utility than the worst-case belief.
Proof. Part (i): The result is obvious for a bidder with valuation zero. The worst-case
belief of bidder A with valuation θ is that bidder B has valuation 1 with probability
zero. Hence, bidder A expects bθ = µ to be the highest bid placed by bidder B. The bid
distribution of type θ makes bidder A with valuation θ indifferent between any bid in the
interval [0, bθ]. Therefore, she has no incentive to deviate. It follows from the definition of
the worst-case belief of bidder A with valuation 1 that she does not earn a higher expected
utility by bidding any bid lower than bθ. Since bidder B does not play a bid above b1, it
cannot be a best reply for bidder A to bid above b1. The bid distribution G1 is constructed
in a way which makes bidder A with valuation 1 indifferent between any bid in [bθ, b1]
which completes the proof.
The remainder of the section is dedicated to proving the worst-case belief condition.
Since type zero expects the lowest possible utility of zero by bidding zero, the worst-case
belief condition is fulfilled for type zero. We will prove the worst-case belief condition for
types θ and 1 separately, i.e. we divide part (ii) of Proposition 10 into two different parts




θ, fθ,∗, b, β∗
)
≤ U (θ, f, br (θ, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fµ.




1, fθ,∗, b, β∗
)
≤ U (1, f, br (1, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fµ.
We begin with part (ii.1). Similarly, as in the case θ ≤ µ, we prove three lemmas which
correspond to three different tools with which we can compare the utility induced by
different bids.36
36In contrast to the case θ ≤ µ, in the case θ > µ we will make use of three tools.
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The first lemma provides a similar result as Lemma 14 and Corollary 2. That is, we
show that for every bid in the interval (0, bθ) there exists only one probability function
which induces this bid as a best reply for the θ-type. As a consequence, one can directly
compute the minimum utility which can be induced for a bid in the interval [0, bθ] and
show that the minimum utility is equal for all bids in the interval [0, bθ].




for fθ,b ∈ Fµ.








, the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation
θ.
We omit the formal proof since it works similarly to the proof of Lemma 14 and is also
covered by the general case.
Corollary 3. For every b ∈ [0, bθ] it holds that 0 =θ b.
That is, every bid in the interval [0, bθ] induces the same expected utility together with
a minimizing probability function.
Proof. Analogously as in the proof of Corollary 2, one can conclude that every bid in [0, bθ)
together with its unique minimizing probability function induces the same expected utility
given by fθ,∗0 θ.
It is left to show that 0 =θ bθ. Any probability function (f0, fθ, f1) which induces bid
bθ = µ as a best reply for type θ has to fulfill
(f0 + fθ) (θ − µ) ≥ f0θ. (33)
Since due to the probability constraints the smallest possible value for f0 is given by θ−µθ ,
it must hold that
(f0 + fθ) (θ − µ) ≥ θ − µ
from which follows that f0 + fθ = 1. Hence, f0 and fθ are uniquely determined by the two
probability constraints. Any probability function which fulfills the probability constraints
and inequality (33) coincides with the worst-case belief of type θ.
Therefore, the worst-case belief of type θ is the only probability function which induces
bθ = µ as a best reply for type θ. Hence, the worst-case belief is the unique minimizing
probability function for bid bθ and it follows from the definition of the worst-case belief
that bids 0 and bθ induce the same expected utility together with a minimizing probability





(θ − µ) = fθ,∗0 θ.
Therefore, it holds for all b ∈ [0, bθ] that
0 =1 b.
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The second lemma corresponds to Lemma 15. That is, it establishes a connection
between binding incentive constraints in minimization problem M θb and bids which are
lower than b with respect to the order ≤θ
Lemma 17. Let b be a bid and fθ,b a solution of minimization problem M θb . If there exists
a binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid bˆ, i.e.
U
(




θ, fθ,b, bˆ, β∗
)
,
then it holds that bˆ ≤θ b.
The same proof as for Lemma 15 applies. For the third tool, we show that for a given
type there exist bids which can never be a best reply independent of the subjective belief.
Hence, these bids cannot be possible deviations from the proposed worst-case equilibrium
for the given type.
Lemma 18. The feasible set of minimization problem M θb for all b ∈ (bθ, b1] is empty.
Assume there exists a bid b in the interval (bθ, b1] such that the feasible set of minimization







, there must be strictly positive probability weight on the 1-type because
otherwise there would be no incentive to bid higher than bθ. In contrast, the worst-case
equilibrium belief of the θ-type has no probability weight on the 1-type. Hence, in order to
preserve the mean, the probability weight on the zero-type or the θ-type in the solution
of minimization problem M θb must be higher than in the worst-case belief. Given the
worst-case belief, the θ-type is indifferent among all bids in the interval [0, bθ]. If the
probability weight of the zero-type is increased, it is optimal for the θ-type to bid zero.
Therefore, the probability weight on the 0-type cannot be increased. Similarly, if the









cannot induce a bid above bθ for the θ-type. The
formal proof is relegated to Appendix 3.8.2.
After introducing the three tools, we can start with the proof of part (ii.1).
Proof. As stated in Observation 2, the worst-case belief condition for type θ is equivalent
to
(i) fθ,∗ ∈ Fmin (θ, b, β∗)
(ii) b ≤θ b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, b1]
for all b ∈ [0, bθ].37 Analogously as in the proof of Corollary 2, one can show that the
worst-case belief of type θ is a solution of minimization problem M θb for all b ∈ [0, bθ]. It
follows from Lemma 16 that condition (i) is fulfilled for all bids in [0, bθ). As shown in the
37We use the notation provided in Definitions 10-12 also for the case θ > µ but use β∗ as defined in 3.3.4.
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proof of Corollary 3, the worst-case belief of the θ-type is the only probability function
which induces bθ as a best reply. Therefore, condition (i) is fulfilled. Given the result in
Corollary 3, condition (ii) reduces to
0 ≤θ b for all b ∈ (bθ, b1].
It follows from Lemma 18 that for all b ∈ (bθ, b1] it holds that 0 <θ b which completes the
proof of part (ii.1).
It is left to show part (ii.2) of Proposition 10, i.e. the worst-case belief condition for type
1. Again, we prove three lemmas which correspond to the three tools presented above.
The first lemma provides a similar result as Lemma 16 and Corollary 3 (and as Lemma
14 and Corollary 2 in the case θ ≤ µ).




for f1,b ∈ Fµ.








, the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation
1.
Corollary 4. For every b ∈ [bθ, b1] it holds that bθ =1 b.
We omit the proofs of the Lemma and the Claim since they work with the same arguments
as before and are covered by the proof of the general case. The following lemma provides
the second tool and corresponds to Lemma 15 and Lemma 17.
Lemma 20. Let b be a bid and f1,b a solution of minimization problem M1b . If there exists
a binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid bˆ, i.e.
U
(




1, f1,b, bˆ, β∗
)
,
then it holds that bˆ ≤1 b.
The same proof as for Lemma 15 applies. The third tool in the proof of the worst-case
belief condition for the 1-type is similar to the third tool (Lemma 18) in the proof of the
worst-case belief condition for type θ. That is, we show that for a given type there exist
bids which can never be a best reply independent of the subjective belief. Hence, these bids
cannot be possible deviations from the proposed worst-case equilibrium for the given type.









such that the minimization problem M1b has a








. Consider two bids b′, b′′ with 0 ≤ b′′ < b <
b′ ≤ bθ.










, the utility for the 1-type of bidding b must be at least
as high as the utilities of bidding b′′ or b′. The higher f1,b0 , the lower is the optimal bid
for type 1. Therefore, the incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′′ sets a lower bound
on the value of f1,b0 while the incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′ sets an upper
bound. We will show that the conditions resulting from these two bounds contradict each
other. Intuitively, a bidder bidding in the interval [0, bθ] faces the bid distribution Gθ of
the θ-type which is constructed in order to make the other θ-type indifferent. Thus, only
for the θ-type the upper and the lower bound are compatible. The formal proof is relegated
to Appendix 3.8.3 .
Given the three tools, we can show part (ii.2).
Proof. As stated in Observation 2, the worst-case belief condition for type 1 is equivalent
to
(i) f1,∗ ∈ Fmin (1, b, β∗)
(ii) b ≤1 b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, b1]
for all b ∈ [θ, b1]. Condition (i) can be proven analogously as in the proof of Proposition 9
and due to Corollary 4, the second condition reduces to
bθ ≤1 b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, bθ).




it holds that bθ <1 b. Therefore, in order
to show the worst-case belief condition for type 1, it is left to show that
bθ ≤θ 0. (34)
As a next step, we use Lemma 21, in order to calculate the worst-case belief of a bidder






s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1





≥ (f0 + fθGθ (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [0, bθ].
The solution of the reduced minimization problem which contains only the constraints
fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
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f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ
would distribute the probability weight solely between type zero and one which would
violate the incentive constraint corresponding to bid zero. Hence, at least one of the
incentive constraints has to be binding. Let bˆ be a bid such that the corresponding
incentive constraint is binding. Since we have shown that the best-reply condition is
fulfilled for type 1, it holds that f1,∗ is an element of the feasible set of minimization
problem M1
bθ
. Since the constraints of minimization problem M1
<bθ
are a subset of the
constraints of minimization problemM1
bθ
, it follows that f1,∗ is a solution ofM1
bθ
. Therefore,





from which follows that bˆ = 0. Therefore, the worst-case belief of type 1 is the
















The solution is given by
f1,∗0 =
(1− µ)2













s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = 1 = µ
f0 ≥ (f0 + fθGθ (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [0, bθ].
f0 ≥ (f0 + fθ + f1G1 (s)) (1− s) for all s ∈ [θ, b1].
The solution of the reduced minimization problem which contains only the constraints
s.t. fθˆ ≥ 0 for all θˆ ∈ {0, θ, 1}
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = 1 = µ
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would distribute the probability weight solely between types zero and θ which would
violate the incentive constraint corresponding to bid θ. Therefore, one of the incentive
constraints with corresponding bid different from zero has to be binding. Let bˆ′ be the bid
corresponding to the binding incentive constraint. It follows from Lemma 20 that bˆ′ ≤1 0.
As argued above, the worst-case belief of type 1 is an element of the feasible set of
minimization problem M1
bθ
. Since the incentive constraint corresponding to bid zero is
binding in this minimization problem, it follows that the worst-case belief of type 1 is an
element of the feasible set of minimization problem M10 . This implies that the feasible
set of minimization problem M10 is not empty. As stated in Lemma 21, the feasible set of
minimization problem M1b is empty for all b ∈ (0, bθ). Hence, it holds that 0 <1 b for all
b ∈ (0, bθ). Therefore, it holds that bˆ′ ∈ [bθ, b1]. It follows from Corollary 4 that bθ =1 bˆ′.
Thus, we can construct the transitive chain
bθ =1 bˆ′ ≤1 0.
We have shown that (34) holds which we established as a sufficient condition for the
worst-case belief condition for type 1.
Since we have shown that the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition hold for all
types, we conclude that the beliefs and strategies specified in 3.3.4 indeed constitute a
worst-case belief equilibrium.
3.4 Revenue comparison of the first-price and second-price
auction
We want to compare the revenue of a first-price and a second-price auction in a setting
where bidders do not know the distribution of their competitors’ valuations. As described
in the model, we assume that the number of bidders, the set possible valuations Θ and the
exogenously given mean µ of valuations is common knowledge. In a second-price auction
bidding the own valuation is a weakly dominant strategy and thus independent of the
belief about the other bidders’ valuations. Therefore, we assume that in a second-price
auction bidders bid their valuation. For the first-price auction we assume that bidders play
the efficient worst-case belief equilibrium.
Since the computation of revenue of the first-price auction involves the computation
of the worst-case beliefs and strategy which is computationally complex, we provide the
formal revenue comparison for the simplified case of two bidders with three possible types
0,θ and 1. As we will see, it highly depends on the valuation distribution which auction
leads to the higher revenue. Hence, we cannot state any general theorems. The revenue
comparison for a given valuation distribution and a given number of bidders requires a
computational solution.
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3.4.1 Revenue of the second-price auction
In order to compute the revenue of the first-price or the second-price auction, we need
to know the true valuation distribution which we denote by (f0, fθ, f1). Given that in a
second-price auction all bidders bid their valuation, the revenue of the second-price auction
is obtained as follows. The expected revenue from type zero is zero. The expected revenue
from type θ is determined by the probability that the θ-type meets another θ-type against
whom she wins with probability 12 and pays θ which gives an expected revenue of
1
2fθθ.
The expected revenue from a 1-type is determined by the probability that she meets a
θ-type, in this case the 1-type wins with probability 1 and pays θ, and by the probability
that she meets a 1-type, in this case the 1-type wins with probability 12 and pays 1. This
results in an expected revenue of fθθ + 12f1. The total expected revenue of a second-price











Due to the probability constraints given by
f0 + fθ + f1 = 1
fθθ + f1 = µ,
there is only one degree of freedom in left in the choice of the probability function (f0, fθ, f1).
The probability constraints can be rewritten as
f0 = 1− fθ − f1
f1 = µ− fθθ
which gives
f0 = 1− (1− θ) fθ − µ
f1 = µ− fθθ.












f2θ θ − f2θ θ2 + µ2
)
.
3.4.2 Revenue of the first-price auction
For the revenue calculation of the first-price auction with worst-case beliefs we have to
differentiate between the case µ ≥ θ and µ < θ. We start with the case µ ≥ θ. In this
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⇔ b1 = 1− 1− µ1− θ2 (1− θ) =
θ + µ
1 + θ .















(1− µ) (s− θ)




= (1− µ) (1− s)
(
µ− θ2)+ (1− µ) (s− θ) (µ− θ2)
(1− s)2 (µ− θ2)2 =
(1− µ) (1− θ)
(1− s)2 (µ− θ2) .
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The expected revenue from a 1-type is given by
∫ b1
θ






1− µ+ θfθ + (µ− fθθ) (1− µ) (s− θ)(1− s) (µ− θ2)
)
s
(1− µ) (1− θ)
(1− s)2 (µ− θ2)ds.






















1− µ+ θfθ + (µ− fθθ) (1− µ) (s− θ)(1− s) (µ− θ2)
)
s
(1− µ) (1− θ)
(1− s)2 (µ− θ2)ds.








denote the worst-case equilibrium belief of type θ. As shown in section 3.3.4, the θ-type








, f1,∗1 = 0.
The θ-type plays a mixed strategy on the interval [0, bθ] where bθ is defined by
θ − bθ = fθ,∗0 θ
⇔ bθ = θ − θ − µ
θ
θ = µ.








⇔ Gθ (s) = sf
θ,∗
0
fθ,∗θ (θ − s)
= s (θ − µ)




= (θ − µ)µ (θ − s) + s (θ − µ)µ
µ2 (θ − s)2 =
(θ − µ) θ
µ (θ − s)2 .
The expected revenue from a bidder with valuation θ is given by∫ µ
0






1− µ− (1− θ) fθ + fθ s (θ − µ)
µ (θ − s)
)
s
(θ − µ) θ
µ (θ − s)2ds.








, is the unique solution of the following



































































= (1− µ) (s− µ)
µ (1− θ) (1− s)
from which follows that
dG1 (s)
ds
= (1− µ) (1− b)µ (1− θ) + (1− µ) (b− µ)µ (1− θ)
µ2 (1− θ)2 (1− s)2 =
(1− µ)2
µ (1− θ) (1− s)2 .










1− µ+ θfθ + (µ− fθθ) (1− µ) (s− µ)




µ (1− θ) (1− s)2ds.














1− µ− (1− θ) fθ + fθ s (θ − µ)
µ (θ − s)
)
s
(θ − µ) θ






1− µ+ θfθ + (µ− fθθ) (1− µ) (s− µ)




µ (1− θ) (1− s)2ds.
3.4.3 Revenue comparison
After calculating the expected revenue of the first-price and the second-price auction we
can compare the revenue for a given θ and µ in dependence of the valuation of fθ. The
minimum possible valuation for fθ is zero. In case θ ≤ µ the maximum possible valuation
of fθ is obtained if f0 = 0 and is equal to 1−µ1−θ . In case θ > µ, the maximum possible
valuation of fθ is obtained if f1 = 0 and is equal to µθ .
The following graph illustrates the revenue comparison for the first-price auction (blue
line) and the second-price auction (red line) for the parameters θ = 0.4 and µ = 0.5.
Figure 4: Revenue of the first-price auction (blue line) and second-price auction (red line)
plotted against fθ for θ = 0.4 and µ = 0.5
In this case the auctioneer would choose the first-price auction independent of the true
valuation distributions. However, there exist valuations for θ and µ where the revenue
functions cross, i.e. it depends on the true valuation distribution which auction leads to
the higher revenue.
The following graph illustrates the revenue comparison for the first-price auction (blue
line) and the second-price auction (red line) for the parameters θ = 0.6 and µ = 0.5.
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Figure 5: Revenue of the first-price auction (blue line) and second-price auction (red line)
plotted against fθ for θ = 0.6 and µ = 0.5
We conclude that the revenue comparison highly depends on the parameters θ and µ and
depending on the valuation of θ and µ, it can depend on the true valuation distribution.
3.5 General Case: n bidders with m valuations
In this section we provide all definitions and results required for the general case with n
bidders and m types. As before, the main result is that there exists an efficient worst-case
belief equilibrium.
Theorem 3. In a first-price auction there exists an efficient worst-case belief equilibrium.
3.5.1 Characterization of the efficient worst-case belief equilibrium
As in the case of two bidders and three types we begin with the characterization of the
strategies and beliefs which we claim to constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium.38 We
denote the worst-case strategy by β∗. The support of the bid distribution of a bidder
with valuation θk is denoted by [bθk−1 , bθk ]. As every bidder adopts the same worst-case
belief-equilibrium, we omit the identity of the bidder in the notation. Every bidder has
the same worst-case belief and moreover, in the worst-case belief of a bidder every other
bidder has the same valuation distribution. Thus, we can denote the worst-case belief of a








, i.e. for l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} let fθk,∗
θl
be the
probability with which one of the other n − 1 bidders has the θl-type in the belief of a
bidder with valuation θk.





= θk. Let θz be the lowest type which is strictly greater than µ. The belief of a
bidder with valuation θk ≤ µ is the probability function which puts strictly positive weight
only on fθk
θk







38As before, we call the strategy and beliefs we claim to constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium worst-case




















θz − θk .
Given this belief, it is a best reply for a bidder with valuation θk to bid θk since the lowest
bid which such a bidder believes is played by another bidder is given by θk. This induces
the lowest possible expected utility of zero and therefore, the strategies and beliefs specified
for types θk ≤ µ fulfill the best-reply condition and the worst-case belief condition.
Now we define the bidding strategy and beliefs for a bidder with valuation θk with
θk > µ. A bidder with type θk > µ plays a mixed strategy on the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ]
where the upper limit of type θk’s bidding interval is the lower limit of type θk+1’s bidding
interval. We will derive the boundaries of this bidding interval inductively starting with
the boundaries of the bidding interval of the θz-type, which we defined above as the lowest
type strictly greater than µ. The θz-type plays a mixed strategy on the interval [bθz−1 , bθz ]
with bθz−1 = θz−1. We define the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θz to be the
solution of the following minimization problem which we denote by M θz<θz−1 :
min
(fθ1 ,...,fθm )



































i.e. among all distributions with mean µ such that for a bidder with valuation θz it is
weakly better to bid θz−1 than any lower bid given the other bidders’ strategies, it is
the distribution inducing the minimum utility. We do not have to include the incentive
constraints with corresponding bid b for b ∈ (θh−1, θh) for 1 < h < z − 1 since these bids
are never played according to the worst-case strategy and thus are never a best reply. Note
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that the feasible set of this minimization problem is non-empty since a distribution which
puts strictly positive probability weight only on the θz−1- and the θz-type preserving the
mean µ is an element of the feasible set. The upper endpoint of the bidding interval of the
θz-type is obtained by the equation(
fθ
z ,∗






= (θz − bθz).
The bid distribution Gθz is defined such that every bidder with valuation θz is indifferent
between every bid in her bidding interval given her belief and the other bidders’ strategies,
i.e. for every s ∈ [bθz−1 , bθz ] where bθz−1 = θz−1 it holds(
fθ
z ,∗

















After we have specified the strategies and beliefs for the θz-type, we can proceed
inductively. Assume, that strategies and beliefs have been specified for types 1, . . . , k − 1
with z ≤ k − 1 < m, then strategies and beliefs for type k are defined as follows. A bidder
with valuation θk plays a mixed strategy on the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ] where bθk−1 is the upper
bound of the bidding interval of the θk−1-type. We define the worst-case belief of type θk



























n−1 (θk − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ],
i.e. among all distributions with mean µ such that for a bidder with valuation θk it
is weakly better to bid bθk−1 than any lower bid given the other bidders’ strategies, it
is the distribution inducing the minimum utility. The bid distribution Gθk and bθk are
determined such that given this belief every bidder with valuation θk is indifferent between















n−1 (θ − s) .
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Obviously, the worst-case strategy is efficient. We will show in the next section that the
feasible set of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
is not empty. Moreover, in Lemma 28 in
Appendix 3.8.5 we derive the unique solution of this minimization problem. We show that
for the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θk it holds that fθ
k,∗









is the unique solution of the system of k linear equations
which includes the two probability constraints and the binding incentive constraints with
corresponding bid bθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 2.
3.5.2 Proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition
After specifying the worst-case strategy and beliefs, we have to show that they indeed
constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium. That is, we have to show the best-reply and the
worst-case belief condition.
Proposition 11. Given the worst-case strategy and the worst-case beliefs as defined in
3.5.1, it holds for all θˆ ∈ Θ that
(i) The best-reply condition given by
bθˆ ∈ Br
(
θˆ, f θˆ,∗, β∗
)






is fulfilled, i.e. every bidder plays a best reply given her valuation, her worst-case
belief and the other bidders’ worst-case strategy.









θˆ, f θˆ,∗, bθˆ, β
∗) ≤ U (θˆ, f, br (θˆ, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fn−1µ .39
That is, there does not exist another belief such that a best reply to this belief induces
a lower expected utility than the worst-case belief.
Proof. Part (i): It follows directly from the definition of the worst-case beliefs, that for a
bidder with valuation θk it is weakly better to bid bθk−1 than any lower bid. By construction,
a bidder with valuation θk is indifferent between any bid in [bθk−1 , bθk ]. Hence, it is left to
show that it is weakly better to bid bθk−1 than any bid higher than bθk . In order to do so,
we will compare the solutions of the following two minimization problems. Let M θk
<bθk−1








39Since utility functions are symmetric among bidders, we will omit the identitiy of the bidder in utility
function. Moreover, if there exists an asymmetric belief about the other bidders’ valuations which
violates the worst-case belief condition then due to the symmetry of the worst-case strategy, there
exists also a symmetric belief. Therefore, it is sufficient to focus only on symmetric beliefs as possible
deviations.
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fθj + fθhGθh (s)
n−1 (θk − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ],
i.e. among all distributions with mean µ such that for a bidder with valuation θk it is
weakly better to bid bθk−1 than any lower bid given the other bidders’ strategies, it is the
distribution inducing the minimum utility. Now we consider minimization problem M θk
b
θk−1
which determines the distribution inducing the minimum utility among all distributions
with mean µ such that for a bidder with valuation θk it is weakly better to bid bθk−1 than
any other bid given the other bidders’ strategies:
min
(fθ1 ,...,fθm )





















n−1 (θk − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ].











are a subset of the constraints of M θk
<b
θk−1
. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that
fθ




In fθk,∗ there is no probability weight on types above θk because this would require more
probability weight on types below µ and hence increase the value of the objective function.
If we plug in fθk,∗ into M θk
b
θk−1
, then all constraints which correspond to a bid above bθk
are fulfilled because there is no probability weight on types above θk. As argued above, all
constraints with corresponding bid in the interval [0, bθk ] are fulfilled. Therefore, fθ
k,∗ is





Computing the worst-case belief of a bidder is equivalent to computing the distribution
inducing the minimum utility of a bidder given the other bidders’ strategies. Thus, one
has to solve the trade-off between putting probability weight on lower types in order to
induce a high bid and putting probability weight on higher types in order to reduce the
winning probability.
This proof shows that this trade-off is solved such that the worst-case belief of a bidder
with valuation θk puts just enough probability weight on lower types in order to induce the
bid bθk−1 and puts as much as possible probability weight on type θk in order to reduce
the bidder’s winning probability.
One can use this proof in order to show that the worst-case belief of the θk−1-type is
an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
. Hence, one can show by
















(θk−1 − bθk−2) = θk−1 − bθk−1 .














n−1 (θk−1 − s) .
It follows that for all s with s < bθk−1 the incentive constraint corresponding to s is fulfilled
if plugging in fθk−1,∗ into M θk
b
θk−1
because adding the inequalities







n−1 (θk−1 − s)
and







n−1 (θk − θk−1)
yields







n−1 (θk − s) .




We have already shown the worst-case belief condition for all types θk ≤ µ. In order to
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show the worst-case belief condition for higher types, as in the case of three types and two
bidders, we introduce the concept of minimizing probability functions and show that we
can switch from comparing the induced utility of distributions to comparing the induced
utility of bids. This is formalized in the following definition and observation.
Definition 13. For a bidder with valuation θi, a bid bi and a strategy β−i of the other
bidders, the set of probability functions Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i) given by
Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i) = argmin
f−i∈Fn−1µ
{U (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) | bi ∈ Br (θi, f−i, β−i)}
is called the set of minimizing probability functions of bid bi for a bidder with valuation θi
given the other bidders’ strategies β−i. Among all probability functions which induce bid bi
as a best reply, a minimizing probability function is a probability function which induces
the minimum utility.









of beliefs bidder i has about the other bidders’ valuations. For a valuation θi of bidder i










r (θi, f−i, βi) , β−i
)
for all f−i ∈ Fn−1µ , is equivalent to the following two conditions:
(i) The belief fθi−i is an element in Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i), i.e. a minimizing probability
function of bid bi for bidder i with valuation θi given the other bidders’ strategies β−i.
(ii) Let b′i be a bid and f−i be an element inFminn−1 (θi, b′i, β−i), i.e. a minimizing probability






≤ U (θi, f−i, b′i, β−i) .
That is, it is sufficient to compare bids if we compare them with respect to the expected
utility they induce together with a minimizing probability function. In order to apply this
technique, we need the following definitions.
Definition 14. For a bidder with valuation θ minimization problem M θb of a bid b ∈
[bθl−1 , bθl ] is the minimization problem corresponding to its minimizing probability functions,
i.e. all solutions of minimization problem M θb are minimizing probability function of b
for a bidder with valuation θ given the other bidders’ worst-case strategy β∗. Formally,






n−1 (θ − b)
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(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl−1)n−1 (θ − b) ≥
 h∑
j=1
fθj + fθhGθh (s)
n−1 (θ − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ].
Definition 15. Apart from the constraints








every constraint in minimization problem M θb compares the utility of bidding b to the utility
of bidding some other bid b′, which is formalized by
U (θ, f, b, β∗) ≥ U (θ, f, b′, β∗) .
We call such a constraint an incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′.
Definition 16. For a type θ and bids b, b′ we use the notation b ≤θ b′ if for the θ-type
bid b′ does not induce a strictly lower expected utility than bid b together with their
minimizing probability functions given the other bidders’ worst-case strategy β∗. Formally,














⇒ b ≤θ b′,
U
(
























⇒ b =θ b′.
We also use the notation b <θ b′ if b′ does not have a minimizing probability function given
θ because it is never a best reply for a bidder with valuation θ, but b does have a minimizing
probability function. We use the notation b =θ b′ if neither b, nor b′ have a minimizing
probability function.
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Given the notation provided in this Definition, we can state a condition which is equivalent
to the worst-case belief condition but is more tractable:







and bidder B’s strategy β∗ given by
U
(
θˆ, f θˆ,∗, bθˆ, β
∗) ≤ U (θˆ, f, br (θˆ, f, β∗) , β∗) for all f ∈ Fn−1µ
is equivalent to





(ii) bθˆ ≤θˆ b′ for all b′ ∈ [0, bθm ].
As in the case with two bidders and three valuations, we prove three lemmas which
correspond to three different tools with which we can compare the utility induced by different
bids and therefore exclude bids as possible deviations from the proposed worst-case strategy.
The first tool is to show that for every valuation θk ≥ θz for every bid in the interval
(bθk−1 , bθk ] there exists only one probability function which induces this bid as a best reply
for the θk-type.40 As a consequence, one can directly compute the minimum utility which
can be induced for a bid in the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ] and show that the minimum utility is
equal for all bids in the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ]. This is formalized in the following Lemma and
Corollary.












equals to fθk,∗, the worst-case
belief of a bidder with valuation θ.
The intuition behind this result works similarly as for the result for two bidders and
three types in Lemma 14. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 3.8.9.
Corollary 5. For every valuation θk with θk ≥ θz and for every b ∈ (bθk−1 , bθk ] it holds
that b =θk bθk−1.
That is, every bid in the interval [bθk−1 , bθk ] induces the same expected utility together
with a minimizing probability function.
Proof. We have shown in the first part of Proposition 11 that the best-reply condition is
fulfilled for all types. Hence, it holds that the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation
θk ≥ θz, which is the solution of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
, is an element of the
feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θk







, it holds that fθ,∗ is a solution of M θk
<b
θk−1
. It follows from Lemma 22 and the
40Recall that we defined θz to be the smallest valuation which is strictly greater than µ.
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definition of the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θk that every bid in (bθk−1 , bθk ]











Thus, it holds for every b ∈ (bθk−1 , bθk ] that
b =θk bθk−1 .
The second tool constitutes a connection between binding incentive constraints in the
minimization problem corresponding to a bid b and bids which are lower than b with
respect to our order. It corresponds to Lemmas 15,17 and 20 in the case of two bidders
and three types.
Lemma 23. Let θ be a valuation, b a bid and fθ,b a solution of minimization problem M θb .
If there exists a binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid bˆ, i.e.
U
(




θ, fθ,b, bˆ, β∗
)
,
then it holds that bˆ ≤θ b.
Proof. Let Lθb and Lθbˆ be the set of feasible solutions , f
θ,b =
(















θ, fθ,bˆ, bˆ, β∗
)
the values of the
objective functions of minimization problem M θb and M θbˆ respectively. In minimization
problem M θ
bˆ
for every bid s the incentive constraint corresponding to s given by
U
(
θ, f, bˆ, β∗
)
≥ U (θ, f, s, β∗)
is fulfilled for f = fθ,b because it holds that
U
(








θ, fθ,b, s, β∗
)
.
The equality follows from the fact that the incentive constraint corresponding to bˆ is
binding in minimization problem M θb . The inequality
U
(




θ, fθ,b, s, β∗
)
holds because fθb is a solution of minimization problem M θb . Since every constraint in M θbˆ
is fulfilled by fθ,b, it holds that fθ,b is an element of Lθ
bˆ
. Therefore in M θ
bˆ
, the solution
of minimization problem M θ
bˆ
has to induce a lower or equal utility than the solution of
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minimization problem M θb and it follows that
U
(








θ, fθ,b, b, β∗
)
.
We conclude that bid b together with a minimizing probability function does not induce
a lower expected utility than bid bˆ together with a minimizing probability function and
therefore it holds that bˆ ≤θ b.
For the third tool, we show that for a given type there exist bids which can never be
a best reply independent of the subjective belief. Hence, these bids cannot be possible
deviations from the proposed worst-case equilibrium for the given type.
Lemma 24. For every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−1 and every b
with bθl−1 < b < bθl the feasible set of minimization problem M θ
k
b is empty.
Lemma 25. For every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θk+1 ≤ θl and every b
with bθl−1 < b ≤ bθl the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb
θl
is empty.
The formal proof is relegated to Appendices 3.8.4 and 3.8.6. The intuition for Lemma
24 is similar to Lemma 21 and the intuition for Lemma 25 is similar to Lemma 18, i.e. as
in the case of two bidders and three valuations. We provide a detailed intuition for both
results at the end of this section.
After introducing these three tools, we can provide the proof of part (ii) of Proposition
11. That is, we prove that the worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for all types. In this
proof we construct a chain where all bids are arranged with respect to our order and the
efficient equilibrium bid is the lowest. Due to the transitivity of our relation, this excludes
all other distributions than the efficient worst-case beliefs as a potential deviation.
Proof. Analogously as in the proof of Corollary 5, one can show that for all θk ≥ θz it






for all b ∈ [bθk−1 , bθk ] Thus, we can conclude from Observation 4 and Corollary 5 that in




b for all b ∈ [0, bθm ]\[bθk−1 , bθk ]. (36)
Lemma 24 shows that if b ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] was to induce a lower expected utility than bθk−1
and l < k, then b needs to be either bθl−1 or bθl . Since every lower bound of a bidding
interval is the upper bound of some interval, it is w.l.o.g. to assume that b is equal to bθl
for an appropriate l. Lemma 25 shows that a lower expected utility can be achieved by
inducing a bid only in the bidding interval of a lower type. Lemma 24 and 25 combined
state that if b ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] was to induce a lower expected utility than bθk−1 , then b = bθl
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for 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 2. In order to show that all bids bθl with 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 2 do not induce a
lower expected utility than bθk−1 , we need to show the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 26. For every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−1 the unique














follows. Choose the minimum p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that the probability vector (fθ1 , . . . , fθm)
is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
fθj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
where (fθ1 , . . . , fθp+2) is the unique solution of the system of linear equations with p + 2
















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p}

















41If p ≥ l, then the number of equations equals to p+ 1 since the equation which is the binding incentive
constraint corresponding to bid bθl is redundant.
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n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}




= 0 for all m ≥ j > p∗ + 2 if p∗ < l. If p∗ ≥ l, then there are p+ 1




= 0 for all p∗ + 1 < j ≤ m.








This is a linear system of two equations which gives a unique fθ1 and fθ2 . If with the




, then we stop. Otherwise we add the equation which is identical to the
binding incentive constraint with corresponding bid 0, i.e.






and obtain a unique solution for (fθ1 , fθ2 , fθ3) and check whether the vector
(fθ1 , fθ2 , fθ3 , 0 . . . , 0) is an element of the feasible set and so forth until we find an element
of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
. Let bθp∗ be the bid corresponding to









θ1 , . . . , f
θk,b
θl












is the unique solution of the
system of equations given by the probability constraints and all added incentive constraints
if p∗ < l − 1. In case p∗ ≥ l − 1, the solution has p∗ + 1 variables which are greater than
zero.
Lemma 27. For every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−2 the minimum
p for minimization problem M θk
b
θl
is greater or equal then l + 1.
Finally, Lemma 27 states that the construction in Lemma 26 leads to a minimum p which
is greater than l. This implies that the binding incentive constraint with corresponding
bid l + 1, i.e.












corresponding to bθl+1 is binding and it follows from Lemma 23 that bθl ≥θk bθl+1 . With
the same reasoning in minimization problem M θk
b
θl+1
the constraint corresponding to bθl+2
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is binding and it follows from Lemma 23 that bθl+1 ≥θk bθl+2 so on. Therefore, we can




k · · · ≥θk bθk−1 .
We conclude that there does not exist a bid which induces a lower expected utility than
bθk−1 which shows the statement in (36). This completes the proof of part (ii) of Proposition
11 which states that the worst-case belief condition is fulfilled for all types.
We relegate the formal proofs of Lemma 26 and 27 to Appendices 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 and
provide an intuition for Lemma 24-27.
Intuition for Lemma 24-27 The intuition for Lemma 24 works similarly as for Lemma
21: Assume there exists a solution of minimization problem M θkb such that bθl−1 < b < bθl








. Consider two bids b′, b′′ ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ]
with b′′ < b < b′. The utility for the θk-type of bidding b must be at least as high as the
utilities of bidding b′′ or b′. The higher fθ
k,b
θl−1 , the lower is the optimal bid for type θ
k
(if we allow only for bids in the interval [bθl−1 , bθl ]). Therefore, the incentive constraint
corresponding to bid b′ sets an upper bound on the valuation of fθ
k,b
θl−1 while the incentive
constraint corresponding to bid b′′ sets a lower bound. We will show that the conditions
resulting from these two bounds contradict each other. Intuitively, a bidder bidding in
the interval [bθl−1 , bθl ] faces the bid distribution Gθl of the θl-type which is constructed in
order to make her indifferent between any bid in the interval [bθl−1 , bθl ]. Thus, only for the
θl-type the upper and the lower bound imposed by the incentive constraints corresponding
to bids b′′ and b′ are compatible.
In order to explain to intuition for Lemma 25 and Lemma 26, we illustrate how to
construct a solution of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
. Given some belief (fθ1 , . . . , fθm), the
expected utility of bidder i with valuation θk and bid bθl is given by





Choosing a probability function which minimizes the expected utility is equivalent to
choosing a distribution which minimizes the sum fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl . If we would look for a
probability function which minimizes the sum fθ1 + · · · + fθl considering only the first
probability constraint, we would set fθ1 + · · · + fθl to zero and put all the probability
weight on types above θl. If we add the constraint that the probability function must have
mean µ, this is not longer possible because the mean would be too high. Therefore, one
would select types on which to put a strictly positive probability weight in a way such
that the mean of the probabilities of types equal or lower than θl is minimized. Then one
would put as much as possible probability weight on types above θl without violating the
constraint that the mean has to be µ. In other words, independently of the valuation of µ
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one would put strictly positive probability weight only on types 0 and θl+1 because this
choice minimizes the mean of the probabilities of types equal or lower than θl. Then we
would choose fθ1 and fθl+1 such that the mean is µ. If we add the incentive constraints,
one would shift only so much probability weight on types above 0 as it is necessary to fulfill
the incentive constraints. In particular, one would put probability weight on some type
θj only if the probability weight on lower types cannot be increased without violating a
constraint.
The statement in Lemma 26 reflects exactly this reasoning. Consider the system of
equations given by the probability constraints and the equations which are identical to the
















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}.
Assume that for the solution fθ1 , . . . , fθp+1 of this system of equations (or fθ1 , . . . , fθp if
p− 1 ≥ l) it does not hold that (fθ1 , . . . , fθp+1 , 0, . . . 0) is an element of the feasible set of
minimization problem M θk
b
θl
. If we now add the equation with corresponding bid bθp , i.e.









then in the solution of the extended system of equations it holds that fp+2 > 0 (or fθp+1 > 0
if p ≥ l). We have to check whether the vector (fθ1 , . . . , fθp+2 , 0, . . . 0) is an element of the
feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
. Since the new vector has positive probability
weight on fθp+2 , it must hold that there is less probability weight on types below fp+2 than
in the old vector (fθ1 , . . . , fθp+2 , 0, . . . 0) (and analogously for the case p ≥ l). Therefore,
the construction in Lemma 26 ensures that probability weight on a higher type is shifted
only if a constraint in minimization problem M θk
b
θl
is not fulfilled and shifting weight on
lower types is not possible because all constraints corresponding to lower types already
hold with equality.
This reasoning also explains the intuition of Lemma 25. It states that for every k ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and l > k the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb for b ∈ (bθl−1bθl ] is
empty. The belief of type θk is constructed such that there is just enough probability
weight on types below θk in order to induce a mixed strategy in the bidding interval of the
θk-type. As argued above, the choice of types on which there is strictly positive probability
weight minimizes the mean of the probabilities of types below θk. If one would try to
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induce a bid bθl above bθk , the probability weight on the θl-type has to be increased. In
order to preserve the mean, this would imply a decrease of the probability weight on lower
types. This is not possible without violating a constraint since the belief of type θk had
already the lowest possible mean of the probabilities of types below θk.
In order to understand Lemma 27, consider minimization problem M θl
b
θl−1
for 1 ≤ l ≤ m.
As shown in the proof of part (i) of Proposition 11, the solution of this minimization








. Since in this proof
we have also shown that in the worst-case belief of the θl-type there is no probability




θ1 , . . . , f
θl,∗
θl
, 0, . . . 0
)
. In Appendix 3.8.5




solution of the system of l equations given by the two probability constraints and the l− 2
incentive constraints given by the bids bθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 2. Hence, for this minimization












be the solution of the system of l equations given by the
two probability constraints and the binding incentive constraints with corresponding bid

















minimization problem M θl
b
θl−1
a constraint with corresponding bid bθj given by


















In minimization problem M θk
b
θl−1
the same incentive constraint is equivalent to









This shows that in minimization problemM θk
b
θl−1
it is possible to put more probability weight


























. Hence, one has to add an additional constraint. Since the constraint
corresponding to bid bθl−1 is redundant, one has to add the constraint corresponding to




is greater than l − 1.
After proving the best-reply and the worst-case belief condition, we conclude that the
strategies and belief specified in 3.5.1 indeed constitute a worst-case belief equilibrium.
110
3.6 Conclusion
We provide a novel approach to endogenize beliefs in games of incomplete information and
apply this approach to bidding in first-price auctions. Our model is based on the assumption
that bidders in a first-price auction who, apart from the mean of the distribution, have little
information about the valuations of their competitors prepare for the worst case. Preparing
for the worst-case means that the bidders assume that given the bidding strategies of
their competitors they will face ex-ante the worst distribution of valuations. Given that
all bidders prepare in the same way a worst-case belief equilibrium arises whenever all
bidders best-reply to the bidding strategies of their competitors and their corresponding
worst-case beliefs. In particular, this implies there is no other belief such that the best
reply to this belief will yield a higher pay-off than in equilibrium. The resulting beliefs
are type-dependent and due to the assumption of a constant mean of the distribution
the beliefs cannot be strictly ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular
this implies that bidders with higher valuations not necessarily face higher competition.
Nevertheless, we show that a worst-case equilibrium exists that allocates the object to the
bidder with the highest valuation with probability one.
Our concept of the worst-case belief equilibrium can be easily extended to any game of
incomplete information and provides a very intuitive way to endogenize beliefs. This is in
particular helpful when modeling situations in which players only interact infrequently and
thus may not be able to form reasonable objective beliefs.
3.7 Notation
• Ui (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) denotes the expected utility of a bidder i with valuation θi, belief
about the other bidders’ valuations f−i, bid bi given the other bidders’ strategies β−i.
• For bidder i with valuation θi and for each belief f−i about the other bidders’
valuations and bidding strategies β−i, the set of best replies of bidder i is given by
Bri (θi, f−i, β−i) = argmax
bi
Ui (θi, f−i, bi, β−i) .












denotes the worst-case belief of a bidder with valuation θk. The bid distribution of a
bidder with valuation θk which is prescribed by the worst-case strategy is denoted by




= Gθk . The support of this bid distribution is given by [bθk−1 , bθk ].










n−1 (θk − bθk−1)








(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl−1)n−1 (θk − bθk−1) ≥
h−1∑
j=1
fθj + fθhGθh (s)
n−1 (θk − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ].
That is, minimization problem M<b
θk−1
ensures that bidding bθk−1 induces at least
the expected utility than bidding any lower bid given the other bidders’ worst-case
strategy β∗.
• For a bidder with valuation θi, a bid bi and a strategy β−i of the other bidders, the
set of probability functions Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i) given by
Fminn−1 (θi, bi, β−i) = argmin
f−i∈Fn−1µ
{U (θi, f−i, bA, β−i) | bA ∈ Br (θi, f−i, β−i)}
is called the set of minimizing probability functions of bid bi for a bidder with valuation
θi given the other bidders’ strategies β−i.
• For a bidder with valuation θ minimization problem M θb of a bid b ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] is the
minimization problem corresponding to its minimizing probability function, i.e. all
solutions of minimization problem M θb are minimizing probability function of b for
bidder with valuation θ given the other bidders’ worst-case strategy β∗. Formally,






n−1 (θ − b)









(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl−1)n−1 (θ − b) ≥
 h∑
j=1
fθj + fθhGθh (s)
n−1 (θ − s)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ],
• We denote the solution of minimization problem M θb by fθ,b =
(





• Apart from the constraints








every constraint in minimization problem M θb compares the utility of bidding b to
the utility of bidding some other bid b′, which is formalized by
U (θ, f, b, β∗) ≥ U (θ, f, b′, β∗) .
We call such a constraint an incentive constraint corresponding to bid b′.
• For a type θ and bids b, b′ we use the notation b ≤θ b′ if for the θ-type bid b′ does
not induce a strictly lower expected utility than bid b together with their minimizing
probability functions given the other bidders’ worst-case strategy β∗. Formally, let














⇒ b ≤θ b′,
U
(
























⇒ b =θ b′.
We also use the notation b <θ b′ if b′ does not have a minimizing probability function
given θ because it is never a best reply for a bidder with valuation θ, but b does have
a minimizing probability function. We use the notation b =θ b′ if neither b, nor b′
have a minimizing probability function.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Proof of Lemma 14













b is a best reply to f1,b for a bidder with valuation 1 but f1,b differs from the worst-case









f1,∗0 + δ0, f
1,∗





Since f1,b has to fulfill the two probability constraints, it must hold that
δ0 + δθ + δ1 = 0 (37)
δθθ + δ1 = 0. (38)
Due to (37), (38) and f1,b 6= f1,∗, it must hold that either δ0 < 0 or δ0 > 0. First, we
consider the case δ0 < 0. Subtracting (38) from (37) gives
δ0 + δθ (1− θ) = 0
⇔ δθ = − δ01− θ (39)
from which follows that δθ > 0. Due to (38), it follows that δ1 < 0. By definition of the






























f1,∗0 + δ0 + f
1,∗
θ + δθ + (f
1,∗









from which follows that(




δ0 − δ01− θ
)
(1− θ)
⇔ −θδ0 (b− θ)− δ1(1− θ) (1− b) ≤ 0.
Since b > θ and δ0 and δ1 are smaller than zero, this leads to a contradiction.
Now we consider the case δ0 > 0. It follows from (39) that δθ < 0. Due to (38), it follows






































f1,∗0 + δ0 + f
1,∗









f1,∗0 + δ0 + f
1,∗






from which follows that(














1− b1 −G1 (b) (1− b)
)
≥ 0.
Since 1− b1 > 1− b > G1 (b) (1− b), b1 > b and δ0 and δ1 are greater than zero, this leads




is a best reply to a belief for a
bidder with valuation 1, then this belief coincides with the worst-case belief of the 1-type.
3.8.2 Proof of Lemma 18
Proof. Assume that the feasible set of minimization problem M θb with b ∈ (bθ, b1] is not

















fθ,∗0 + δ0, f
θ,∗





It holds that fθ,b1 > 0 because otherwise bidding above bθ is not a best reply. Since f
θ,∗
1 = 0,
it follows that δ1 > 0. Due to the probability constraints, it must hold
δ0 + δθ + δ1 = 0 (40)
δθθ + δ1 = 0. (41)
Hence, it must hold that δθ < 0 because otherwise (41) cannot be fulfilled. Subtracting
(41) from (40) gives
δ0 + δθ − δθθ = 0.
Since δθ − δθθ < 0, it follows that δ0 > 0. Because the expected utility from bidding b must














fθ,∗0 + δ0 + f
θ,∗


































where the last equality follows from the definition of bθ in (30). It follows that
(δ0 + δθ + δ1G1 (b)) (θ − b) > δ0θ > 0.
Because b ≤ θ, it must hold that
δ0 + δθ + δ1G1 (b) > 0.
Since δ1 > 0 and G1 (b) ≤ 1, it holds that
0 < δ0 + δθ + δ1G1 (b) ≤ δ0 + δθ + δ1G1 (b) + δ1 (1−G1 (b)) = δ0 + δθ + δ1 = 0.
We conclude that the assumption that the feasible set of minimization problem M θb with
b ∈ (bθ, b1] is not empty, leads to a contradiction.
3.8.3 Proof of Lemma 21









































1− s′′) . (43)
Let s′′ < b < s′ be such that
s′ − b = b− s′′ = α (44)
for some appropriate α > 0. Rearranging of (42) gives
⇔ f1,b0 ≥
f1,bθ Gθ (s′) (1− s′)− f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b)
s′ − b . (45)
Rearranging of (43) gives
⇔ f1,b0 ≤
f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b)− f1,bθ Gθ (s′′) (1− s′′)
b− s′′ . (46)
If we show that
f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b)− f1,bθ Gθ (s′′) (1− s′′)
b− s′′ <
f1,bθ Gθ (s′) (1− s′)− f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b)
s′ − b , (47)
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we find a contradiction between inequalities (45) and (46). Due to (44), inequality (47) is
equivalent to




1− s′′) < f1,bθ Gθ (s′) (1− s′)− f1,bθ Gθ (b) (1− b) .
If b is a best reply to f1,b, it must hold that f1,bθ > 0 because otherwise bidding zero or
above bθ would be strictly better. Therefore, the inequality is equivalent to




1− s′′)+Gθ (s′) (1− s′) > 0.
Due to (44), this is equivalent to
−2Gθ (b)
(
1− s′ + α)+Gθ (s′′) (1− s′ + 2α)+Gθ (s′) (1− s′) > 0
⇔ (1− s′) [−2Gθ (b) +Gθ (s′′)+Gθ (s′)] + α[−2Gθ (b) + 2Gθ (s′′)] > 0. (48)








⇔ Gθ (s) = f
θ,∗
0 s
fθ,∗θ (θ − s)
.
If b ≤ µ2 , we choose s′′ = 0 and it holds that s′ = 2b ≤ µ = bθ.
Then inequality (48) is equivalent to
(
1− s′)( −2fθ,∗0 b










fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
> 0. (49)
It holds that
θ − b− (θ − 2b) > 0
⇔ −2b (θ − 2b) + 2b (θ − b) > 0.
Due to (44), this is equivalent to









fθ,∗θ (θ − s′)
> 0.
It follows that in order to show (49), it is sufficient to show that
(
θ − s′)( −2fθ,∗0 b










fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
≥ 0.
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Multiplying the inequality with (θ − b) and plugging in α = (s′ − b) reduces the problem
to
− 2b (θ − s′)+ s′ (θ − b)− 2b (s′ − b) ≥ 0. (50)
It holds that
s′ ≥ 2b
⇔ −2b (θ − b) + s′ (θ − b) ≥ 0
⇔ −2bθ + s′θ − s′b+ 2b2 ≥ 0
−2bθ + 2bs′ + s′θ − s′b− 2bs′ + 2b2 ≥ 0
−2b (θ − s′)+ s′ (θ − b)− 2b (s′ − b) ≥ 0.
Thus, we have shown inequality (50) from which follows that inequality (47) holds. This
shows that inequalities (42) and (43) lead to a contradiction in case b ≤ µ2 .












⇔ Gθ (s) = −f
θ,∗
0 (µ− s) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − s)
.




2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
+ −f
θ,∗
0 (µ− (2b− µ)) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)





2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
+ −2f
θ,∗
0 (µ− (2b− µ)) + 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)





2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
+ −2f
θ,∗
0 (µ− b) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)





2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − b)
+ −4f
θ,∗
0 (µ− b) + 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ)
fθ,∗θ (θ − 2b+ µ)
)
> 0
⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α)− 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0
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⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ−b)[θ−θµ+θα−2b+2bµ−2bα+µ−µ+µα−(θ − θµ+ 2θα− b+ bµ+ 2bα)]
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[−αθ − b+ µb+ µ− µ+ µα]
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
By definition of α in (44), this is equivalent to
⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[−(µ− b)θ − b+ µb+ µ− µ+ µ(µ− b)]
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
⇔ 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[µ− b− θ(µ− b)]
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) ≥ 0.
Since 2fθ,∗0 (µ− b)[µ− b− θ(µ− b)] > 0, it is sufficient to show that
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α)
+ fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α) + fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0. (51)
It holds that
µ > b
⇔ (µ− b) (1− θ) (−θ + µ+ θ − 2b+ µ) > 0
⇔ − (θ − µ) (µ− b) (1− θ) + (θ − 2b+ µ) (µ− b) (1− θ) > 0
⇔ (θ − µ) [−θb+ b− µ+ µθ] + (θ − 2b+ µ) [θb+ µ− b− µθ] > 0
⇔ (θ − µ) [−θ + θb+ 2b− 2b2 − µ+ µb+ θ − 2bθ + θµ− b+ 2b2 − bµ]
+ (θ − 2b+ µ) [−θ + θb+ µ− µb+ θ − b− µθ + µb] > 0
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⇔ (θ − µ) [− (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− b) + (θ − b) (1− 2b+ µ)]
+ (θ − 2b+ µ) [− (θ − µ) (1− b) + (1− µ) (θ − b)] > 0
Since fθ,∗θ > 0, this is equivalent to
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− b) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− 2b+ µ)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
Since −b = −µ+ α and −2b+ µ = −µ+ 2α, this is equivalent to
− 2fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (1− µ+ α) + fθ,∗θ (θ − µ) (θ − b) (1− µ+ 2α)
+ fθ,∗θ (1− µ) (θ − 2b+ µ) (θ − b) > 0.
Thus, we have shown inequality (51) from which follows that inequality (47) holds. This
shows that inequalities (42) and (43) lead to a contradiction in case b > µ2 . We conclude
that in any possible case the assumption that the feasible set of minimization problem M1b
with b ∈ (0, bθ) is not empty, leads to a contradiction.
3.8.4 Proof of Lemma 24
Proof. We have to show that for every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−1
and every b with bθl−1 < b < bθl the feasible set of minimization problem M θ
k
b is empty.
Assume that there exist l and b with bθl−1 < b < bθl such that there exists an element of








. Then for every

























































Let s′′ < b < s′ be such that
n−1√
θk − s′′ − n−1
√
θk − b = n−1
√
θk − b− n−1
√
θk − s′ = α (54)
⇔ n−1
√
θk − s′ + α = n−1
√
θk − b , n−1
√





































































θk − b− n−1√θk − s′ . (55)

































































θk − s′′ − n−1√θk − b . (56)

























θk − b− n−1√θk − s′ , (57)








































θk − s′ > 0.
If bid b is a best reply, it must hold that fθ
k,b
θl





























θk − s′ > 0
⇔ n−1
√
θk − s′ (−2Gθl (b) +Gθl (s′′)+Gθl (s′))+ α (−2Gθl (b) + 2Gθl (s′′)) > 0
⇔ n−1
√
θk − s′ (−2Gθl (b) +Gθl (s′′)+Gθl (s′)) > α (2Gθl (b)− 2Gθl (s′′)) . (58)
For all s ∈ [bθl−1 , bθl ] the distribution Gθl is defined by the equation(
fθ
l,∗














































denotes the worst-case belief of the θl-type.
Let b∗ be defined by
n−1
√
θk − bθl−1 − n−1
√
θk − b∗ = n−1
√
θk − b∗ − n−1
√
θk − bθl .
If b ≤ b∗, we choose s′′ = bθl−1 and it holds that
n−1√
θk − b− n−1
√
θk − s′ = n−1
√





θk − bθl−1 − n−1
√
θk − b∗ = n−1
√





θk − s′ ≥ n−1
√
θk − b− n−1
√
θk − b∗ + n−1
√
θk − bθl ≥ n−1
√
θk − bθl







θl − bθl−1 − n−1
√
θl − b and αs′2 := n−1
√
θl − b− n−1
√
θl − s′.







































θl − b .
Since 1 > fθ
l,∗
θl
> 0 and ∑lj=1 fθl,∗θj = 1, it holds that ∑l−1j=1 fθl,∗θj > 0 and therefore the
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θl − b .
Since n−1√ is concave, it holds that αs′1 ≤ αs
′
2 from which follows that
−2αs′1
n−1√







θl − s′ > 0.
Hence, if θk > θl, it is sufficient to show that
−2αs′1 n−1
√









θl − b ≥ 2ααs′1 .
Since αs′1 ≤ αs
′
2 , it is sufficient to show that
−2αs′1 n−1
√
θl − s′ + 2αs′1 n−1
√
θl − b ≥ 2ααs′1
⇔ − n−1
√
θl − s′ + n−1
√
θl − b ≥ α
which is true since n−1√ is concave. Thus, we have shown inequality (57) and conclude that
in the case b ≤ b∗ the assumption that the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb is not
empty, leads to a contradiction.
If b > b∗, then we choose s′ = bθl and it holds that
n−1√
θk − s′′ − n−1
√
θk − b = n−1
√





θk − b∗ − n−1
√
θk − bθl = n−1
√





θk − s′′ ≤ n−1
√
θk − bθl−1 − n−1
√
θk − b∗ + n−1
√
θk − b ≤ n−1
√
θk − bθl−1






θl − b− n−1
√




θl − s′′ − n−1
√
θl − b. (59)
By definition of bθl , it holds that(
fθ
l,∗



















































































































































































θl − s′′ n−1
√
































θk − bθl + 2α
)
n−1√
θl − b > 0.
Since n−1√ is concave, it holds that αs′′1 ≥ αs
′′






















































θl − s′′ n−1
√












θk − bθl + 2α
)
n−1√
θl − b > 0.
If θk > θl, it holds that α n−1
√
































































θl − s′′ n−1
√












θk − bθl + 2α
)
n−1√
θl − b ≥ 0.

















θl − s′′ n−1
√












θk − bθl + 2α
)
n−1√
θl − b ≥ 0.
By definition of α in (54), it holds that n−1
√
θk − bθl + α = n−1
√




θl − bθl n−1
√
θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ + n−1
√
θl − s′′ n−1
√





θl − bθl n−1
√
θk − s′′ n−1
√






θl − b n−1
√
θk − bθl − n−1
√









θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ − n−1
√







θl − b n−1
√
θk − bθl − n−1
√
θl − bθl n−1
√
θk − b > 0,
n−1√
θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ − n−1
√
θk − s′′ n−1
√
θl − b > 0
and
n−1√
θl − s′′ ≥ n−1
√
θl − bθl ,




θl − b n−1
√
θk − bθl − n−1
√







θk − b n−1
√
θl − s′′ − n−1
√








θl − b n−1
√
θk − bθl − n−1
√
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√
θl − s′′ − n−1
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θk − b− α+ n−1
√



























θl − b− α1 + n−1
√



















Thus, we have shown inequality (57) and conclude that also in the case b > b∗ the assumption
that the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb for θk > θl and bθl−1 < b < bθl is not
empty, leads to a contradiction.
For the proofs to follow we will need the following Lemma.
3.8.5 Lemma 28
Lemma 28. For every valuation θk ≥ θz the worst-case belief fθk,∗ is the solution of the
















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}.
Proof. As defined in 3.5.1, the worst-case belief of type θk is the solution of the minimization
problem with objective function




which consists of the two probability constraints and all incentive constraints with
























for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and all s ∈ [bθh−1 , bθh ].




a solution of minimization problem M θk
b
θk−1
. Hence, an incentive constraint corresponding
to a bid b with bθj−1 < b < bθj with 1 < j < k − 1 cannot be binding because otherwise it




be an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb . But this would be a
contradiction to Lemma 24.
Hence, the set of possible binding incentive constraints is a subset of the incentive
constraints with corresponding bids bθj with j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}. It is left to show that
every incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθj with j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2} is binding.
As shown in the proof of part (i) of Proposition 11, in the worst-case belief of type θk there
is no probability weight on types above θk and therefore we can write the worst-case belief




θ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk
, 0, . . . , 0
)




θ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk
, 0, . . . , 0
)
an incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2} is not
binding in minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
. Then we will construct a feasible solution of
minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
which leads to a lower value of the objective function than(
fθ
k,∗
θ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk













Given the intuition provided above for Lemma 26, this should not come as a surprise.




on lower types should be as high as possible without violating a constraint because this
allows to put probability weight on high types without violating the second probability
constraint. More precisely, if a constraint with corresponding bid bθj is not binding, this
implies that one can reduce the probability weight on fθj−1 and increase probability weight
on fθj without violating an incentive constraint. This reduces the mean and therefore one
can increase the probability weight on fθk . This results in a lower value of the objective
function. The rest of the proof formalizes this idea.
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i.e. let θl be the smallest valuation such that fθ
k,∗
θl








θ1 + θ1 , f
θk,∗
θ2 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θl
− θl , fθ
k,∗
θl+1
, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θk
− θk , fθ
k,∗
θk+1




fulfills all constraints of M θk
<b
θk−1
but leads to a lower value of the objective function. Here
θ1 , θl , θk are strictly positive real numbers such that it holds
θ1 − θl + θk = 0 (60)
− θlθl + θkθk = 0. (61)
First, we will show that such θ1 , θl , θk exist, then we will show that the proposed vector
is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
. Since it follows from
(60) that θ1 − θl < 0, it follows directly that the constructed vector leads to a lower value
of the objective function than fθk,∗.
Equations (60) and (61) are solved by any choice of θ1 , θl , θk that fulfill























This shows that θ1 , θl , θk can be chosen as strictly positive real numbers. Moreover, it
holds that the smaller the valuation of θ1 , the smaller the valuation of θl . Therefore,




θ1 + θ1 + · · ·+ fθ
k,∗
θl













is fulfilled. The probability constraints are fulfilled by construction. Since all incentive





θ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk
, 0, . . . , 0
)




= 0 for all 1 < j < l, all incentive constraints with corresponding bid






θ1 + θ1 + f
θk,∗










θ1 + θ1 + f
θk





























and θ1−θ2 < 0. Hence, we have found a vector of probabilities which fulfills all probability




> 0, the constraint that all probabilities have to be non-negative is also fulfilled if
θl is sufficiently small. We conclude that the assumption that the incentive constraint
with corresponding bid 0 is not binding in the worst-case belief of type θk, leads to a
contradiction.
Case 2: j > 1. If the non-binding incentive constraint is an incentive constraint with
corresponding bid bθj with j > 1, we proceed similarly, by constructing a vector which is
an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
<b
θk−1
but leads to a lower value









then it must hold that l′ ≤ k − 1 because otherwise bidding bθk−1 would never be a best







θ1 − θ1 , fθ
k,∗
θ2 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θj
+ θj , fθ
k,∗
θj+1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θl




, . . . , fθ
k,∗
θk
+ θk , f
θk,∗
θk+1




where θ1 , θj , θl′ , θk are strictly positive real numbers such that it holds
− θ1 + θj − θl′ + θk = 0 (62)
θjθ
j − θl′θl
′ + θkθk = 0. (63)
Since it follows from (62) that −θ1 + θj − θl < 0, it follows directly that the constructed
vector leads to a lower value of the objective function than fθk,∗. In addition, we choose
θl′ sufficiently small such that the non-binding incentive constraint(
fθ
k,∗





















θ1 + · · ·+ fθ
k,∗








θ1 + · · ·+ fθ
k,∗
θj





Again, we will first show that such θ1 , θj , θj , θk exist, then we will show that the proposed




Equations (62) and (63) are solved by any choice of θ1 , θj , θj , θk which fulfills












⇔ −θ1θk + θjθk − θl′θk − θjθj + θl′θl
















⇔ θj = θl′ +
θ1θ
k




⇔ θj = θl′ +
θ1θ
k











⇔ θj = θl′ +
θ1θ
k





+ θ1θkθj + θl′θl
′
θk (θk − θj)
⇔ θj = θl′ +
θ1θ
k











θk (θk − θj) ...
This shows that θ1 , θj , θl′ , θk can be chosen as strictly positive real numbers. Moreover,
it holds that the smaller the valuation of θ1 and θl′ , the smaller the valuation of θj and
θk . Therefore, θ1 , θj and θl′ can be both chosen sufficiently small such that the incentive
constraint (64) is fulfilled.
The probability constraints are fulfilled by construction. Since all incentive constraints
with corresponding bid b with bθh−1 < b < bθh for h < k − 1 are not binding under fθk,∗,
they will be fulfilled under fθk if θ1 , θj , θl′ , θk are sufficiently small. Any incentive
130






θ2 + · · ·+ fθ
k,∗








































and 0 > −θ1 + θj − θl′ > −θ1 . The incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθj
is fulfilled by construction. Since fθ
k,∗
θh
= 0 for j < h < l′, it holds that all incentive
constraints with corresponding bid bθh with j < h < l′ are fulfilled if θl′ is sufficiently
small.






θ2 + · · ·+ fθ
k,∗










θ2 + . . .+ f
θk,∗
θh



























and −θ1 + θj − θl′ < 0. Hence, we have found a vector of probabilities, fθ
k
 , which
fulfills all probability and all incentive constraints while inducing a lower value of the
objective function. We can assume that fθkθ1 > 0 because otherwise, the incentive constraint
corresponding to bid 0 = bθ1 is not binding and the first case applies. Since fθ
k
θl′ > 0, the
constraint that probabilities are non-negative is also fulfilled if θl′ is sufficiently small. We
conclude that the assumption that an incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθj for
1 ≤ j ≤ k − 2 is not binding, leads to a contradiction.
3.8.6 Proof of Lemma 25
Proof. We have to show that for every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θk+1 ≤ θl
and every b with bθl−1 < b ≤ bθl the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb
θl
is empty.
Assume that the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb for some b ∈ (bθl−1 , bθl ] with

























for some appropriate be real numbers δθ1 , . . . , δθm . We will prove the claim in four steps:
(1) For every j with k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m it holds δθj ≥ 0.
(2) There exist strictly positive real numbers α and β such that
k∑
j=1































then it holds that δˆθj ≤ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.









solution of minimization problem M θkb , leads to a contradiction.
Proof of step (1)
As shown in the proof of part (i) of Proposition 11, it holds that fθ
k,∗
θj
= 0 for all j > k.
Since probabilities cannot be negative, it follows that δθj ≥ 0 for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Proof of step (2)
Since k < l and fθ
k,∗
θj































is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem
M θ
k




θ1 + δθ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk























It follows that either∑kj=1 δθj < 0 or∑lj=k+1 δθj > 0. Due to the first probability constraint,
it holds∑mj=1 δθj = 0. Assume that∑kj=1 δθj ≥ 0. Then it must hold∑lj=k+1 δθj > 0. Since
due to step (1) it holds that δθj ≥ 0 for all k+1 ≤ j ≤ m, it follows that
∑m
j=1 δθj > 0 which
leads to a contradiction. Hence, it must hold that ∑kj=1 δθj < 0. Therefore, there exist
strictly positive be real numbers α and β such that ∑kj=1 δθj = −α and ∑mj=k+1 δθj = β.
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Proof of step (3)
We start the proof of step (3) by showing the following claim: Let
(

































in minimization problem M θkb all




θ1 + δˆθ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk






















for all t ≤ k − 1.











is an element of feasible set of minimization problem
M θ
k
b . If we would consider only the constraint
∑k
j=1 δ˜θj = −α, then one could achieve
arbitrarily small values of the term ∑kj=1 δ˜θjθj by choosing high values of δθ1 , . . . , δk−1












is minimized if the values of all δ˜θj with 1 ≤ j ≤ k− 1 are as high as possible and the value
of δθk is as low as possible without violating any incentive constraint.
An incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθt−1 < b′ < bθt with t < k cannot








would be an element of
the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb′ which would be a contradiction to Lemma
24. It follows that if all constraints with corresponding bid bθt with t < k are binding,
δ˜θ1 , . . . , δ˜θk−1 cannot be increased without violating an incentive constraint in minimization
problem M θkb . A decrease of δ˜θt with t ≤ k − 1 would imply a higher δ˜θk which would
lead to a higher value of the term ∑kj=1 δθjθj . We conclude that the values of all δθj with
1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 are as high as possible if all constraints with corresponding bid bθt with




θ1 + δˆθ1 , . . . , f
θk,∗
θk





















for t ≤ k − 1.
We will use this claim in order to show inductively that all δˆθ1 , . . . , δˆθk−1 are non-positive.























Since δˆθl ≥ 0, it holds that
δˆθ1 + . . .+ δˆθlGθl (b) ≤ 0.
Moreover, it follows from fθ
k,∗
θj




























where the equality follows from Lemma 28. It also holds that(
fθ
k,∗


















from which it follows that
δˆθ1 ≤
(







We now turn our attention to the inductive step. Assume it is already shown that δˆt ≤ 0
for all 1 ≤ t < k − 2. It follows from Lemma 28 that(
fθ
k,∗





































from which follows that
δˆθt+1 =
(












We conclude that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 it holds δˆθj ≤ 0.
Proof of step (4)
Recall that we defined δθ1 , . . . , δθm by(
fθ
k,b













According to step (3) it holds ∑kj=1 δˆθjθj ≥ ∑kj=1 δˆθjθk = −αθk. Hence, the maximal
possible valuation for the term −∑kj=1 δθjθj equals to αθk. Since due to step (1), δθj ≥ 0
for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m, it follows that ∑mj=k+1 δθjθj ≥∑mj=k+1 δθjθk+1 = βθk+1. Hence, the
maximal possible valuation for the term −∑mj=k+1 δθjθj equals to −βθk+1. It follows from
the probability constraints that




























j ≤ −α+ αθk + β − βθk+1.
Since α = β it holds
−α+ αθk + β − βθk+1 < 0.
Hence, the assumption that the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb is not empty,
leads to a contradiction.
3.8.7 Proof of Lemma 26
Let θl and θk be a pair of valuations such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−2 and let p∗ be the minimum p
in the construction in Lemma 26. Such a minimum p exists since the worst-case belief of the
θk-type is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
and due to Lemma
28, in M θk
b
θl
only the incentive constraints with corresponding bid bθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 are
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binding if plugging in the worst-case belief. That is, the construction in Lemma 26 stops














































n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}.
We will prove this Lemma using the following steps:


















= 0 for all j > p∗ + 1 if p∗ ≥ l and for all j > p∗ + 2 if p∗ < l.
(2) It holds for fθk,bθl that all constraints in M θk
b
θl
with corresponding bid bθj with j ≤ p∗
have to be binding.




















Proof of step (1)
If p∗ > k, then the equation which is the binding incentive constraint corresponding to bid
bθl is obviously redundant and therefore, the system of equations in Lemma 26 consist of
two probability constraints and p∗ − 1 binding incentive constraints. This gives a system
of p∗ + 1 equations for p∗ + 1 variables. We will provide the proof for the case p∗ ≥ l since
the case p∗ < l works analogously and we will show in Lemma 27 that it indeed holds that
p∗ ≥ l.
Assume that there exists at least one h with p∗ + 1 < h ≤ m such that f bθl
θh
> 0. Let




















It holds that f˜θ
k,b
θl
j = 0 for all j with j > p∗ + 1. Therefore, it holds that δθj ≥ 0 for all
p∗ + 1 < j ≤ m and there exists at least one j with p∗ + 1 < j ≤ m such that δθj > 0.
Before we proceed with the proof, we introduce the concept of δ-sequences. We define
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, . . . , δθlmax , δθkmin , . . . , δθkmax
)
with δkmin = δlmax+1 such
that for all j with lmin ≤ j ≤ lmax it holds δθj < 0 and for all kmin ≤ j ≤ kmax it holds


























, . . . , δθj,lmax , δθj,kmin , . . . , δθj,kmax
)
be the j− th δ-sequence. Let
δ′θj :=
∑j,kmax
s=j,lmin δθs and θ



















can again be decomposed into δ-sequences. Let m′′ be the number








, . . . , δ′
θj,kmax
)



















If there does not exist a t with 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that ∑tj=1 δθj > 0, the process of





with δfinal1 < 0 and δ
final
2 > 0. Since
∑m
j=1 δθj = 0, it holds that δ1 = −δ2











We illustrate the concept of δ-sequences with the following example.
Example 8. Let















The vector has two relevant properties. It holds that ∑mj=1 δθj = 0 and there does not
exist a t with 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that ∑tj=1 δθj = 0. This vector can be decomposed into two
δ-sequences given by
(




−18 , 14 , 18
)

























We define δ′1 =
∑3
1 δθj = −14 and δ′2 =
∑6












4 = δ′1θ2 + δ′2θ4.




is a δ-sequence and it holds
δ′1θ












2 + δ′2θ4 > 0.
























solution of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
as constructed in Lemma 26. Let the vector




















We can decompose the vector (δθ1 , . . . , δθm) into δ-sequences. Due to the two probability















with δfinal1 > 0 and δ
final
2 < 0. Then there exists some 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that
∑t
j=1 δθj > 0.
First, we consider the case that t > p∗. It holds that f˜θ
k,b
θl
j = 0 for all j > p∗ + 1.
Thus, it holds that δθj ≥ 0 for all j > p∗ + 1 from which follows that
∑m
j=t+1 δθj ≥ 0.
Since ∑tj=1 δθj > 0, it holds that ∑mj=1 δθj > 0 which leads to a contradiction to the first
probability constraint.











induce a lower value of the objective function than the solution of the minimization problem,
it must hold that
l∑
j=1
δθj ≤ 0. (67)












, is an element
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of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
bl
and we defined the real numbers δθj for
















































































from which follows that
(δθ1 + . . .+ δθl)
n−1
√
θk − bθl ≥ (δθ1 + . . .+ δθt) n−1
√
θk − bθt
⇔ (δθ1 + . . .+ δθl) ≥







which leads to a contradiction to (67). Therefore, the existence of δfinal1 > 0 and δ
final
1 < 0



















Since this is a contradiction to the second probability constraint, it follows that the




> 0 leads to
contradiction.
Proof of step (2)
It follows from Lemma 28 that(
fθ
k,∗


















The worst-case belief of type θk is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem
Mb
θk−1
































Hence, the worst-case belief equilibrium of type θk is an element of the feasible set of
minimization problem M θk
b
θl
. Assume that the construction in Lemma 26 has reached the
step where the constraint with corresponding bid bθk−1 was added, i.e. all constraints with
corresponding bid bθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 were added and are binding. Consider the solution
vector in this step i.e. the solution of the system of linear equations consisting of the two
probability constraints and the binding incentive constraints with corresponding bid bθj for
1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. According to Lemma 28, this solution vector coincides with the worst-case
belief equilibrium of type θk. As argued above, this is an element of the feasible set of
minimization problem M θk
b
θl
and therefore the construction in Lemma 26 would stop. We
conclude that it holds p∗ ≤ k − 1.




= 0 for all j > k. Assume that there exists an
incentive constraint with corresponding bid bθh with 1 ≤ h ≤ p∗ which is not binding. Let


















Then there exists j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that δj 6= 0.
We consider the following two cases:


























































, this vector is an element of the feasible set
of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
, these two cases constitute all possible cases.
Case 1:
As before, we decompose the vector (δθ1 , . . . , δθm) into δ-sequences. If we can show that
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there does not exist a t with 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that
t∑
j=1
δθj > 0, (68)






with δfinal1 < 0
and δfinal2 > 0. Assume there exists a t with 1 ≤ t ≤ m such that
∑t
j=1 δθj > 0. Since




= 0 for all j > k. Because fθ
k,∗
θj
= 0 for all
j > k, it follows that δθj = 0 for all j > k. Due to the first probability constraint, it holds
that ∑mj=1 δθj = 0 and therefore it must hold that ∑kj=1 δθj = 0. Hence, t must be smaller
than k. It follows from Lemma 28 that(
fθ
k,∗































































It follows that ∑tj=1 δθj ≤ 0 which is a contradiction to (68). Thus, the process of






with δfinalθm < 0

































violates the second probability constraint.
Case 2:
































. Therefore, it must hold ∑lj=1 δθj ≤ 0. By
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and due to Lemma 28, it holds that(
fθ
k,∗

















from which follows that ∑lj=1 δθj >∑kj=1 δθj = 0 which leads to a contradiction.
We conclude that in both cases the assumption that there exists a h with 1 ≤ h ≤ p∗ such




, leads to a contradiction.
Proof of step (3):
According to the first step, it holds that fθ
k,b
θl
j > 0 only for 1 ≤ j ≤ p∗ + 1 are greater
















n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}.








(fθ1 + · · ·+ fθl) n−1
√




 n−1√θk − bθh for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}.
We will show that this system of linear equations has a unique solution. In order to
do so, we will show that the matrix corresponding to the system of equations has rank
p∗ + 1 by applying the Gauss elimination method and obtaining a row echelon form. The
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incentive constraints can be also summarized as










θk − bθh+1 = 0
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗ − 1}. In order to obtain an upper triangular matrix, we will successively


















= θp∗+1 − µ






positive. Now we subsequently use the transformed incentive constraints given by










θk − bθh+1 = 0
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗ − 1} in order to eliminate the variables fθp∗ , fθp∗−1 , . . . fθ2 . We show
by induction that in every elimination step all coefficients are strictly positive. In particular,
this implies that none of the coefficients is equal to zero and hence, we obtain an upper
triangular matrix after applying the Gauss elimination method. We start the induction by
showing that in the equation which is obtained after eliminating fθp∗ all coefficients are
strictly positive. The variable fθp∗ is eliminated by multiplying the incentive constraint
given by

























= θp∗+1 − µ.
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 = θp∗+1 − µ
where all coefficients are strictly positive. Now we turn our attention to the induction





all coefficients c and cj for 1 ≤ j ≤ h are strictly positive. Now we have to eliminate the
variable fθh using the incentive constraint










θk − bθh = 0.










































n−1 (θk − bθh) for all h ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}
can be rearranged to a system of linear equations such that the resulting matrix has rank












fulfills the same p∗ + 1 equations and the solution





















3.8.8 Proof of Lemma 27
We have to show that for every pair of valuations θl and θk such that θz ≤ θl ≤ θk−2 the
minimum p for minimization problem M θk
b
θl
is greater or equal then l + 1. We will prove














as constructed in Lemma 26. Assume that the minimum p is strictly smaller
than l + 1. Under this assumption, we will show the following steps:
(1) The minimum p is equal to l − 1.


















Then for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l it holds δθj > 0, for all l + 2 ≤ j ≤ k it holds that δθj < 0 and
for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m it holds that δθj=0.











of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
leads to a contradiction to the assumption p∗ < l + 1
Proof of step (1):
If the minimum p, denoted by p∗, is strictly smaller than l + 1, then the last equation
added in the construction of Lemma 26 has a corresponding bid which is lower or equal























is fulfilled trivially. Therefore, it holds p∗ < l. It cannot hold that p∗ < l − 1 because
then according to Lemma 26 there would be no probability weight on types above θl. This












is maximized. This cannot be optimal because the worst-case belief of the θk-type is an
element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk
b
θl
and has a lower value of the
objective function. We conclude that p∗ = l − 1.
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Proof of step (2):


















Since the minimum p equals to l − 1, it follows from Lemma 26 that in the solution of
minimization problem M θk
b
θl
there is no probability weight on types above θl+1. In the
worst-case belief of the θk-type there is probability weight on types θj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and
there is no probability weight on types θj for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Therefore, for all j with
l + 2 ≤ j ≤ k it holds that δθj < 0 and for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m it holds that δθj = 0. Note that
the set {j | l + 2 ≤ j ≤ k} is not empty because l ≤ k − 2. Since ∑mj=1 δθj has to be zero,
it follows that ∑l+1j=1 δθj > 0.














, all constraints with corresponding bid below bθl have to binding. We use
this in order to show by induction that δθ1 , . . . , δθl have to be strictly positive.








































































































Subtracting (69) from (70) gives
δθ1 + · · ·+ δθl ≥









We start the inductive proof by showing that δθ1 is strictly positive. According to Lemma
26, it holds that(
fθ
k,∗



































According to Lemma 26 it also holds that(
fθ
k,∗






























































Assume that we have shown that δθj > 0 for all 1 ≤ j < h for some 1 < h < l. Then we






















and according to Lemma 28 it holds that(
fθ
k,∗
















from which follows that
(δθ1 + · · ·+ δθh) n−1
√
















We conclude that for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ l it holds δθj > 0.
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Proof of step (3):
Let α and β be strictly positive be real numbers such that ∑l+1j=1 δθj = α and ∑kj=l+2 δθj =
−β. Due to the two probability constraints it must hold that








j = 0. (74)







−βθl+2. It follows from step (2) that ∑l+1j=1 δθjθj < ∑l+1j=1 δθjθl+1 = αθl+1. According to








j < αθl+1 − βθl+2 = βθl+1 − βθl+2 < 0
which is a contradiction to (74). Hence, we have found a contradiction to the assumption
that the minimum p is strictly smaller than l + 1.
3.8.9 Proof of Lemma 22
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Assume that fθk,b 6= fθk,∗. Then there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that δj 6= 0. Therefore,
one can decompose the vector (δθ1 , . . . , δθm) into δ-sequences and if there does not exist
a 1 ≤ t ≤ m with ∑tj=1 δθj > 0, the process of decomposing into δ-sequences end with a
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2 > 0.
Assume there exists a 1 ≤ t ≤ m with ∑tj=1 δθj > 0. We consider two cases: t ≤ k and
t > k.
Case 1: t ≤ k.
Following the steps in the proof of Lemma 24, one can show that it either holds(
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Thus, we consider two subcases.
Case 1.1: (75) holds. It follows from the definition of bθk and from Lemma 28 that(
fθ
k,∗












(θk − bθt). (77)
Since fθk,b is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb , it holds that(
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Subtracting equation (77) gives k∑
j=1
δθj




 n−1√θk − bθt .
Thus, it holds that ∑kj=1 δθj > 0. Due to the first probability constraint, it follows that∑m
j=k+1 δθj < 0. Since f
θk,∗
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≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
















(θk − bθt). (78)
Since fθk,b is an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θkb , it holds that(
fθ
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Subtracting equation (78) givesk−1∑
j=1
δθj




 n−1√θk − bθt .




≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
that δθj ≥ 0 for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Since
∑m
j=1 δθj = 0, it follows that δk < 0 which is a
contradiction to (76).
Case 2: t > k.




= 0 for all j > k, this leads to a contradiction to the constraint fθ
k,b
θj
≥ 0 for all
1 ≤ j ≤ m.
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the assumption that fθk,b 6= fθk,∗, leads to a contradiction.
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4 Strategies under strategic uncertainty
I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete
information who faces uncertainty about the other players’ strategies. I propose
a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common
knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not rationalizable.
Second, I apply the maximin expected utility criterion. Using this decision
criterion, one can derive predictions about outcomes and recommendations for
players facing strategic uncertainty. A bidder following this decision criterion in
a first-price auction expects all other bidders to bid their highest rationalizable
bid given their valuation. As a consequence, the bidder never expects to win
against an equal or higher type and resorts to win against lower types with
certainty.
JEL classification: C72, D81, D82, D83
Keywords: Auctions, Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness,
Rationalizability
4.1 Introduction
I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who
faces strategic uncertainty. Formally, a player faces strategic uncertainty if the smallest set
of strategies such that the player knows that the other players’ true strategy is an element
of this set, is not a singleton. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps:
First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all actions which are not
best replies. That is, the set of the other players’ possible strategies is restricted to the
set of rationalizable strategies. Afterwards, I apply the maximin expected utility criterion.
Using this decision criterion, I can derive recommendations for a player facing strategic
uncertainty. Furthermore, I analyze outcomes under the assumption that every player in
the game uses this decision criterion. In sections 4.2-4.4 I consider a game with incomplete
information under strategic uncertainty with common knowledge of type distributions. In
an extension in section 4.5 I discuss how the proposed decision criterion can be applied
under the presence of both, distributional and strategic uncertainty.
Before I explain the decision criterion in more detail, I argue why strategic uncertainty
can occur in games (of complete or incomplete information). Consider a game and a player
who has to decide about her strategy. There may exist strategy profiles which formally
fulfill the conditions of a (Bayes-) Nash equilibrium. However, a player may be uncertain
whether her opponents employ such strategies and consequently face strategic uncertainty.
As stated by Pearce (1984), “some Nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not
all reasonable strategy profiles are Nash equilibria”. He argues that if players cannot
communicate, then a player will best reply to Nash equilibrium strategies only if she is
able to deduce these equilibrium strategies. However, a player may consider more than one
strategy of the other players’ as possible. For example, this can occur under the existence
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of multiple Nash equilibria without one being focal or salient (Bernheim (1984)). Thus, a
Nash equilibrium may not be a suitable decision criterion if a player does not observe or
does not deduce a unique conjecture about the other players’ strategies. Similarly, Renou
and Schlag (2010) argue that “common knowledge of conjectures, mutual knowledge of
rationality and utilities, and existence of a common prior” are required in order to justify
Nash equilibria as a decision criterion.
So far, I argued that a player may not know which strategies are played by the other
players. But a player may not consider all strategies of the other players as possible. The
fact that rational players interact strategically given some commonly known rules of a
game (e.g. the rules of a first-price auction), already contains information about the set of
possible strategies. Therefore, in the first step of the decision criterion I propose to consider
strategies which a player can deduce only from common knowledge of rationality. Under
strategic uncertainty a player is rational if her action is a best reply given her type, the
commonly known type distribution and a conjecture about the other players’ strategies. A
strategy which a player assumes to be played by another rational player has to be rational
as well, i.e. the action prescribed by a strategy for a given type has to be a best reply given
the type, the commonly known type distribution and a conjecture about the other players’
strategies. This reasoning continues ad infinitum. Pearce (1984) and Bernheim (1984) (and
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) for games of incomplete information) show that common
knowledge of rationality is equivalent to bidders playing rationalizable strategies 42. These
are strategies which survive the iterated elimination of actions which are not best replies
to some strategy which consists of actions which have not been eliminated in previous
elimination rounds.
In the second step I apply the maximin expected utility criterion due to Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). A player applying this criterion chooses the action which maximizes her
minimum expected utility given her type. The application of the maximin expected utility
criterion can be modeled as a simultaneous zero-sum game against an adverse nature whose
action space consists of the other players’ rationalizable strategies. Given the strategy of
the adverse nature, the player applying the maximin criterion chooses the action which
maximizes her expected utility. The adverse nature’s utility is the player’s expected utility
multiplied by -1.
In other words, under the proposed decision criterion a player facing strategic uncertainty
forms a subjective belief about the other players’ strategies and acts optimally given this
subjective belief. The first step of the decision criterion determines the set from which a
player chooses her subjective belief. The second step determines how the subjective belief
42For games of incomplete information where also the type distribution is not known, i.e. only the type
spaces and action spaces are common knowledge, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) use the term
belief-free rationalizable strategies. If additional information about possible strategies or distributions is
common knowledge, i.e. more than the type spaces and the action spaces is common knowledge, they
use the term ∆-rationalizable strategies. If the type distribution is common knowledge but nothing
besides the actions spaces is known about strategies, they use the term rationalizable strategies. I will
use the term rationalizable strategies throughout the paper.
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is chosen. The subjective belief is given by the adverse nature’s equilibrium strategy, in
the following called subjective maximin belief. In order to distinguish the Nash equilibrium
in the simultaneous game between a player and the adverse nature and the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium which may exist in a given game of incomplete information, I will refer to the
Nash equilibrium in the former case as a maximin equilibrium.
By assuming common knowledge of rationality and applying the maximin expected
utility criterion, I am able to derive recommendations for players facing distributional and
strategic uncertainty. Moreover, I characterize outcomes under the assumption that every
player follows the proposed decision criterion.
The following two examples illustrate two different reasons for why strategic uncertainty
can occur and how the proposed decision criterion applies under strategic uncertainty. In
the first example there exist multiple Nash equilibria without one being salient. In the
second example a salient Nash equilibrium exists but is not the unique rationalizable action.
In particular, the salient Nash equilibrium is not compatible with actions derived from the
maximin utility or minimax regret criterion. Afterwards, I will summarize the results for
first-price auctions under strategic uncertainty and provide the results for the extension of
the decision criterion to both, distributional and strategic uncertainty.
For the first example consider a sender who has to deposit a package either in places A,
B or C. A receiver has to decide to which places she sends one or two drivers in order to
pick up the package. If the package is picked up, sender and receiver earn each a utility
of P and zero otherwise. In addition, the receiver faces a cost of c if a driver travels to
place A or B and a cost of c˜ if a driver travels to place C. The game is summarized in the
following utility table:
A B C AB AC BC
A P ;P − c 0;−c 0;−c˜ P ;P − 2c P ;P − c− c˜ 0;−c− c˜
B 0;−c −c˜ P ;P − c 0;−c˜−c˜+ α P ;P − 2c 0;−c− c˜ P ;P − c− c˜
C 0;−c 0;−c P ;P − c˜ 0;−2c 0;P − c− c˜ P ;P − c− c˜
Assume it is common knowledge that it holds P − c˜ < −c and P − 2c > −c. The Nash
equilibria in this game are (A;A), (B;B) and both players mixing between A and B with
probability 12 . Although Nash equilibria exist, the players may be uncertain about each
other’s strategy since there does not exist a particularly salient one. The application of the
maximin criterion leaves both players indifferent between actions A and B. The maximin
criterion does not yield to action AB for the receiver since by choosing AB she would
face the risk that the sender deposits the package in C, leaving the receiver with the costs
of two drivers −2c. However, the result of the maximin criterion changes after assuming
common knowledge of rationality. Excluding actions which are not best replies leads to
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the elimination of strategies C, AC and BC for the receiver, leading to the elimination of
action C for the sender:
A B AB
A P ;P − c 0;−c P ;P − 2c
B 0;−c −c˜ P ;P − c −c˜ P ;P − 2c
Now the maximin criterion leads to action AB for the receiver. In other words, if the
receiver anticipates that the sender anticipates that she will never send a driver to C, the
application of the maximin criterion leads to action AB. In this case, the receiver earns a
utility of P − 2c with certainty. If she would follow a Nash equilibrium strategy or apply
the maximin criterion directly, she would face the risk of getting a utility of −c.
As a second example consider the following utility table. It illustrates the decision
problem of a player who is uncertain about which of the possible rationalizable actions her
opponent will choose:
X Y Z
A 10;10 0;9 0,0
B 15;1 5;9 0,0
C 14;1 4;9 4;0
D 11;10 6;9 0;0
The unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, (A,X), is focal in the sense that it is
the social optimum and leads to the highest possible utility for both players. However, a
rational column player can also choose Y instead of X. Action Y is rationalizable and
moreover, the application of the maximin or the minimax regret criterion would lead to
action Y for the column player. In other words, the column player may prefer to get a
utility of 9 with certainty instead of aiming for the utility of 10 and risking to get a utility
of 1. Given this uncertainty about the column player’s strategy, the row player may resort
to the application of the maximin criterion. This leads to action C which ensures a utility
of 4 for the row player. However, the row player can anticipate that action Z is strictly
dominated for the column player. After the elimination of this action, C becomes strictly
dominated for the row player. The iterated elimination of actions which are not best replies,






Now the application of the maximin criterion leads to action B for the row player. That
is, after anticipating that the column player will never play Z, the row player can ensure a
utility of 5 instead a utility of 4.
These examples show how the proposed decision criterion provides recommendations
under strategic uncertainty. Moreover, they show why players may not expect their
opponents to play Nash equilibria and why the application of the maximin utility criterion
alone may cause forgone profits. After discussing the two examples, I provide an intuition
and a summary of the results for first-price auctions where bidders’ valuations are identically
and independently distributed according to a commonly known distribution function.
Consider the simple example of a first-price auction with two bidders who can have either a
valuation of zero with probability p or a valuation of 1 with probability 1−p. For simplicity,
assume an efficient tie-breaking rule. We have to compute the highest rationalizable bids
of each type. The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation zero is zero. If a
bidder with valuation 1 bids zero, she gets an expected utility of p. Hence, bidding too
close to the own valuation (or even above) cannot be rational for a 1-type.
b1 = 1− p 10
The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation 1 makes her indifferent between
winning against the 0-type by bidding zero and winning with probability one. That is, it is
obtained by the equation43
1− b1 = p ⇔ b1 = 1− p.
A bidder with valuation 1 who applies the proposed decision criterion has the subjective
maximin belief that the other bidder with valuation 1 bids b1. Therefore, her best reply is
to win against the 0-type of the other bidder with certainty by bidding zero.
For the general case with an arbitrary number of bidders and valuations, for every type
there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. A bidder applying the proposed decision
criterion assumes that every other bidder places the highest rationalizable bid given her
type. As a consequence, the bidder never expects to win against a bidder with an equal or
higher type and therefore bids the highest rationalizable bid of a lower type in order to
43For the case with two possible valuations the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with the higher
valuation coincides with the highest bid played in the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium. With more than
two valuations the highest rationalizable bid of a type is strictly higher than the highest bid played in
the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
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win against the lower type with certainty. If every bidder applies this decision criterion,
then every bidder has the same beliefs about distributions and strategies. Every bidder
calculates which highest rationalizable bid of a lower type maximizes her expected utility. It
turns out that due to the symmetry of beliefs about valuation distributions and strategies,
the higher the type of the bidder, the higher is the type whose highest rationalizable bid
maximizes her expected utility. Therefore, the outcome is efficient, i.e. the bidder with the
highest valuation wins the auction with probability one.
In an extension I analyze both, distributional and strategic uncertainty. In this case the
strategy space of the adverse nature consists of all rationalizable strategies and all possible
valuation distributions. For a restriction of the set of possible distributions I assume
common knowledge of an exogenously given mean µ of bidders’ valuations.44 Although in
reality bidders go at great lengths in order to learn about their competitors’ valuations,
such learning has its limits and bidders may be able to learn only the support and the
mean of the valuation distribution.
Under strategic uncertainty with common knowledge of rationality and distributional
uncertainty with common knowledge of an exogenously given mean, as before, for every
type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. A bidder applying the proposed
decision criterion assumes that every other bidder places the highest rationalizable bid
given her type. Let θµ be the lowest valuation which is higher than the mean. The highest
rationalizable bid of a bidder with a valuation lower than θµ is her valuation. The subjective
maximin belief of such a bidder about the other bidders’ valuation distributions is that the
probability weight is distributed between her own valuation and θµ. As a consequence, a
bidder with a valuation lower than θµ expects a utility of zero and is indifferent between any
bid between zero and her valuation. Every bidder with valuation θ such that θ ≥ θµ never
expects to win against a bidder with the same valuation. Hence, the subjective maximin
belief of such a bidder about the other bidders’ valuation distribution maximizes the
probability weight on θ and makes the bidder indifferent between any highest rationalizable
bid of lower types. As a consequence, the bidder mixes among all highest rationalizable
bids of lower types. Therefore, the outcome is not efficient.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I conclude the introduction with an
overview over the related literature. The second section contains the formal description
of the proposed decision criterion. In the third section I collect sufficient conditions for
actions to be rationalizable which will be useful for the derivation of subjective maximin
beliefs and outcomes under maximin strategies. Moreover, I provide sufficient conditions
for the existence of such outcomes. In the fourth section I apply the decision criterion
to first-price auctions under strategic uncertainty. The fifth section contains the formal
description of the decision criterion under distributional and strategic uncertainty and
its application to first-price auctions. The appendix contains the proofs not provided in
44The assumption of common knowledge of an exogenously given mean under distributional uncertainty
has been used before. See for example Montiero (2009).
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previous sections.
Relation to the literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature - the literature on decision criteria under
uncertainty and robustness and the literature on rationalizability. Two widely used decision
criteria under uncertainty are the maximin utility and the minimax regret criterion.
The axiomatization of the maximin expected utility criterion is provided in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), the axiomatization of the minimax regret criterion is provided in Stoye
(2011). In Bergemann and Schlag (2008) both criteria are applied to a monopoly pricing
problem where a seller faces uncertainty about the buyer’s valuation distribution. Since
the seller knows that the buyer will obtain the good if the price is equal or lower than her
valuation, the seller does not face strategic uncertainty.
The maximin expected utility criterion has been applied to first-price auctions under
distributional uncertainty. Lo (1998) derives Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies
in a first-price auction under the maximin expected utility criterion where it is common
knowledge that the true valuation distribution is an element of a given set of distributions.
Salo and Weber (1995) assume that only the set of possible valuations is common knowledge
and that ambiguity averse bidders use a convex transformation of the uniform distribution
as a prior. They find, that the more ambiguity averse a bidder is, the higher is the bid.
Chen et al. (2007) analyze first- and second-price auctions where bidders face one of two
possible distributions which can be ordered with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
Thus, an ambiguity-averse bidder would assume the stochastically dominating distribution.
In their experimental findings they reject the hypothesis that bidders are ambiguity-averse.
These three papers use Bayes-Nash equilibria as a solution concept, that is, the issue of
strategic uncertainty is not addressed.
Bose et al. (2006) derive the optimal auction in a setting where seller and bidders may
face different degrees of ambiguity, that is, they may face different sets of possible valuation
distributions. Carrasco et al. (2018) consider a seller facing a single buyer. The set of
distributions the seller considers to be possible is determined by a given support and mean.
In these two papers strategic uncertainty is not an issue since the seller chooses a strategy
proof direct mechanism.
Renou and Schlag (2010) analyze strategic uncertainty using the minimax regret criterion.
Besides Kasberger and Schlag (2017), I am the only one addressing distributional and
strategic uncertainty. They use the minimax regret criterion and allow for the possibility
that a bidder can impose bounds on the other bidders’ bids or valuation distributions. For
example, they consider the case where a bidder can impose a lower bound on the highest
bid.
In their literature on robust mechanism design Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
consider the problem of a social planner facing uncertainty about the players’ actions.
In Bergemann and Morris (2005) a social planner can circumvent uncertainty about the
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players’ strategies by choosing ex-post implementable mechanisms. Bergemann and Morris
(2013) provide predictions in games independent of the specification of the information
structure. In order to do so, they characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. An
application of this concept to first-price auctions is carried out in Bergemann et al. (2017).
In Carroll (2016) two agents accept or reject a proposed deal where the valuation for each
agent depends on an unknown state. The main result provides an upper bound of welfare
loss among all information structures.
The concept of rationalizable strategies has been first introduced by Bernheim (1984)
and Pearce (1984) for games with complete information. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b)
extend rationalizability to games of incomplete information. An application to first-price
auctions has been carried out by Dekel and Wolinsky (2001). They apply rationalizable
strategies to a first-price auction with discrete private valuations and discrete bids. They
present a condition on the distribution of types under which the only rationalizable action
is to bid the highest bid below valuation. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003a) assume that
valuation distributions in a first-price auction are common knowledge but not the strategies
of the bidders. They characterize the set of rationalizable actions under the assumption of
strategic sophistication, which implies common knowledge of rationality and of the fact that
bidders with positive bids win with positive probability. They find that for a bidder with
a given valuation θ all bids in an interval (0, bmax (θ)) are rationalizable where bmax (θ)
is higher than the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid. Using this result, one can immediately
tell that under common knowledge of rationality a bidder applying the maximin expected
utility criterion has the subjective maximin belief that every other bidder with valuation
θ bids bmax (θ). I replicate this result in section 4.4 for first-price auctions with discrete
valuations.
To the best of my knowledge I am the first one applying the maximin expected utility
criterion to strategic uncertainty and the first one combining rationalizable strategies with
a decision criterion under uncertainty.
4.2 Model
Underlying game of incomplete information The starting point of the model is a
game of incomplete information which is denoted by
(
{1, . . . , I},Θ, A, {ui}i∈{1,...,I}
)
where
{1, . . . , I} is the set of players and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, Ai ⊆ R is the set of possible
actions and Θi ⊆ R is the set of possible privately known types of player i. A and Θ are
defined by A = A1 × . . . × AI and Θ = Θ1 × . . . × ΘI . A pure strategy of player i is a
mapping
βi : Θi → Ai
θi 7→ ai.
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The set Si is the set of all pure strategies of player i. A strategy of player i is a mapping
βi : Θi → ∆Ai
θi 7→ ai
where ∆Ai is the set of probability distributions on Ai. In the following gβiθi will denote
the density of the bid distribution βi (θi) and supp (βi (θi)) its support.45 Let
ui : A×Θi → R
(a1, . . . , aI , θi) 7→ ui (a1, . . . , aI , θi)
denote the utility function of player i. That is, I consider a setting with private valuations.
For a given profile of strategies (β1, . . . , βn) and a given type distribution
F : Θ→ [0, 1]
the expected utility of a player i is given by












(aj) dθ−jdF−i (θ−i) dθ−i (79)
where the function ui stems from the underlying game of incomplete information and where
F−i is defined by F−i (θ−i) = F (θ−i, θi).46
Action space of adverse nature In order to formalize the maximin expected utility
criterion, a new player, denoted by n, is introduced, representing the adverse nature
a player i applying the maximin expected utility criterion faces. Players i and n play
a simultaneous zero-sum game where utilities are induced by the underlying game of
incomplete information. The first step of a formal description of this game is the definition
of the adverse nature’s action space. It accounts for the residual uncertainty of player i.
In sections 4.2-4.4 I study only strategic uncertainty and assume common knowledge of a
type distribution given by
F : Θ→ [0, 1].
That is, the adverse nature’s action space is the set of all other players’ strategies which
player i considers to be possible which is the set of rationalizable strategies.
45A pure strategy can be interpreted as distribution of bids which puts probability weight 1 on one bid. I
abuse notation since in the case of a pure strategy, βi (θi) denotes an element in Ai while in the case of
a (mixed) strategy βi (θi) denotes an element in ∆Ai. However, in the following it will be clear whether
βi is a pure or a mixed strategy.
46For a vector (v1, . . . , vI) I denote by v−i the vector (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vI).
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Rationalizable strategies As argued in the introduction, in many economic settings
players may face uncertainty about the other players’ strategies. Even if a (Bayes-) Nash
equilibrium exists, a player may consider also other strategies of her opponents to be
possible. For example, multiple Nash equilibria can exist or the Nash equilibrium strategies
are not aligned with preferences the other players may have, e.g. maximin or minimax
regret preferences. In order to determine the set of strategies a player can expect from
rational opponents, I assume common knowledge of rationality. That is, it is common
knowledge that every player i maximizes her expected utility given her type, the commonly
known type distribution F and a conjecture about the other players’ strategies.
The assumption of common knowledge of rationality leads to the following reasoning.
Every player i maximizes her expected utility given her type, the type distribution F and a
conjecture about the other players’ strategies. The strategy which player i assumes is played
by some player j 6= i has also to be compatible with common knowledge of rationality.
Therefore, for every possible type of player j, the action prescribed by the strategy assumed
by player i maximizes j’s expected utility given her type, the type distribution F and
a conjecture about the other players’ strategies. Again, player j’s conjecture has to be
compatible with common knowledge of rationality. This reasoning continues ad infinitum.
47
Given the type of a player, an action which is compatible with common knowledge of
rationality is called rationalizable. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) have shown that it is
equivalent to define a rationalizable action as follows.
Definition 17. ggggg
(i) Let i ∈ {1, . . . , I} be a player and θi ∈ Θi be a type of player i. The set of
rationalizable actions for player i is defined as follows. Set RS1i (θi) := Ai. Assume
that for k ∈ N the set RSki (θi) is already defined. Then the set RSk+1i (θi) is defined
as the set of all elements ai in Ai for which there exists a strategy profile β−i of the
other players such that it holds
(i) aj ∈ supp (βj (θj)) for θj ∈ Θj ⇒ aj ∈ RSkj (θj) for all j 6= i
(ii) ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui (θi, a′i, β−i, F−i)





(ii) A strategy βi of a player i is rationalizable if for every θi ∈ Θi every action ai with
ai ∈ supp (βi(θi)) is rationalizable, i.e. an element of RSi (θi).
47As stated above, under strategic uncertainty a rational player acts optimally given a conjecture about the
other players’ strategies (and a conjecture about the other players’ type distributions if also distributional
uncertainty is present). Instead of “conjecture” other terms have been used in economic literature, e.g.
belief, subjective prior, assumption, assessment ect. I use the term conjecture as proposed in Bernheim
(1984).
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(iii) For a player i let RS−i be the set of rationalizable strategies of the other I−1 players.
The intuition behind this definition is that an action for a player which is consistent with
common knowledge of rationality, i.e. a rationalizable action, is an action which survives
the iterated elimination of actions which are not best replies. An action is a best reply
if it maximizes the player’s expected utility given her type, the commonly known type
distribution F and a conjecture about the other players’ strategies which prescribe actions
that have not been eliminated yet.
The definition of rationalizable strategies allows for a formal definition of the adverse
nature’s action space and therefore for a formal definition of the simultaneous game against
the adverse nature.
Simultaneous game against adverse nature The following definition summarizes all
components describing a game under strategic uncertainty.
Definition 18. A game under strategic uncertainty consists of an underlying game of
incomplete information, denoted by ({1, . . . , I},Θ, A, {ui}i ∈ {1, . . . , I}), a subset of players
{i1, . . . ik} ⊆ {1, . . . , I} applying the maximin expected utility criterion, and a player n.
For every i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} player i chooses a strategy
βi : Θi → ∆Ai.
A strategy of n is a mapping which for every player i ∈ {i1, . . . ik} and for every possible
type of player i assigns a strategy of the other players:
βn = (βni1 , . . . , βnik ) : Θi1 × . . .×Θik → RS−i1 × · · · ×RS−ik .
(θi1 , . . . , θik)→
(
β




Here the superscript nij , θij for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} indicates that the other players’ strategies
β
nij ,θij
−ij are chosen by the adverse nature faced by player ij and depend on the player’s type
θij . The utility of a player i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} is given by
Ui
(
θi, βi (θi) , βni,θi−i , F−i
)
which is defined as in (79) and depends on the utility function of player i in the underlying
game of incomplete information, denoted by ui:
ui : A×Θi → R.
(a1, . . . , aI , θi) 7→ ui (a1, . . . , aI , θi) .
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θi, βi (θi) , βni,θi−i , F−i
)
.
Throughout the remainder of the paper it will be assumed that a game under strategic
uncertainty is given without explicitly stating all its ingredients.
Since the other players’ strategies the adverse nature chooses for a player i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik},
are not observed by a player j 6= i, j ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, the adverse nature faces an independent
minimization problem for every player applying the expected maximin utility criterion.48
Note that after specifying the subset of players who apply the maximin expected utility
criterion, a given game of incomplete information uniquely defines a game under strategic
uncertainty.
Now it is possible to define a maximin strategy in a game under strategic uncertainty
which can be seen as a recommendation for a player facing strategic uncertainty.
Definition 19. In a game under strategic uncertainty for a player i a strategy
βi : Θi → ∆Ai
is a maximin strategy if there exists a Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game between
nature and player i such that βi is player i’s equilibrium strategy.
The Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game between nature and player i is called
maximin equilibrium.
As described above, such a maximin strategy has two properties. First, if a player
would not choose an action according to a maximin strategy, then there would exist a
rationalizable strategy of the other players under which the player’s expected utility is
lower than under the action prescribed by a maximin strategy. Second, the strategy chosen
by nature can be interpreted as the player’s subjective belief about the state of the world
against which she maximizes her expected utility given her type. The second property is
formalized in the following definition.
Definition 20. In a game under strategic uncertainty let βni be the adverse nature’s
maximin equilibrium strategy projected on the i′th component. A subjective maximin belief
of player i with valuation θi is defined as
βni (θi) = βni,θi−i ,
that is, the adverse nature’s maximin equilibrium strategy evaluated at θi.
48Equivalently, one could introduce an additional adverse nature for every player applying the minimax
expected utility criterion.
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Note that the subjective maximin belief of player is not necessarily unique. However,
every best reply of a player i to any subjective maximin belief induces the same expected
utility for player i.
4.3 Outcomes under strategic uncertainty
So far, I have characterized the set of strategies of a player which are obtained if this
particular player applies the maximin expected utility criterion. In addition to the derivation
of maximin strategies for particular players, one can analyze what happens if all players
adopt maximin strategies. Since under strategic uncertainty players do not observe each
other’s strategies, I do not use the term equilibrium, but the term outcome.
Definition 21. In a game under strategic uncertainty an outcome under maximin strategies
is a strategy profile (β1, . . . , βI , βn) such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} it holds that player
i’s strategy is a maximin strategy given the adverse nature’s strategy βn.
In other words, for every player i ∈ {1, . . . , I} it holds that (β1, . . . , βI , βn) constitutes a
maximin equilibrium in the simultaneous game between all players and the adverse nature.
The following Proposition follows from the definition of rationalizable strategies and of an
outcome under maximin strategies.
Proposition 12. In a game under strategic uncertainty let (β1, . . . , βI , βn) be an outcome
under maximin strategies. Then for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} it holds that βi is a rationalizable
strategy for player i.
One can prove this Proposition by showing per induction that for every k ∈ N, for every
θi ∈ Θi and for every ai ∈ supp (βi(θi)) it holds that ai is an element in RSki (θi). The
formal proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.1.
The following conclusions can be derived from this proposition. First, this proposition
shows that the maximin expected utility criterion is consistent with common knowledge
of rationality. That is, every action resulting from the application of the maximin utility
criterion is rationalizable. Second, it provides a sufficient condition for a strategy to be
rationalizable which will be useful in subsequent proofs. Third, the same proof as for
Proposition 12 can be used in order to show that an action which is a best reply to a
rationalizable strategy is again rationalizable. The last statement is formalized in the
following Corollary.
Corollary 6. In a game under strategic uncertainty let i ∈ {1, . . . , I} be a player with
valuation θi and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , I}\{i} let βj be a rationalizable strategy for player j.










then ai ∈ RSi (θi), that is, ai is a rationalizable action for player i with valuation θi.
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Another sufficient condition for an action to be rationalizable is that it is played in a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. It follows from Corollary 6 that a best reply to strategies played
in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is rationalizable. This constitutes another sufficient condition
for an action to be rationalizable. These two conditions are formalized in the following
definition and proposition.
Definition 22. In a game of incomplete information a strategy profile (β1, . . . βI) together
with a profile of type distributions
(
Fˆ1, . . . , FˆI
)
is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common











That is, every player maximizes her expected utility given the other players’ strategies and
the other players’ commonly known type distributions.
Proposition 13. Let the profile of strategies (β1, . . . , βI) together with the profile of type
distributions
(
Fˆ1, . . . , FˆI
)
constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common prior of a
game of incomplete information. Then the following holds true:
(i) For every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} the strategy βi is rationalizable.
(ii) Let i ∈ {1, . . . I} be a player with valuation θi and let ai ∈ Ai be a best reply to β−i












then ai ∈ RSi (θi), that is, ai is a rationalizable action for player i with valuation θi.
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.2.
As mentioned above, for every player applying the maximin expected utility criterion,
the adverse nature faces an independent optimization problem. Thus, if {i1, . . . , ik} is the
set of players applying the maximin expected utility criterion, then the game against an
adverse nature can be seen as k independent two-player zero-sum games. This allows for
the application of all results for two-player zero-sum games including the existence result
for Nash equilibria.
4.4 First-Price Auctions under Strategic uncertainty
In this section I apply the proposed decision criterion to first-price auctions. The first
subsection specifies the model for first-price auctions. The second subsection gives a rather
informal preview of the results. The third subsection provides a list of the necessary
notation and definitions. The fourth and fifth subsection contain a detailed description and
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derivation of the results for first price auctions under strategic uncertainty with common
knowledge of valuations and common knowledge of the valuation distribution, respectively.
4.4.1 Model
Underlying game of incomplete information As in the general model, the model description
starts with the specification of the underlying game of incomplete information. There are
I risk-neutral bidders competing in a first-price sealed-bid auction for one indivisible good.
Before the auction starts, every bidder i ∈ {1, ..., I} privately observes her valuation (type)
θi ∈ Θ =
{
0 = θ1, θ2, . . . , θm−1, 1 = θm
}
. A pure strategy of bidder i is a mapping
βi : Θ→ B
θi 7→ βi(θi)
where B is a finite (arbitrarily fine) grid of bids on an interval [0, B] with Θ ⊆ B.49 A
strategy of a bidder i is a mapping
βi : Θ→ ∆B
θi 7→ βi (θi)
where ∆B is the set of bid distributions on B. For every b ∈ B with b > 0 there exists a








In a first-price auction the bidders submit bids, the bidder with the highest bid wins the
object and pays her bid. In addition, it holds an efficient tie-breaking rule.50 Thus, the
utility of bidder i with valuation θi and bid bi given that the other bids are b−i is denoted
by
49A finite grid is used for the set of all possible bids instead of the interval [0, B] because of the following
reason. Consider two bidders 1 and 2 with the same valuation θ. If bidder 1 bids some amount b < θ,
one has to identify the smallest bid which is strictly higher than b since this would be the unique best
reply of bidder 2. This allows a more formal analysis than using expressions like "bidding an arbitrarily
small amount more than b". The grid is assumed to be finite in order to ensure that any subset of the
bid grid is compact. Since the grid can be arbitrarily fine, I assume for simplicity that Θ ⊆ B.
50The core statements in the results do not depend on the choice of the tie-breaking rule, i.e. under
a random tie-breaking rule for every bidder and every valuation the bid prescribed by the maximin
strategy would change by at most one step on the bid grid.
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ui (θi, bi, b−i) =

θi − bi if bi > max
j 6=i
bj
θi − bi if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi > max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
0 if bi = max
j 6=i
bj and θi < max
j 6=i
{θj | bj = bi}
1
k (θi − bi) if bi = maxj 6=i bj and θi = maxj 6=i {θj | bj = bi}
0 if bi < max
j 6=i
bj
where θj denotes the valuation of bidder j with bid bj for j ∈ {1, ..., n} and k =
#{max{θj |bj = bi}}.
The bidders’ valuations are identically and independently distributed according to a
distribution function
F : Θ→ [0, 1].
It is assumed that all components of the underlying game of incomplete information as
well as rationality are common knowledge among all bidders.
As mentioned above, the above defined game of incomplete information uniquely defines
a game under strategic uncertainty (after specifying the players applying the maximin
expected utility criterion). In the following I will call this game first-price auction under
strategic uncertainty. Moreover, I also consider the case where the valuations of the bidders
are common knowledge. In this case I use the term first-price auction under strategic
uncertainty and common knowledge of valuations.
4.4.2 Preview of results
Common knowledge of valuations If in a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty
and common knowledge of valuations there exists a unique bidder with the highest valuation,
this bidder’s maximin strategy is to bid the second-highest valuation and every other
bidder’s maximin strategy prescribes to be indifferent between any bid between zero and
her valuation. If at least two bidders have the highest valuation, then every bidder’s
maximin strategy prescribes to be indifferent between zero and her valuation.
Common knowledge of the valuation distribution In a first-price auction under strategic
uncertainty the bidders’ strategies are equal in every outcome under maximin strategies
and every outcome is efficient.
For every type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. For every bidder and
every type the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidders that every bidder
places the highest rationalizable bid given her type. As a consequence, a bidder applying
the maximin expected utility criterion never expects to win against a bidder with an equal
or higher type. The bidder calculates which highest rationalizable bid of a lower type
maximizes her expected utility. It turns out that due to the symmetry of beliefs about
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distributions and strategies, the higher the type of the bidder, the higher is the type whose
highest rationalizable bid maximizes her expected utility. Therefore, every outcome under
maximin strategies is efficient.
4.4.3 Notation and definitions
For the formal analysis it is useful to have an overview over the notation and definitions
which will be used in the remainder of this paper.
• For θk ∈ Θ let bθk be the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk.
• For θk, θl ∈ Θ, f i,θk
j,θl
denotes the probability with which type θl of bidder j occurs in
the subjective maximin belief of a bidder i with valuation θk.
• If f i,θk
j,θl
does not depend on the identities of bidder i and j, I use the notation fθk
θl
.
Definition 23. An auction mechanism is a double (x, p) of an allocation function x and
a payment function p. The allocation function
x : (B)I → [0, 1]I
x : (b1, . . . , bI)→ (x1, . . . , xI) with xi ∈ [0, 1],
∑
xi ≤ 1
determines for each participant the probability of receiving the item and the payment function




p : (b1, . . . , bI)→ (p1, . . . , pI) with pi ∈ R+
determines each participant’s payment.
Definition 24. In a first-price auction a bidder i with valuation θi and strategy βi overbids
a bidder j with valuation θj and strategy βj if for every b, b′ such that b ∈ supp (βi(θi)) and
b′ ∈ supp(βj (θj)) it holds that b ≥ b′ if θi > θj and b > b′ if θi ≤ θj.
Note that due to the efficient tie-breaking rule, a bidder who overbids every other bidder
wins with probability 1 in any auction mechanism where the highest bid wins.
In order to evaluate outcomes in terms of social surplus, I introduce the following
definition.
Definition 25. Let (β1, . . . , βI , βn) be an outcome under maximin strategies of an auction
mechanism. The outcome (β1, . . . , βI , βn) is efficient if for all bid vectors (b1, . . . , bI), such
that for every i ∈ {1, . . . I} there exists a valuation θi with bi ∈ supp(βi(θi)), it holds that




That is, the good is allocated with probability one to a group of bidders who have the highest
valuation.
4.4.4 Common knowledge of valuations
Proposition 14. Consider a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty and common
knowledge of valuations. Then there exists an outcome under maximin strategies and the
following holds true:
(i) If θk > max
j 6=i
θj, i.e. there exists a unique bidder k with the highest valuation, then
bidder k bids θk′ = max
θj∈Θ\{θk}
θj, i.e. the bidder with the highest valuation bids the
second-highest valuation and every bidder i 6= k is indifferent between any bid between
zero and her valuation.
(ii) If it holds that θk = θl = max
j∈{1,...,I}
θj, i.e. there exist at least two bidders k and l with
the highest valuation, then every bidder is indifferent between any bid between zero
and her valuation.
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.3.
The intuition behind part (i) is that one can show that the second-highest valuation θk′
is the highest rationalizable bid of bidder k with the highest valuation θk. If the adverse
nature chooses for all other bidders the subjective maximin belief that bidder k bids θk′ ,
this induces a utility of zero for any other bidder. Hence, any strategy of the adverse
nature has to induce an expected utility of at most zero for all bidders besides k. That is,
the subjective maximin belief of a bidder i 6= k with valuation θi is that at least one other
bidder bids an amount which is equal or greater than θi. As a consequence, all bidders are
indifferent between zero and their valuation. The adverse nature chooses the subjective
maximin belief for bidder k such that the bidder with the second-highest valuation bids
her valuation θk′ . Hence, it is a best reply for bidder k to bid θk′ . Similar arguments apply
to part (ii).
This Proposition describes the bidding behavior in a first-price auction under strategic
uncertainty under the assumption that every bidder applies the proposed decision criterion.
Since the bidders do not best reply to each other’s strategies, the Proposition also provides
the maximin strategy for every bidder. That is, the strategy prescribed in the outcome
also serves as a recommendation for a bidder facing strategic uncertainty in a first-price
auction.
Note that while the unique Nash equilibrium in this setting is rationalizable, there are
much more rationalizable actions than played in the Nash equilibrium. In particular, in
the case of two bidders who have the same valuation v all actions in the interval [0, v]
are rationalizable. This leaves room for more outcomes than the unique Nash-equilibrium
which is weakly dominated.
168
4.4.5 Common knowledge of the valuation distribution
Now I consider the case where not the bidders’ valuations but the distribution of the
valuations is common knowledge. In this case in an outcome under maximin strategies for
every type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. For every bidder and every type
the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidders that every other bidder will
bid the highest rationalizable bid given her type. As a consequence, it is never a best reply
for a bidder to overbid bidders with the same type. Hence, every bidder overbids only
lower types and it depends on the commonly known valuation distribution which types
are overbid. Since the strategy chosen by the adverse nature is the same for every bidder
and every type, this results in an efficient outcome. This is illustrated by the following
example.
Example 9. Consider a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty with two bidders
1 and 2 and three possible valuations 0, θ and 1 which are identically and independently
distributed according to a commonly known distribution function F ∈ ∆{0, θ, 1}. For every
type θk ∈ {0, θ, 1} there exists a highest rationalizable bid bθk . For every bidder and every
type the adverse nature chooses a strategy of the other bidder to bid the highest rationalizable
bid given her type. That is, every bidder with every type has the subjective maximin belief
that the 0-type bids zero, the θ-type bids bθ and the 1-type bids b1.
b
θ θ0 b1 1
Hence, bidder 1 with type θ never expects to win against bidder 2 with type θ and therefore
bids 0. Bidder 1 with type 1 never expects to win against bidder 2 with type 1 and has to
decide between bidding 0 and bidding bθ. Since the same reasoning holds for bidder 2, in
any case the outcome is efficient.
The insights from this example are formalized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 15. In a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty there exists an outcome
under maximin strategies. Every outcome is efficient.
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.4.
I will show the existence of an efficient outcome under maximin strategies by construction.
Then I will show that every strategy of the adverse nature in an outcome under maximin
strategies induces the same bidding strategies as in the constructed outcome and therefore
every outcome has to be efficient. The proof by construction has the advantage that it
determines the maximin strategies for every bidder, i.e. it provides a recommendation for
a bidder facing strategic uncertainty.
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For the construction of the efficient outcome it is crucial to calculate the highest
rationalizable bid for every type. The following three steps serve as a preparation for this
calculation.
(I) Show that for every type θk ∈ Θ there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid bθk .
(II) Show that for every type zero is a rationalizable bid.
(III) Show that for every type θk ∈ Θ every bid in the interval [0, bθk ] is rationalizable.
The first step follows from the fact that B is compact and well-ordered with respect
to ≤. For a proof sketch of step (II) consider a proof by induction with respect to the
valuations in Θ. Assume it has been shown that for every bidder with valuation θj such
that j < k+ 1 bidding zero is a rationalizable action. Assume that a bidder with valuation
θk+1 conjectures that all lower types bid zero. Due to step (I), for every type there exists a
highest rationalizable bid. Assume further, that the bidder with valuation θk+1 conjectures
that all equal or higher types bid their highest rationalizable bid, then it is a best reply of
this bidder to bid zero. As stated in Corollary 6, a best reply to a rationalizable strategy
profile is rationalizable and therefore zero is a rationalizable action for a bidder with
valuation θk+1.
For an intuition of step (III) consider the bid 0+. Since bidding zero is a rationalizable
action for every bidder and every type, it is straight-forward that for a sufficiently fine
bid grid bidding 0+ is a rationalizable action for every bidder and every type besides zero.
Because if a bidder conjectures that all bidders bid zero, than she could win the auction
with probability 1 by bidding 0+. The same holds for
(
0+
)+ and so on. This process
reaches some bid b such that for type θ2 it is more profitable to bid zero and win against
the zero-type than to bid b+ even if all other bidders with a type higher than zero bid b.
Then b is the highest rationalizable bid for type θ2 and all bids in the interval [0, b] are
rationalizable for a bidder with valuation θ2. The analogous reasoning applies to every
higher type. Since the bids in B are well-ordered with respect to ≤, one can show the
result by double induction with respect to the types and the bids.
Given these steps, one can calculate the highest rationalizable bid for every type. The
highest rationalizable bid bθ
k
for a bidder i with valuation θk is induced by the belief about
the other bidders’ strategies such that
(i) All bidders with a lower type bid their highest rationalizable bid.








is a best reply to the belief which maximizes the expected utility of bidding
b
θk . The strategies in (i) are rationalizable by definition and it follows from step (III) that
the strategies specified in (ii) are rationalizable. Hence, the highest rationalizable bid bθ
k
of type θk makes this type indifferent between winning with probability 1 by bidding bθ
k
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and the most profitable overbidding of a lower type given that all lower types bid their
highest rationalizable bid.
In an outcome under maximin strategies for every bidder and every type the adverse
nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidders that every other bidder places the
highest rationalizable bid given her type. As a consequence, a bidder never expects to win
against an equal or higher type. The maximin strategy of a bidder is determined by the
most profitable overbidding of a lower type given that every lower type places her highest
rationalizable bid.
The following example continues with Example 9 and illustrates the calculation of the
highest rationalizable bids and the maximin strategies.
Example 10. Consider again the case with two bidders 1 and 2 and three possible valuations
0,θ and 1 which are identically and independently distributed according to a commonly
known distribution function F ∈ ∆{0, θ, 1}.
b
θ θ0 b1 1
The highest rationalizable bid for type zero is zero. The highest rationalizable bid for type θ
is given by the bid bθ which makes her indifferent between winning with probability 1 by
bidding bθ and just overbidding type zero:
θ − bθ = F (0) (θ − 0)
⇔ bθ = θ (1− F (0)) + F (0) .
The highest rationalizable bid for type 1 is given by the bid b1 which makes her indifferent
between winning with probability 1 by bidding b1 and the most profitable overbidding of a
lower type. That is, type 1 has to be indifferent between bidding b1 and the maximum utility
of bidding either 0 = b0 or bθ:
1− b1 = max
{





For a numerical example consider the parameters θ = 12 , F (0) =
1
3 , F (θ) =
2
3 and



























from which follows that
b
1 = 1− 49 =
5
9
which is illustrated below:
b
θ = 13
θ0 b1 = 59
1
After computing the highest rationalizable bids, one can compute bidding strategies in an
outcome under maximin strategies. Type zero bids zero. Note that the highest rationalizable
bid of type θ is determined by the case that type θ wins with probability 1. Since type θ of
bidder 1 has the subjective maximin belief that type θ of bidder 2 bids bθ, bidder 1 would
win only with probability 12 by bidding b
θ. Hence, given the subjective maximin of bidder 1
with type θ, it is not a best reply to bid equal or higher than bθ. Therefore, she does not
expect to win against type θ of bidder 2 and bids zero. Similarly, type 1 of bidder 1 does
not expect to win against type 1 of bidder 2 and has to decide whether to overbid type 0
or type θ of bidder 2, i.e. whether to bid 0 or bθ. In any case the outcome is efficient.51
Bidding zero gives an expected utility of
F (0) = 13










Hence, type 1 of bidder 1 will bid bθ (and analogously for type θ of bidder 2).
Applying the same procedure, one can compute the highest rationalizable bids for every
number of types and every choice of parameters and then compute the bids under maximin
strategies. The following two graphs show the highest rationalizable bids for m equidistant
types with a uniform distribution for m = 10 and m = 20.
51Due to the efficient tie-breaking rule the outcome is efficient even if different types submit equal bids.
However, efficiency does not depend on thy choice of the tie-breaking rule. Under a random tie-breaking







Figure 6: Highest rationalizable bids for m = 10
Figure 7: Highest rationalizable bids for m = 20
The following two graphs show the bids in an outcome under maximin strategies for m
equidistant types with a uniform distribution for m = 10 and m = 20.
Figure 8: Bids in an outcome under maximin strategies for m = 10
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Figure 9: Bids in an outcome under maximin strategies for m = 20
Figures 3 and 4 show that the outcome under maximin strategies is efficient since the
bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction with probability 1. However, it is
possible that different types submit equal bids. Whenever a bidder is not indifferent
between two bids, her bidding strategy is unique which is the case in figures 3 and 4.
The strategy of the adverse nature is not necessarily unique. Assume that it is a best
reply of a bidder i with valuation θk ∈ Θ to bid bθl for l < k. Then it is possible that
the adverse nature decreases the bid of some bidder j 6= i with type θl′ for l 6= l′ without
changing the best reply of bidder i and hence without changing her expected utility.
Since all possible strategies of the adverse nature induce the same bidding strategies, the
non-uniqueness of the adverse nature’s strategy does not affect efficiency.
The recursive computation of the highest rationalizable bids for all types is formalized
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 16. In a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty the highest rationalizable
bids can be defined by the following recursion. The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with
valuation zero is zero. Assume that for every type θj with j < k the highest rationalizable bid
b
θj has been already defined. Then the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation
θk is determined by the equality









The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.4.52
Proposition 16 states that the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk
makes this bidder indifferent between winning the auction with probability 1 by bidding
b
θk and the most profitable overbidding of some lower type given that all lower types bid
their highest rationalizable bid.
52For a simpler notation I assume that the highest rationalizable bids bθ
j
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m lie on the bid
grid. Otherwise, the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk would be defined by
max{b ∈ B | b < bθk} where the bid bθk is defined by bθ
k











After calculating the highest rationalizable bid for every type, one can specify the
strategies played in an outcome under maximin strategies.
Proposition 17. In a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty it holds for every
















) ∣∣ θj < θk} .
This proposition states that every bidder chooses the most profitable overbidding of a
lower type. The intuition for this result is as follows. I show in the proof of Proposition
15 that there exists an outcome under maximin strategies such that for every bidder the
adverse nature chooses as the other bidders’ strategy that every bidder places the highest
rationalizable bid given her type. The strategy specified in Proposition 17 is a best reply to
this strategy of the adverse nature. Moreover, I show in the proof of Proposition 15 that in
every outcome under maximin strategies of a first-price auction under strategic uncertainty
the bidders’ strategies are equal. Therefore, in every outcome the bidders’ strategies are as
specified in Proposition 17. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.4. Note that as
before, this Proposition also provides the maximin strategy, i.e. a recommendation, for a
bidder facing strategic uncertainty in a first-price auction.
Proposition 17 shows that a bidder with a given type does not need to know the exact
value or distribution of higher types but only of lower types. This stems from the fact
that a bidder with a given type does not expect to win against bidders with the same or a
higher type. This Proposition also provides an intuition for the fact that every outcome is
efficient. The higher the valuation of a bidder, the higher is the type such that bidding the
highest rationalizable bid of this type maximizes the bidder’s expected utility.
Similarly as in the case where bidders’ valuations are known, there are more rationalizable
actions than actions played in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium as formalized in the following
Proposition.









in the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium β∗.53 If m ≥ 3, it holds for all
k 6= 1 that bθk∗ < bθ
k
.
Proof. The formal proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.5.
Proposition 16 provides the explanation for this result. Since the Bayes-Nash equilibrium
is efficient, the highest bid in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is induced if a bidder overbids all
bidders with an equal or lower type. In contrast, the highest rationalizable bid is induced
if a bidder overbids all other bidders.
53It follows from Montiero (2009) that a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists.
175
4.5 Distributional and strategic uncertainty
In this section the formal model and the application to first-price auctions allow not only
for strategic but also for distributional uncertainty. The first subsection contains the formal
model, the second subsection collects all results for the general model. The third subsection
specifies the formal model for first-price auctions and the fourth subsection provides the
results.
4.5.1 Model
This subsection provides the formal model for a game under both, distributional and
strategic uncertainty. The underlying game of incomplete information is the same as in
section 4.2. As before, a player applying the maximin expected utility criterion plays a
simultaneous game against an adverse nature.
Action space of adverse nature Under distributional uncertainty the adverse nature’s
action space does not only consist of rationalizable strategies but also of the set of
distributions which the player considers to be possible. I allow for the possibility that a
player does not know the exact type distribution but has more knowledge than just the
other players’ type spaces. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 26. Let ∆Θ−i be the set of all probability distributions on Θ−i. The set ∆Θ−i
is the smallest subset of ∆Θ−i such that player i knows that the true type distribution is
an element in ∆Θ−i.
Analogously as for strategic uncertainty, it holds that distributional uncertainty is present
if the set ∆Θ−i is not a singleton. Note that the assumption that a player knows that the
true type distribution (or the true strategy) is an element of some set is w.l.o.g. since it
covers any possible knowledge structure. For example, if a bidder i knows only the type
spaces of the other bidders but nothing else about the type distribution, then ∆Θ−i is
equal to ∆Θ−i, the set of all type distributions on Θ−i. In contrast, if bidder i faces no
distributional uncertainty and knows that the distribution of the other bidders’ types is
given by a function F−i, then the set ∆Θ−i is equal to {F−i}.
Throughout the paper I use the axiomatization of the knowledge operator where the
statement that a player knows something implies that it is true. Therefore, for every player
i it holds that the true type distribution of the other player is indeed an element in ∆Θ−i .
As in section 4.2, the strategies which a player considers to be possible are the set of
rationalizable strategies.
Rationalizable strategies As before, I assume common knowledge of rationality which
implies that the adverse nature has to choose from the set of rationalizable strategies. If
distributional uncertainty is added to strategic uncertainty, the definition of a rationalizable
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action changes. Under distributional and strategic uncertainty a player is rational if her
action is a best reply given her type, a conjecture about the other players’ strategies and a
conjecture about the other players’ type distributions which is an element in ∆Θ−i .
Definition 27. ggggg
(i) Let i ∈ {1, . . . , I} be a player and θi ∈ Θi be a type of player i. The set of
rationalizable actions for player i is defined as follows. Set RS1i (θi) := Ai. Assume
that for k ∈ N the set RSki (θi) is already defined. Then the set RSk+1i (θi) is defined
as the set of all elements ai in Ai for which there exists a type distribution F−i ∈ ∆Θ−i
and a strategy profile β−i of the other players such that it holds
(i) aj ∈ supp (βj (θj)) for θj ∈ Θ⇒ aj ∈ RSkj (θj) for all j 6= i
(ii) ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
Ui (θi, a′i, β−i, F−i)





(ii) A strategy βi of a player i is rationalizable if for every θi ∈ Θi every action ai with
ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)) > 0 is rationalizable, i.e. an element of RSi (θi).
(iii) For a player i let RS−i be the set of rationalizable strategies of the other I−1 players.
The definition of the possible distributions and strategies and of rationalizable strategies
allows for a formal definition of the adverse nature’s action space and therefore for a formal
definition of the simultaneous game against an adverse nature.
Simultaneous game against adverse nature The following definition summarizes all
components describing a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
Definition 28. A game under distributional and strategic uncertainty consists of a game
of incomplete information, denoted by ({1, . . . , I},Θ, A, {ui}i ∈ {1, . . . , I}), a subset of
players {i1, . . . ik} ⊆ {1, . . . , I} applying the maximin expected utility criterion, and a
player n. For every i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} player i chooses a strategy
βi : Θi → ∆Ai.
A strategy of n is a mapping which for every player i ∈ {i1, . . . ik} and for every possible
type of player i assigns a distribution of the other players’ valuations in a convex set ∆Θ−i
and a strategy of the other players in RS−i:









(θi1 , . . . , θik)→
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The utility of a player i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} is given by
Ui
(




which is defined as in (79) and depends on the utility function of player i in the underlying
game of incomplete information, denoted by ui:
ui : A×Θi → R.
(a1, . . . , aI , θi) 7→ ui (a1, . . . , aI , θi)











The term uncertainty can include distributional uncertainty or strategic uncertainty or
both. If only one type of uncertainty is present, I will refer to this case as pure distributional
or pure distributional uncertainty. For instance, a game under pure strategic uncertainty
as defined in section 4.2, is a special case of a game under distributional and strategic
uncertainty. If the type distribution F is common knowledge as defined in section 4.2, then
it holds for all players i that ∆Θ−i = {F−i}.
Now it is possible to define a maximin strategy in a game under distributional and
strategic uncertainty.
Definition 29. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty for a player i a
strategy
βi : Θi → ∆Ai
is a maximin strategy if there exists a maximin equilibrium in the simultaneous game
between nature and player i such that βi is player i’s equilibrium strategy.
The Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game between nature and player i is called
maximin equilibrium.
Analogously to section 4.2, one can define the subjective maximin belief of a bidder.
Definition 30. In a game under uncertainty let βni be the adverse nature’s maximin
equilibrium strategy projected on the i′th component. A subjective maximin belief of player








that is, the adverse nature’s maximin equilibrium strategy evaluated at θi.
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4.5.2 Outcomes under distributional and strategic uncertainty
The definition of an outcome in a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty is
analogous to the definition in a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
Definition 31. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty an outcome under
maximin strategies is a strategy profile (β1, . . . , βI , βn) such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} it
holds that player i’s strategy is a maximin strategy given the adverse nature’s strategy βn.
Analogously to Proposition 12 and Corollary 6 the following Proposition and Corollary
hold true which state that a strategy played in an outcome under maximin strategies is
rationalizable and that every action which is a best reply to a profile of rationalizable
strategies is also rationalizable.
Proposition 19. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty let (β1, . . . , βI , βn)
be an outcome under maximin strategies. Then for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I, βn} it holds that βi
is a rationalizable strategy for player i.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.1.
Corollary 7. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty let i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
be a player with valuation θi and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , I}\{i} let βj be a rationalizable










then ai ∈ RSi (θi), that is, ai is a rationalizable action for player i with valuation θi.
I will now provide another simple condition which is sufficient for an action to be
rationalizable and therefore facilitates the derivation of maximin strategies. In order to do
so, the following definition is needed.
Definition 32. For a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty a profile of
strategies (β1, . . . , βI) ∈ ∆A1 × · · · ×∆AI together with a profile of subjective beliefs
about the other players’ type distributions
(
F 1−1, . . . , F I−I
)
∈ ∆Θ−1 × · · · ×∆Θ−I is called
subjective-belief equilibrium with given strategies if every player acts optimally given her
belief and the other players’ strategies, i.e. for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, every θi ∈ Θi and every












That is, in a subjective-belief equilibrium players best reply to each other’s strategies but
do not know each other’s type distributions. Every player forms a subjective belief about
the other players’ type distributions and acts optimally given this subjective belief and the
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other players’ strategies. An example for a subjective-belief equilibrium is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium with a common prior.
Example 11. Let the strategy profile (β1, . . . βI) together with the profile of beliefs(
Fˆ−1, . . . , Fˆ−I
)
be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common prior. Then (β1, . . . βI)
together with
(
Fˆ−1, . . . , Fˆ−I
)
constitutes a subjective-belief equilibrium.
The following proposition states that a strategy which is played in a subjective-belief
equilibrium is rationalizable.
Proposition 20. In a game under distributional and strategic uncertainty an action
ai ∈ Ai is rationalizable for a player i with valuation θi if there exists a subjective-belief
equilibrium with strategies (β1, . . . , βI) such that ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)).
Proof. Let (β1, . . . , βI) together with
(
F 1−1, . . . , F I−I
)
be a subjective-belief equilibrium.
Let i be a player with valuation θi and ai be an action such that ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)). It is to
show that ai ∈ RSi(θi). I show by induction with respect to k that for every j ∈ {1, . . . , I},
for every k ≥ 1 and for all θj ∈ Θj it holds that
aj ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ RSkj (θj) .
Then it follows that aj ∈ RSj (θj) and one can conclude that ai ∈ RSi (θi) because
ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)). It holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , I} that
aj ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ RS1j (θj) for all θj ∈ Θj
since RS1j (θj) = Aj by definition. Assume it is already shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , I} it
holds that
ai ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ RSkθj for all θj ∈ Θj .
Let j be some player with type θj and subjective belief F j−j =
(









Then F j−j and β−j fulfill the properties
(i) al ∈ supp (βl (θl))⇒ al ∈ RSlk (θl) for all l 6= j











The first property follows from the induction hypothesis and the second property follows
from the definition of a subjective-belief equilibrium with given strategies. By definition
of a rationalizable action, it follows that βj (θj) ∈ RSk+1j . Hence, it is shown that
aj ∈ supp (βj (θj))⇒ aj ∈ RSj (θj).
The analogous result as in Proposition 13 holds also for games under distributional
and strategic uncertainty. That is, every strategy played in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
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is rationalizable and every action which is a best reply to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is
rationalizable.
Proposition 21. Let the profile of strategies (β1, . . . , βI) together with the profile of type
distributions (F1, . . . , FI) constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a common prior of a
game of incomplete information. Then the following holds true:
(i) For every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} the strategy βi is rationalizable.
(ii) Let i ∈ {1, . . . I} be a player with valuation θi and let ai ∈ Ai be a best reply to β−i












then ai ∈ RSi (θi), that is, ai is a rationalizable action for player i with valuation θi.
It can be proved as a direct result of Proposition 20.
Proof. As stated in Example 11, every Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a subjective-belief
equilibrium. Due to Proposition 20, every strategy played in a subjective-belief equilibrium
is rationalizable. Hence, every strategy played in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is rationalizable
which proves the first part. Corollary 7 states that best replies to rationalizable strategies
are rationalizable. Therefore, a best reply to a strategy which is played in a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium is rationalizable which shows the second part.
If {i1, . . . , ik} is the set of players applying the maximin expected utility criterion, then
as under pure strategic uncertainty, the game against an adverse nature can be seen as k
independent two-player zero-sum games. This allows for the application of all results for
two-player zero-sum games including the existence result for Nash equilibria.
After presenting the formal model, I turn to the application to first-price auctions under
distributional and strategic uncertainty.
4.5.3 First-price auctions under distributional and strategic uncertainty:
Model
The underlying game of incomplete information is the same as for first-price auctions
under strategic uncertainty in subsection 4.4.1. What differs is the set of distributions a
bidder applying the maximin expected utility criterion considers to be possible. Before,
the valuation distribution was common knowledge. Now I assume that the set of possible
valuations, i.e. the support of the valuation distribution, and the mean of the valuation
distribution is common knowledge.
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Possible distributions It is common knowledge that every bidder’s valuation is drawn from
the set Θ =
{
0 = θ1, θ2, . . . , θm−1, 1 = θm
}
according to a distribution with an exogenously
given mean µ. Formally, let
FI−1µ =
{










the set of all distributions of independently drawn valuations for I − 1 bidders with mean
µ. Then it holds for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} that
∆Θ−i = FI−1µ .
As argued before, the above defined game of incomplete information uniquely defines a
game under distributional strategic uncertainty (after specifying the player applying the
maximin expected utility criterion). In the following I will call this game first-price auction
under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
4.5.4 First-price auctions under distributional and strategic uncertainty:
Results
Preview or results If in a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty
there exist types θk, θk′ , θk′′ ∈ Θ such that 0 < θk ≤ µ < θk′ < θk′′ , then every outcome is
inefficient.
For every type there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid. For every bidder and
every type the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidders that every bidder
places the highest rationalizable bid given her type.
Let θµ be the lowest valuation which is higher than the mean. The highest rationalizable
bid of a bidder with a valuation lower than θµ is her valuation. The subjective maximin belief
of a bidder with valuation lower than θµ about the other bidders’ valuation distributions
is that the probability weight is distributed between her own valuation and θµ. As a
consequence a bidder with a valuation lower than µ expects a utility of zero and is
indifferent between any bid between zero and her valuation.
A bidder applying the maximin expected utility criterion with a valuation θk such
that θk ≥ θµ never expects to win against a bidder with the same valuation. Hence, the
subjective maximin belief of the bidder about the other bidders’ valuation distribution
maximizes the probability weight on θk and makes the bidder indifferent between any
highest rationalizable bid of lower types. As a consequence, the bidder mixes among all
highest rationalizable bids of lower types. Therefore, if types θk, θk′ , θk′′ ∈ Θ such that
0 < θk ≤ µ < θk′ < θk′′ exist, then with positive probability type θk′′ bids zero and type
θk
′ bids the highest rationalizable bid of type θk which is θk. Conclusively, the outcome is
not efficient.
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Example 12. Consider a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty
with two bidders 1 and 2 and three possible valuations 0, θ and 1 which are identically and
independently distributed with a commonly known mean µ. Assume that it holds θ < µ.
The first step is to calculate the highest rationalizable bid for every valuation.
The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation zero is zero. Assume that bidder
1 and bidder 2 have the subjective belief that the other bidder’s valuation distribution
distributes the probability weight between types θ and 1, i.e. there is zero probability weight
on type 0. Given that bidder 1 and bidder 2 have this subjective belief, the following
strategies constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium:
(i) Type θ of bidder 1 and bidder 2 bids θ.
(ii) Type 1 of bidder 1 and bidder 2 plays a mixed strategy on the interval [θ, b1] for
θ < b1 < 1.
Thus, it is part of a subjective-belief equilibrium that a bidder with valuation θ bids θ.
It follows from Proposition 20 that bidding θ is a rationalizable action for a bidder with
valuation θ. Since bidding above valuation cannot be rationalizable, the highest rationalizable
action of a bidder with valuation θ is to bid θ.
b
θ = θ µ0 b1 1
Let b1 denote the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation 1. In order to
compute b1, consider the conjecture of a bidder with valuation 1 that the strategy of the
other bidder is such that
(iii) Type zero bids zero,
(iv) Type θ bids θ,




It has been already shown that (iv) is rationalizable and similarly as in the case of pure
strategic uncertainty, one can show that (vi) is rationalizable. It follows from Corollary
7 that a best reply to the strategy described in (iii)− (vi) is rationalizable. Thus, this is
the rationalizable strategy which maximizes the expected utility of bidding b1 and therefore
induces the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation 1, i.e. bidding b1 is a best
reply to this strategy.
A rationalizable bid is a best reply to a strategy of the other bidders and to a distribution
of their valuations. Hence, in addition to the strategy inducing b1, one has to derive the
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denote the corresponding probability
mass function. It must hold that






which is equivalent to









Since b1 is the highest bid for which this condition is fulfilled, it holds that
b








which is equivalent to
b




(1− θ) . (81)







is the unique solution to the following system of linear equations
f10 + f1θ + f11 = 1






After obtaining the solution
f10 =
1− µ









one can compute b1 using equation (81), i.e. it holds
b




(1− θ) = µ1 + θ .
After deriving the highest rationalizable bids for every type, the second step is to derive
the adverse nature’s strategy. In the setting of strategic and distributional uncertainty
the adverse nature’s strategy determines for every bidder and every type a strategy and a
valuation distribution of the other bidder. As in the case of pure strategic uncertainty, for
every bidder and every type the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other bidder
to place the highest rationalizable bid given her valuation.54
54As in the case of pure strategic uncertainty, the strategy of the adverse nature is not necessarily unique
in a maximin equilibrium but in every equilibrium the strategies of the bidders coincide with the best
reply to the strategy of the adverse nature as described.
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The subjective maximin belief of a bidder with valuation zero is irrelevant since such
a bidder always earns a utility of zero. For a bidder with valuation θ the adverse nature
chooses a distribution of the other bidder’s valuations which puts zero probability weight
on type zero. Since type θ bids θ, this induces an expected utility of zero for a bidder with
valuation θ. A bidder with valuation 1 never expects to win against a bidder with valuation
1. Therefore, a bidder with valuation 1 has to decide between bidding zero and bidding θ.


















































In the final step, for every bidder and every type one has to find the set of best replies
to the adverse nature’s strategy. Moreover, one has to identify the best replies such that
the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate from her strategy derived in the
second step. Since the expected utility of a bidder does not decrease if one of the other
bidders places a lower bid, the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate from
the strategy where for every bidder and every type she prescribes the highest rationalizable
bid.55 Hence, it is sufficient to check whether the adverse nature has an incentive to deviate
from the chosen distributions.
A bidder with valuation zero bids zero. A bidder with valuation θ expects a utility of zero
and is indifferent between any bid in the interval [0, θ]. Hence, the adverse nature does not
have an incentive to deviate. A bidder with valuation 1 is indifferent between bidding 0
and θ. In a maximin equilibrium in the game against the adverse nature, a bidder with
valuation 1 mixes between 0 and θ in a way such that the adverse nature is indifferent
among any valuation distribution which fulfills the constraints that probabilities add up to
one and the mean µ is preserved. Therefore, the adverse nature does not have an incentive
to deviate.
Note that the distribution of the other bidder’s valuations which the adverse nature
chooses for a type is the same distribution which induces the highest rationalizable bid
for this type. That is, a bidder i with a given type assumes that her opponent j has the
same assumption about i’s valuation distribution as i’s assumption about j’s valuation
distribution. But bidder i assumes that j has a different belief about i’s strategy than i’s
55An exception is that if one bidder bids above her valuation, it would be a best reply of the adverse nature
to choose as the strategy of the other bidders that every other bidder bids zero. This would induce
a strictly negative utility for the bidder bidding above her valuation. However, one can exclude this
exception in a maximin equilibrium.
185
belief about j’s strategy.
The insights from the example about bidders’ strategies are generalized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 22. Consider a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
There exists an outcome under maximin strategies. If there exist types θk, θk′ , θk′′ ∈ Θ such
that 0 < θk ≤ µ < θk′ < θk′′, then there does not exist an efficient outcome.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.6.
The inefficiency stems from the fact that every type above µ mixes between all highest
rationalizable bids of all lower types. With positive probability type θk′′ bids zero and type
θk
′ bids the highest rationalizable bid of type θk which is θk. Conclusively, the outcome is
not efficient.
Similarly as under pure strategic uncertainty, I will show the existence of an outcome
under maximin strategies by construction. The following three steps serve as a preparation
for the calculation of the highest rationalizable bids.
(I) Show that for every type θk ∈ Θ there exists a unique highest rationalizable bid bθk .
(II) Show that for every type zero is a rationalizable bid.
(III) Show that for every type θk ∈ Θ every bid in the interval [0, bθk ] is rationalizable.
The explanation for steps (I)-(III) works analogously as for steps (I)-(III) in the case of
pure strategic uncertainty. For the calculation of the highest rationalizable bids, first,
consider valuations equal or below µ. Analogously as in the example, on can show that the
highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk such that θk ≤ µ is θk. This bid is
induced by the subjective belief equilibrium where the probability weight is distributed
between types θk and θµ and all bidders with valuation θk bid θk, where θµ is the smallest
valuation strictly higher than µ.
The calculation of the highest rationalizable bids for higher types works by recursion.
Assume that for a bidder i with valuation θk ≥ θµ and that for all j < k the highest
rationalizable bids has been already computed. The highest rationalizable bid bθ
k
of a
bidder with valuation θk is a best reply to a conjecture about the other bidders’ strategies
and distributions.
The strategies which induce bθ
k
are given by
(i) Every bidder with valuation θj such that θj < θk bids her highest rationalizable bid.







The valuation distribution of the other bidders which induces bθ
k
has to minimize the
incentive to bid another bid. In addition, probabilities have to add up to zero and the








be a vector of probabilities such that
according to the valuation distribution inducing bθ
k















































1 + · · ·+ fθkθmθm = µ.






I−1 (θk − bθj) for 1 ≤ j < k
have to be equal.
The recursive calculation of the highest rationalizable bids and the distributions inducing
them, is formalized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 23. Consider a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty.
For θk ≤ µ the highest rationalizable bid bθ is equal to θk.
Assume that for all j < k, the highest rationalizable bid bθ
j
has been already defined and









































I−1 (θk − bθj) for 1 < j < k.
The highest rationalizable bid bθ
k
is obtained by the equation
b







The proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.6. After calculating the highest rationalizable
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bid for every type, one can specify the strategies played in an outcome under maximin
strategies.
Proposition 24. In a first-price auction under distributional and strategic uncertainty
it holds for every outcome under maximin strategies and for every bidder i and every
valuation θk that
(i) Every bidder with valuation θk such that θk ≤ µ is indifferent between any bid in the
interval [0, θk].
(ii) Every bidder with valuation θk such that θk > µ mixes among the bids {bθj | j < k},
that is, among the set of all highest rationalizable bids of lower types.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 4.7.6.
4.6 Conclusion
I conclude by first providing a short summary and afterwards discussing the assumptions
made in this paper as well as possible extensions.
4.6.1 Summary
I propose a new decision criterion for players who face strategic uncertainty in games
of incomplete information. The decision criterion works in two steps. First, I assume
common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which do not survive the
iterated elimination of strategies which are not best replies. Second, I apply the maximin
expected utility criterion. With this decision criterion one can derive recommendations
for a player facing strategic uncertainty and analyze outcomes under the assumption that
every player follows this decision criterion. Moreover, I provide an extension of the model
to distributional and strategic uncertainty.
I apply this decision criterion to first-price auctions under pure strategic uncertainty
and under both, distributional and strategic uncertainty. In both cases every bidder has
the subjective belief that every other bidder places the highest rationalizable bid given her
type. Therefore, a bidder applying the proposed decision criterion resorts to win against
lower types with certainty by bidding highest rationalizable bids of lower types. Besides
providing recommendations for bidders facing strategic oder distributional uncertainty in
first-price auctions, I characterize all outcomes under the assumption that every bidder
applies this criterion. Under pure strategic uncertainty every outcome is efficient. Under
distributional and strategic uncertainty every outcome is inefficient (under a mild condition
on the number and distribution of possible valuations).
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4.6.2 Discussion
Choice of decision criterion
The decision criterion under uncertainty used in this paper is the maximin expected utility
criterion. The analogous analysis could be conducted with other criteria such as the
minimax expected regret criterion.
Possible distributions and strategies
In this paper I restricted the set of possible strategies by assuming common knowledge of
rationality and the set of possible distributions by assuming common knowledge of a mean.
This restriction is crucial for the application of the maximin expected utility criterion.
Otherwise, in first-price auctions there would exist a distribution or strategy inducing an
expected utility of zero for a player independent of her action.
For example, Bergemann and Schlag (2008) apply the maximin expected utility criterion
to a monopoly pricing problem where a seller faces uncertainty about the buyer’s valuation
distribution. Without a restriction of the set of possible distributions the adverse nature
would choose a distribution which puts the whole probability weight on valuation zero.
Thus, they assume that the seller knows that the buyer’s true valuation distribution is in
the neighborhood of a model distribution. Other papers applying the maximin expected
utility criterion to distributional uncertainty also assume an exogenously given restriction
of the set of possible distributions.
Due to a similar reasoning, a restriction of the set of possible strategies is required if
the maximin expected utility criterion is applied to strategic uncertainty. For example,
if one would apply the maximin expected utility criterion to a first-price auction where
a bidder faces uncertainty about the other bidders’ strategies, then without a restriction
of the set of possible strategies the adverse nature would choose a strategy of the other
bidders such that all bidders place arbitrarily high bids. First, such strategies do not
seem plausible. Second, the maximin expected utility criterion does not provide a useful
recommendation. In order to solve these issues, one could also exogenously restrict the set
of possible strategies. For example, Kasberger and Schlag (2017) apply the minimax regret
criterion to first-price auctions and assume common knowledge of an exogenously given
restriction of the players’ bidding strategies, for instance, in form of a lower bound of the
highest bid.
However, the fact that rational agents interact strategically in a given economic setting
already contains information about the possible strategies. Thus, it is possible to use
an endogenous restriction of the set of possible strategies - which is given by the set of
rationalizable strategies - in order to apply the maximin expected utility criterion. The
model can be easily extended in a way which allows for additional (exogenously given)
knowledge about possible strategies.
Under distributional uncertainty an exogenously given restriction of the set of possible
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distributions is still necessary. Besides fixing the mean, there exist other possibilities to
restrict the set of possible distributions and strategies. For instance, one could investigate
outcomes under distributional uncertainty under the assumption that further moment
conditions of the type distribution are common knowledge.
Cognitive complexity
Formally, the derivation of the set of rationalizable actions for an agent with a given type
requires an infinite intersection of sets. However, the proofs use a finite number of recursion
steps. In the model under strategic uncertainty and in the model under distributional
uncertainty the bid of a bidder with type θk is obtained after at most k recursion steps.
One could argue that a sufficiently rational player can conduct the necessary calculations.
But one could also argue that for some players these calculations may be too difficult.
Therefore, similarly as in level-k models, one could define the concept of k-rationalizability.
That is, a player i could know that her opponent can compute the set RSkj for all players
j and for k ∈ N, but cannot compute the sets RSk′j for k′ > k (see Bernheim (1984)).
Depending on the parameters, this knowledge can influence player i’s maximin strategy.
Robustness
In addition to the maximin expected utility criterion, one could introduce an additional
robustness criterion in the following sense: Does the maximin strategy of an agent change if
the adverse nature deviates from her strategy to another strategy in an -neighborhood? If
there is a change, does the strategy and the resulting expected utility change continuously?
As an example, consider a first-price auction under pure strategic uncertainty with a
commonly known distribution function, two bidders and three valuations 0, θ and 1. Bidder
1 with valuation 1 has the subjective maximin belief that bidder 2 with valuation 1 bids b1.
Hence, bidder 1 with valuation 1 bids either bθ or zero. However, all bids in the interval
[0, b1] are rationalizable for a bidder with valuation 1. Hence, (if the bid grid is sufficiently
fince) an -neighborhood of b1 and its intersection with the set of rationalizable actions
contains bids lower than b1. If bidder 1 with valuation 1 has the subjective belief that
bidder 2 with valuation 1 bids lower than b1, e.g.
(
b
1)−, then b1 becomes a best reply for
bidder 1 with valuation 1. This constitutes a discontinuity in her best reply.
As a second example, consider a first-price auction under pure strategic uncertainty
with two bidders and a commonly known common valuation v. To bid v is the highest
rationalizable action for both bidders. Therefore, bidder 1 has the subjective maximin belief
that bidder 2 bids v. As a consequence, bidder 1 is indifferent between any bid in [0, v].
Assume that bidder 1 chooses the action v (or v−). As any other bid, this leads to a utility
of zero given the subjective maximin belief that bidder 2 bids v. An -neighborhood of v
and its intersection with the set of rationalizable actions contains only bids below v, e.g. it
contains the bids v,v− and (v−)−. The best replies to these bids are in an -neighborhood
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of v (or v−) and the induced utilities are in an -neighborhood of zero. Hence, bidding v
(or v−) fulfills the robustness property that an -deviation of the subjective maximin belief
induces an -deviation of the best replies and expected utility.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of Proposition 12 and 19
Proof. Proposition 12 is a special case of Proposition 19 such that for every player i it holds
that ∆Θ−i = F−i where F is the commonly known valuation distribution as assumed in
Proposition 12. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove Proposition 19. Every player maximizes
her expected utility given a distribution of the other players’ types and a rationalizable
strategy of the other players chosen by nature. Let (β1, . . . , βI , βn) be an outcome under
maximin strategies. It is to show that for every player i and for every type θi an action ai
which is in the support of βi (θi) is an element in RSki (θi) for every k ≥ 1. The proof works
by induction. It is true that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} every action ai ∈ Ai is an element
in RS1i (θi) since it holds by definition that RS1i (θi) = Ai. Assume it is already shown
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , I} and every θi ∈ Θi that every action ai with ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)) is
an element in RSki (θi). Let i bid a bidder with valuation θi. Since n can choose only
among rationalizable strategies, it holds for every j 6= i that βni,θij is a rationalizable





it holds that aj ∈ ⋂k≥1RSkj (θj). It follows that




for θj ∈ Θj ⇒ aj ∈ RSjk (θj) for all j 6= i.
By definition of an outcome under maximin strategies, it holds for every action ai with
ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)) that ai is a best reply given the adverse nature’s strategy, i.e. a best
reply to the other bidders’ valuation distribution and strategies chosen by the adverse
nature. Therefore, it holds that













By definition of the set RSk+1i (θi), it follows from (i) and (ii) that for every ai with
ai ∈ supp (βi (θi)) is an element in RSk+1i (θi) and it follows by induction that ai is an
element in RSki (θi) for every k ≥ 1.
4.7.2 Proof of Proposition 13
Since Proposition 13 is a special case of Proposition 21 such that for every player i it holds
that ∆Θ−i = F−i, where F is the commonly known valuation distribution as assumed in
Proposition 13, the proof follows from the proof of Proposition 21.
4.7.3 Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. (i) At first, I consider the case where there exists a unique bidder k who has
the highest valuation and show that her highest rationalizable bid is the second-highest
valuation, denoted by θ′k. In order to do so, I will show by induction that for every bidder
i 6= k the bids in the interval (θk′ , 1] are not rationalizable. Let i be an arbitrary bidder
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which is not bidder k. Hence, bidder i’s valuation is strictly lower than 1. The induction
steps are descending and start with 1. Since 1 is the highest possible bid, bidder i wins with
strictly positive probability if she bids 1 which cannot be rationalizable since she would
earn a negative utility with positive probability. For the induction step assume that it has
been shown that all bids equal or higher than b with b ∈ (θk′ , 1] are not rationalizable for all
bidders i 6= k. It is to show that for an arbitrary bidder i 6= k the bid b− is not rationalizable
if b− > θk′ . Since all bids strictly higher than b− are not rationalizable for all bidders
besides bidder k, it is also never a best reply for bidder k to bid strictly higher than b−.
Therefore, bidder i wins with strictly positive probability if she bids b−. Since b− is strictly
higher than her valuation, this cannot be optimal. This completes the induction step from
which follows that for all bidders i 6= k the bids in the interval (θk′ , 1] are not rationalizable.
It follows that for bidder k all bids in the interval (θk′ , 1] are not rationalizable. In every
Nash equilibrium the highest bidder bids the second-highest valuation θk′ . Since according
to part (i) of Proposition 13 a strategy played in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is rationalizable,
the bid θk′ is rationalizable for bidder k. It follows that θk′ is the highest rationalizable
bid of bidder k.
If the adverse nature chooses for all bidders i 6= k as the action of bidder k to bid θ′k , i.e.
βni,θik (θk) = θk′ , every bidder i 6= k with valuation θi expects a utility of zero independent
of her action. Therefore, any other strategy of the adverse nature which is played in a
maximin equilibrium, has to induce an expected utility of zero for every bidder i 6= k. That
is, the subjective maximin belief of a bidder i 6= k with valuation θi is that at least one
other bidder bids equal or higher than θi. As a result, every bidder i 6= k is indifferent
between all bids in the interval [0, θi]. It is left to show that a bidder i 6= k does not bid
above her valuation. Assume there exists a bidder i with valuation θi who bids b > θi.
Since for all bidders j 6= k bidding zero is rationalizable, it is rationalizable for bidder k to
bid zero. Given that bidder i bids b, the adverse nature chooses as the strategy of the other
bidders to bid zero, i.e. for every j 6= i it holds that βni,θij (θj) = 0. As a result, bidder i
wins with probability 1 and expects a negative utility which cannot be part of a maximin
equilibrium. Hence, none of the bidders places bids strictly higher than her valuation in a
maximin equilibrium.
In order to minimize the expected utility of bidder k, the adverse nature chooses as the
strategy of the second-highest bidder, i.e. bidder k′ with valuation θk′ , to bid her valuation
i.e. βnk,θkk′ (θk′) = θk′ . This is the highest rationalizable bid which can be placed by a
bidder who is not bidder k. As a consequence, bidder k bids θk′ .
(ii) Finally, I consider the case where at least two bidders have the highest valuation θk.
Analogously as before, one can show by induction that for every bidder the bids in the
interval (θk, 1] are not rationalizable. In every Nash equilibrium every highest bidder bids
her valuation θk. Therefore, it holds due to Corollary 13 that the bid θk is rationalizable
for every highest bidder. It follows that θk is the highest rationalizable bid and therefore
is the action which the adverse nature chooses as the action of a highest bidder k for a
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bidder i 6= k, i.e. βni,θik (θk) = θk. This implies that every bidder does not expect to earn a
positive utility and therefore is indifferent between any bid between zero and her valuation.
Bids strictly higher than the own valuation can be excluded analogously as above.
4.7.4 Proof of Propositions 15, 16 and 17
In order to prove Propositions 15 and 16, I will show the following Lemmas which formalize
steps (I) -(III).
Lemma 29. For every bidder i and every valuation θk ∈ Θ there exists a unique highest
rationalizable bid bθ
k
. This bid does not depend on the identity of bidder i.
Proof. For every bidder i and every valuation θi the set of rationalizable actions RSi (θi)
is a finite set in a metric space and therefore compact. Since every compact set contains
its supremum, there exists a maximum element of the set RSi (θi). Since this is a subset
of B and by definition, B is well-ordered with respect to the relation ≤, the maximum
element of RSi (θi) has to be unique. Due to the symmetry of the bidders, the highest
rationalizable bid does not depend on the identity of the bidder.
Lemma 30. For every type θk ∈ Θ zero is a rationalizable bid.
Proof. The proof works by induction with respect to the types in Θ. The induction starts
with θ1 = 0. Montiero (2009) shows that with a given commonly known distribution there
exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with discrete valuations where
type zero bids zero. It follows from part (i) of Corollary 13 that zero is a rationalizable
action for type zero.
For the induction step assume that it has been already shown for all types θj with j ≤ k
that zero is a rationalizable action for type θj . Consider a bidder i with valuation θk+1
who conjectures that all other bidders with type θj such that j ≤ k bid zero which is
rationalizable by assumption. According to Lemma 29, for every bidder and every type
there exists a highest rationalizable bid. Let the conjecture of bidder i with valuation θk+1
be such that every other bidder with type θj such that j > k bids her highest rationalizable
bid. Since all types with valuation θj such that j > k bid at least the highest rationalizable
bid of type θk+1 and all other types bid zero, it is a best reply of bidder i with valuation
θk+1 to bid zero. As stated in Corollary 6, a best reply to a rationalizable strategy profile
is rationalizable and therefore zero is a rationalizable action for bidder i with type θk+1.
This completes the induction step and hence one can conclude that for every bidder and
every type zero is a rationalizable action.
Lemma 31. For every type θk ∈ Θ every bid in [0, bθk ] is rationalizable.
Proof. The proof works by showing a formally stronger statement by induction with respect
to the types in Θ. The statement is that for every type θk ∈ Θ it holds that every bid in
the interval [0, bθ
k
] is rationalizable for every type θj such that j ≥ k.
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The induction starts with k = 1, i.e. with θ1 = 0. The highest rationalizable bid for
type θ1 is zero and it follows from Lemma 30 that zero is a rationalizable bid for every
type θj ≥ θ1.
For the induction step assume that it has been already shown that for all l ≤ k it holds
that every bid in the interval [0, bθ
l
] is rationalizable for every type θj such that j ≥ l. By
using induction with respect to the bids, I will show that the same statement holds for
type θk+1. The induction starts with the bid zero. It follows from Lemma 30 that zero
is rationalizable for every type. For the induction step assume that it has been already
shown that every bid in the interval [0, b] with b < bθ
k+1
is rationalizable for every type θj
with j ≥ k + 1. In order to show that b+ is rationalizable for every type θj with j ≥ k + 1,
consider a bidder i with valuation θj with j ≥ k + 1 and strategies of the other bidders
such that for every other bidder it holds that
(i) Every type θh with h < j bids her highest rationalizable bid.
(ii) Every type θh with h ≥ j bids b.
The strategies in (i) are rationalizable by definition and the strategies in (ii) are rationalizable
by the assumption in the induction step (in the second induction with respect to the bids
in the interval [0, bθ
k
]). Given this conjecture about the other bidders’ strategies it is a
best reply for bidder i with valuation θj to bid b+. Any change in part (i) would imply




which does not increase the expected utility of bidding b+. Any deviation
from (ii) implies that there exists at least one bidder and a valuation θh with h ≥ j such
that this bidder places either a lower or a higher bid than b. If the bid is lower, then the
same reasoning as above applies. If a bidder with valuation θh deviates to a higher bid,
then by bidding b+ bidder i with valuation θj does not overbid type θl of the deviating
bidder anymore which decreases bidder i’s winning probability.
Conclusively, any conjecture deviating from the strategies in (i) and (ii) does not increase
the expected utility of bidding b+. Therefore, if bidding b+ is not a best reply to the beliefs
in (i) and (ii), then b is the highest rationalizable bid for type θj which is a contradiction
to the assumption b < bθ
k
. This completes the induction step of the second induction.
It follows that any bid in the interval [0, bθ
k+1
] is rationalizable for every type θj with
j ≥ k + 1. This completes the induction step of the first induction. Therefore, it has
been shown that for every type θk ∈ Θ it holds that every bid in the interval [0, bθk ] is
rationalizable for every type θj such that j ≥ k.
After proving Lemmas 29-31, I continue with the proof of Proposition 16.
Proof of Proposition 16
Proof. Consider a bidder with valuation θk. As shown in the proof of Lemma 31, for every
type the conjecture given by
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(i) Every type θl with l < k bids her highest rationalizable bid .






induces the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk , that is, the highest
rationalizable bid bθ
k
of a bidder with valuation θk is a best reply to the conjecture that all
other bidders employ this strategy. Given this conjecture, the expected utility of a bidder
with type θk ∈ Θ who bids bθk is given by
θk − bθk .
This utility has to be higher than the utility induced by any other bid. A bid can be a best
reply for a bidder if she just overbids some other bidder. Formally, a bid b can be best reply
for a bidder with valuation θk only if there exists a bidder j 6= i and a valuation θl < θk
such that bidder j with valuation θl bids b (or there exists a bidder j with valuation θl ≥ θk
such that bidder j with valuation θl bids b− or b). Hence, the only potential candidates for




with j < k. Thus, equation (80) ensures that bidding
b
θk induces at least the same expected utility than any other bid which can be a best reply.
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. I show the existence of an efficient outcome under maximin strategies by construction
and then show that bidders’ strategies are equal in every outcome. Conclusively, there exists
an outcome under maximin strategies and every outcome is efficient. The construction of
an efficient outcome works as follows. According to Lemma 29 for every type there exists
a unique highest rationalizable bid. For every type and every player the adverse nature
chooses the other bidders’ strategies such that every bidder places the highest rationalizable
bid given her type, i.e. for pair of bidders i, j and for every pair of valuations θi, θj it holds
that
βni,θij (θj) = b
θj . (82)
Let βn denote this adverse nature’s strategy. Independent of the bidders’ strategies there
does not exist another strategy of the adverse nature which induces a lower expected utility
for any of the bidders.56 Thus, the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate
from this strategy. Every bidder plays a best reply given her type and the adverse nature’s
strategy. Due to the compactness of B, such a best reply always exists. I will show that
the outcome defined by these best replies is efficient.
56An exception is that if one bidder bids above her valuation, it would be a best reply of the adverse nature
to choose as the strategy of the other bidders that every other bidder bids zero. This would induce
a strictly negative utility for the bidder bidding above her valuation. However, one can exclude this
exception in a maximin equilibrium.
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For a bidder with valuation θk the best reply is given by the most profitable overbidding





















































− F (θj) ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ j < l, it follows from (84) that for all θk′ such that
θk
′





































First, consider the case where for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} the inequality in (83) is strict.
Then for a bidder with valuation θk there exists a unique best reply, denoted by bθ
l
. Hence,
in order to show efficiency, it is sufficient to show that every best reply of a bidder with
valuation θk′ with θk′ > θk is equal or greater than bθ
l
.
It holds for every 1 ≤ j < l that the inequality in (85) is strict. It follows that none of
the bids bθ
j
for 1 ≤ j < l can be a best reply for a bidder with valuation θk′ . Thus, a best
reply of a bidder with valuation θk′ with θk′ > θk is equal or greater than bθ
l
.
Second, consider the case where for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} the expression in
(83) holds with equality. Let j1, . . . jh be all indices for which it holds that the expression
in (83) holds with equality where θjh = max
j∈{j1,...,jh}
θj . That is, bθh is the highest best















































For all j such that j < jh and j /∈ {j1, . . . , jh} as in the first case, it holds that the inquality
in (83) is strict and therefore also the inequality in (85). Conclusively, the best reply of
a bidder with valuation θk′ is at least as high as the highest best reply of a bidder with
valuation θk. Therefore, the outcome is efficient.
So far, I have shown by construction that an outcome under maximin strategies exists
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and that this outcome is efficient. More precisely, I have shown that any combination of
best replies to the adverse nature’s strategy βn as defined in (82) is efficient. Formally, let
Bθ
j be the set of best replies for a bidder with valuation θj given the adverse nature’s
strategy βn, i.e. Bθ






θj , b′, βn, F
)
.
Let (b1, . . . , bm) be a vector of bids such that bj ∈ Bθj for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then for
every i, j with j > i, it holds that bj ≥ bi.
It remains to show that every outcome is efficient. In order to show that every outcome
is efficient, I will show that if
(
βˆ1, . . . βˆI , βˆn
)
is an outcome under maximin strategies, then
it holds for every bidder j and every valuation θj that
Bˆθj ⊆ Bθj






θj , b′, βˆn, F
)
.
Assume there exists an outcome under maximin strategies, denoted by
(
βˆ1, . . . βˆI , βˆn
)
,




and b /∈ Bθi . This implies that there exists a bidder j 6= i and a valuation θl such that













(depending on whether θi > θl or θi ≤ θl). In other words, since the outcome is not efficient,
there exists a bidder i who bids differently than in the efficient outcome by bidding b. This
in turn implies that there exists another bidder j such that in the subjective maximin
belief of bidder i with valuation θi bidder j’s strategy differs from the strategy prescribed
by βn in a way which makes the bid b a best reply for bidder i.
Since in the subjective maximin belief of bidder i bidder j with valuation θl deviates from
bidding her highest rationalizable bid and cannot bid higher than the highest rationalizable
bid of type θl, it holds that b < bθ
l
. Therefore, the adverse nature could strictly decrease
the winning probability of bidder i with valuation θi by deviating to the strategy which
prescribes to bid bθl for bidder j with valuation θl. Thus,
(
βˆ1, . . . βˆI , βˆn
)
cannot constitute
an outcome under maximin strategies. Conclusively, every outcome under maximin
strategies has to be efficient.
Proof of Proposition 17
Proof. With the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 15, one can show that for
every outcome
(
βˆ1, . . . βˆI , βˆn
)
under maximin strategies it holds for every bidder i and
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every valuation θi that
Bθi ⊆ Bˆθi













θj , b′, βˆn, F
)
and βn is defined as in (82). This is the strategy of the adverse nature which chooses as
the subjective maximin belief for every bidder and every valuation that every other bidder
places the highest rationalizable bid given her valuation. It follows that
Bˆθi = Bθi
That is, in every outcome under maximin strategies, bidders play best replies to the adverse
nature’s strategy βn. Therefore, in every outcome the bidders’ strategies are as specified in
Proposition 17.
4.7.5 Proof of Proposition 18





induction starts with θ2. The highest rationalizable bid for type θ2 is obtained by the
equation
θ2 − bθ2 = F I−1 (0) θ2
⇔ bθ2 = θ2
(
1− F I−1 (0)
)
.
The highest bid which is placed by a bidder with valuation θ2 in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium














)− F I−1 (0))
F I−1 (θ2) .


















− F I−1 (0)
⇔ 1− F I−1 (0) > F
I−1 (θ2)− F I−1 (0)
F I−1 (θ2)
⇔ bθ2 > bθ2∗ .
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∗ for all j ≤ k.






As stated in Proposition 16, it holds that



























∗ is a best reply, it must induce an expected utility which is greater or equal
than the expected utility induced by any other bid, given that every other bidder plays














Due to the induction assumption, it holds that bθ
l
∗ < b
θl from which follows that


















and therefore it holds that















F I−1 (θk+1) . (86)
It holds that


































F I−1 (θk+1) ≤ b
θk+1
.







This completes the induction step and the proof.
4.7.6 Proof of Propositions 22, 23 and 24
First, I prove Proposition 23 which formalizes the recursive calculation of the highest
rationalizable bids for every type. This calculation is crucial for the proofs of Propositions
22 and 24. In order to prove Proposition 23, I state the following three lemmas which
formalize steps (I)-(III) in section 4.5. The proofs work analogously as for Lemmas 29, 30
and 31 in section 4.4 and are therefore omitted.
Lemma 32. For every bidder i and every valuation θk ∈ Θ there exists a unique highest
rationalizable bid bθii .
Lemma 33. For every type zero is a rationalizable bid.
Lemma 34. For every type θk ∈ Θ it holds that every bid in [0, bθk ] is rationalizable.
Proof of Proposition 23
Proof. First, I examine the highest rationalizable bids of a bidder with valuation θk such
that θk is lower or equal than µ. Consider a subjective belief equilibrium where every
bidder has the subjective belief that the other bidders’ valuation distribution distributes the
probability weight between types θk and θµ where θµ = min{θk ∈ Θ | θk > µ}. Formally,








where for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} it holds that fθkθj denotes the probability with which type θj









θµ − θk and f
θk
θj = 0 for θ
j 6= θk, θµ.
Given this subjective belief, in every subjective-belief equilibrium every bidder with
valuation θk bids θk. It follows from Proposition 20 that bidding θk is a rationalizable
action for a bidder with valuation θk. Since it is not rationalizable to bid above valuation,
θk is the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk.
Now I examine the highest rationalizable bids of a bidder with valuation θk such that
θk is strictly greater than µ. Analogously as in the proof Proposition 16, the highest
rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk is induced by the strategy of the other
bidders’ such that
(i) All bidders with a lower type bid their highest rationalizable bid.







The strategies in (i) are rationalizable by definition and the strategies in (ii) are rationalizable
due to Lemma 34. It follows from Corollary 7 that a best reply to these strategies is
rationalizable. The highest rationalizable bid of a bidder with valuation θk is a best reply
to the strategies in (i) and (ii) and to a distribution of the other bidders’ valuations. Let








































I−1 (θk − bθj) for 1 < j < k.











s.t. fθj ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
fθ1 + · · ·+ fθm = 1
fθ1θ
1 + · · ·+ fθmθm = µ.








denote the solution vector of this

















Since f˜θk 6= fθk , it holds that at least one δθj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m is unequal to zero. Therefore,
as in the proof of Lemma 26 in section 3.8.7, one can decompose the vector (δθ1 , . . . , δθm)
into δ-sequences and if there does not exist a 1 ≤ t ≤ m with ∑tj=1 δθj > 0, the process





with δfinal1 < 0 and δ
final
2 > 0.
Assume there exists a 1 ≤ t ≤ m with ∑tj=1 δθj > 0. Since a bidder with valuation θk
never expects to win against an equal type and the mean µ has to be preserved, it is not
optimal for the adverse nature to put positive probability weight on types above θk. If
there would be positive probability weight on types above θk, one could shift probability
weight from types above θk and types below θk to type θk in a way which preserves the
mean. Since this reduces the winning probability of a bidder with valuation θk, it cannot
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be optimal for the adverse nature to put positive probability weight on types above θk.
Therefore, it holds that δθj > 0 for j > k. Since it must hold that
∑m
j=1 δθj = 0, it holds







I−1 (θk − bθl)
 .
This implies that  h∑
j=1
f˜θj
I−1 (θk − bθh)
is the minimum value of the objective function of minimization problem M θk . Since fθk is
an element of the feasible set of minimization problem M θk , the vector fθk cannot induce

















 I−1√(θk − bθh)
h∑
j=1
δθj ≤ 0. (87)








I−1 (θk − bθt) .








I−1 (θk − bθt)
from which follows that h∑
j=1
δθj




 I−1√θk − bθt .
Since∑tj=1 δθj > 0, it follows that∑hj=1 δθj > 0 which is a contradiction to (87). Therefore,








δfinal1 < 0 and δ
final
















one can conclude that the assumption that the solution of minimization problem M θk does
not coincide with the unique solution of the system of k linear equations as specified in
Proposition 22, leads to a contradiction. Therefore, the solution of this system of linear
equations is the unique distribution inducing the highest rationalizable bid of a bidder
with valuation θk.
Proof of Proposition 22 and Proposition 24
Proof. Given the distribution of the other bidders’ valuations, the adverse nature chooses
for a bidder with valuation θk ≤ µ, the bidder expects the lowest possible utility of zero.
Thus, the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate from this strategy. In order
to choose for a bidder with valuation θk > µ a distribution of the other bidders’ valuations,













s.t. fθj ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
fθ
k






1 + · · ·+ fθkθmθm = µ.
Since this minimization coincides with the minimization problem in the proof of Proposition
23 and the minimization problem has a unique solution, the distribution of the other bidders’









as specified in Proposition 23. A bidder with valuation θk best
replies to the adverse nature’s strategy. If θk ≤ µ, the bidder expects a utility of zero and
is indifferent between any bid between zero and her valuation. If θk > µ, the bidder is
indifferent between any highest rationalizable bid of a lower type. Thus, mixing among all
highest rationalizable bids of lower types is a best reply to the adverse nature’s strategy.
In a maximin equilibrium every player with valuation θ > µ will mix in a way such that
the adverse nature does not have an incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium.
Thus, the strategies proposed in Propositions 22 and 24 indeed constitute a maximin
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equilibrium in the game with I players and an adverse nature. Analogously as in the proof
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